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Introduction Ge´ne´rale
Cette the`se traite de l’impact des risques de liquidite´ et de production sur le
lien entre flux de capitaux et croissance d’une part, et entre politique de change et
croissance d’autre part. Ainsi, nous proposons des explications a` certains paradoxes
de finance internationale : le paradoxe de l’allocation et le paradoxe du re´gime de
change.
Le paradoxe de l’allocation fait re´fe´rence a` la relation ”perverse” entre flux
de capitaux et croissance. En effet, l’inte´gration financie`re est traditionnellement
conside´re´e comme une opportunite´ pour les pays en de´veloppement de croˆıtre plus
vite en attirant les flux de capitaux du monde de´veloppe´. Lorsque le rendement
marginal du capital est plus e´leve´ que le taux d’inte´reˆt mondial, que ce soit a`
cause d’une faible dotation en capital ou de la croissance de la productivite´ globale
des facteurs (PGF), les agents domestiques devraient emprunter aupre`s du reste
du monde afin d’investir dans leur propre production. Cependant, cette vision des
choses a e´te´ remise en cause par le fait que les flux de capitaux qui devraient e´galiser
les rendements marginaux n’ont pas lieu (Lucas, 1990). Les re´cents ”de´se´quilibres
mondiaux” ne font que renforcer ce paradoxe : au lieu de recevoir des flux de
capitaux, les pays e´mergents investissent dans les pays industriels, en particulier
aux Etats-Unis. Pour une partie de la litte´rature, ces de´se´quilibres sont dus a`
l’inefficacite´ des marche´s financiers e´mergents, qui pousse les agents domestiques
a` se tourner vers les marche´s financiers e´trangers. Cette interpre´tation a contribue´ a`
renouveler la fac¸on de conside´rer la relation des pays en de´veloppement aux marche´s
financiers mondiaux. Ces derniers ne sont pas seulement une source de financement
xi
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externe, mais aussi des fournisseurs de services financiers. En particulier, lorsque
le risque de production ou de liquidite´ ne peut eˆtre assure´ au niveau local, les
marche´s financiers e´trangers peuvent fournir des actifs liquides et sans risque qui
servent a` l’auto-assurance des investisseurs des pays en de´veloppement contre leur
risque spe´cifique. Cette approche permet d’expliquer les de´se´quilibres mondiaux par
l’e´pargne de pre´caution des pays e´mergents. Cependant, les implications de l’e´pargne
de pre´caution sur les liens entre croissance et flux de capitaux sont encore peu
e´tudie´es. L’objectif principal de cette the`se est donc de re´-examiner la
relation entre flux de capitaux et croissance a` travers la prise en compte
de l’e´pargne de pre´caution. Cette de´marche implique de tenir compte du risque
individuel des investisseurs et de l’incomple´tude des marche´s financiers domestiques.
Conside´rer que les pays e´mergents sont a` la recherche non seulement de financement
externe, mais aussi d’actifs liquides et sans risque permet de mieux comprendre
cette relation dans les faits. En particulier, dans les donne´es, la croissance n’est pas
associe´e a` davantage d’entre´e de capitaux, comme le pre´dirait la the´orie standard,
mais a` davantage de sorties (Aizenman and Pinto, 2007; Prasad et al., 2007;
Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2007). Ces faits constituent le ”paradoxe de l’allocation”
et font l’objet d’une tentative d’explication dans les deux premiers chapitres de
cette the`se.
Par ailleurs, les de´faillances des syste`mes financiers domestiques des pays
e´mergents, notamment leur inefficacite´ dans l’assurance du risque de liquidite´ des
entreprises, affecte la relation entre croissance et politique macroe´conomique. Ces
de´faillances permettent d’expliquer en particulier le deuxie`me paradoxe, le paradoxe
du re´gime de change. Ce paradoxe renvoie a` l’absence de relation robuste dans la
litte´rature empirique entre politique de change et croissance (Baxter and Stockman,
1989; Husain et al., 2005; Dubas et al., 2005; De Grauwe and Schnabl, 2005). Aghion
et al. (2006a) proposent une explication de ce paradoxe. Ils montrent empiriquement
que la stabilite´ du taux de change a un effet d’autant plus be´ne´fique sur la croissance
que le de´veloppement financier est faible. L’argument the´orique repose sur l’ide´e
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qu’en pre´sence de contraintes de cre´dit, les fluctuations ont des effets asyme´triques
sur la capacite´ d’innovation des entreprises. Par conse´quent, la volatilite´ a un impact
ne´gatif sur la capacite´ moyenne des firmes a` innover. Or, la flexibilite´ du taux de
change est une source de volatilite´ macroe´conomique, comme le montrent Aghion
et al. (2006a). Si ce re´sultat permet d’expliquer la ”peur du change flottant” dans
les pays e´mergents, il est incomplet. Notamment, il est ne´cessaire de prendre en
compte la dollarisation de la dette pour expliquer cette peur. En effet, la dollarisation
rend plus vulne´rables les revenus des firmes aux fluctuations du taux de change. Le
second objectif de cette the`se est donc d’examiner l’impact de la flexibilite´
du taux de change sur la croissance, mais en se concentrant sur le roˆle de
la dollarisation de la dette. Cette question est aborde´e dans le troisie`me chapitre.
Les deux premiers chapitres s’inscrivent dans la litte´rature e´tudiant l’impact
de l’inte´gration financie`re sur la croissance. En particulier, ils abordent les liens
entre croissance et flux de capitaux. Or, les flux de capitaux peuvent d’autant
plus jouer un roˆle dans le de´veloppement qu’ils comple`tent le syste`me financier
domestique, en particulier (i) en termes d’acce`s a` l’e´pargne e´trange`re d’une part, (ii)
de diversification des risques d’autre part. Nous faisons dans ce qui suit le bilan de
la litte´rature sur ces deux canaux majeurs de l’impact de la libe´ralisation financie`re.
Nous constaterons que, d’une part, (i) il n’existe pas encore de the´orie expliquant les
flux d’e´pargne Nord-Sud observe´s. Ces derniers constituent l’objet de notre e´tude.
D’autre part, (ii) dans les faits, la diversification des risques est loin d’eˆtre effective,
que ce soit au niveau domestique ou international. Cette constatation appuie
la de´marche adopte´e dans cette the`se, qui consiste a` conside´rer la libe´ralisation
financie`re non comme une source supple´mentaire de diversification, mais comme
une source de titres liquides et sans risques. Dans ce cas, l’auto-assurance des agents
domestiques passe non par le partage des risques, mais par l’e´pargne de pre´caution.
C’est cette e´pargne qui permet alors d’expliquer les paradoxes des flux Nord-Sud.
Le troisie`me chapitre, quant a` lui, se rattache a` la litte´rature sur les effets de la
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volatilite´ sur la croissance et sur la ”peur du change flottant”. Nous montrons qu’il
existe un seuil de dollarisation au-dela` duquel une e´conomie ouverte ne peut profiter
des vertus des re´gimes de change flexible, au risque de nuire a` la croissance.
Dans ce qui suit, nous analysons la litte´rature sur les liens entre inte´gration
financie`re et croissance en la rattachant a` nos travaux. Cet expose´ est suivi d’un
re´sume´ des deux premiers chapitres de la the`se. Ensuite, nous abordons plus en
de´tail la litte´rature sur le lien entre re´gime de change et croissance afin d’introduire
le troisie`me chapitre, qui est alors re´sume´.
Le roˆle du secteur financier dans le de´veloppement e´conomique a fait l’objet d’un
de´bat presque centenaire. Depuis que Schumpeter (1911) a mis en avant les effets
be´ne´fiques des services financiers sur la croissance, deux courants ont e´merge´. Pour
le premier (Robinson, 1952; Lucas, 1988), les marche´s financiers sont un simple reflet
de l’activite´ e´conomique. Pour le second, meˆme si la causalite´ n’est pas unilate´rale,
il est important d’e´tudier comment le de´veloppement financier affecte la croissance
e´conomique (Patrick, 1966; Goldsmith, 1969; McKinnon, 1973). Au regard des e´tudes
empiriques, il est a` pre´sent clair que, meˆme si le de´veloppement e´conomique ge´ne`re de
lui-meˆme les incitations a` l’e´mergence d’un secteur financier, de bonnes institutions
financie`res font partie des pre´-requis a` la croissance.1 En offrant les services des
marche´s exte´rieurs la` ou` pe´chent les marche´s domestiques, la libe´ralisation permet-
elle d’ame´liorer les performances e´conomiques ? Afin de re´pondre, il est important
de distinguer d’abord quelles sont les diffe´rentes fonctions des marche´s financiers.
Levine (2005) en de´finit cinq : 1) la production d’information sur les projets avant
1 Dans les e´tudes e´conome´triques, l’endoge´ne´ite´ du syste`me financier a e´te´ traite´e en utilisant des
instruments, soit le niveau de de´veloppement des marche´s financiers en de´but de pe´riode (King
and Levine, 1993a; Levine and Zervos, 1998), soit par l’origine le´gale de La Porta et al. (1998)
(Levine, 1998, 1999; Levine et al., 2000; Beck et al., 2000). Ces e´tudes e´tablissent ainsi que
la composante exoge`ne du de´veloppement financier a bien un impact positif sur la croissance.
D’autres e´tudes arrivent aux meˆmes conclusions en utilisant la dimension temporelle, notamment
par le test de causalite´ a` la Granger (Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; Xu, 2000; Christopoulos
and Tsionas, 2004) ou en utilisant des donne´es de´sagre´ge´es (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Jayaratne
and Strahan, 1996; Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998).
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investissement ; 2) la supervision de l’investissement ; 3) l’e´change, la diversification
et la gestion du risque ; 4) La mobilisation et la centralisation de l’e´pargne ; 5) La
facilitation des e´changes de biens et services. Ces cinq fonctions ont toutes fait l’objet
d’une recherche abondante. Cependant, du point de vue de l’ouverture financie`re,
elles n’ont pas toutes les meˆmes implications.
En effet, l’ouverture financie`re ne permet pas toujours de combler certaines
lacunes des syste`mes financiers domestiques. En ce qui concerne les deux premie`res
fonctions, a` savoir la production d’information et la supervision des investissements,
elles sont plus a` meˆme d’eˆtre remplies par le syste`me financier local. En effet, ce
dernier posse`de l’avantage de la proximite´ et de la familiarite´ avec les projets e´tudie´s
ou supervise´s, de meˆme qu’une connaissance plus approfondie de l’environnement ou`
les projets sont mene´s et du syste`me le´gal encadrant les modalite´s de supervision.
Quant a` la cinquie`me fonction, a` savoir la facilitation des e´changes de biens et
services, elle de´signe le roˆle que joue la monnaie dans la fluidification des e´changes.
Hormis dans les cas de dollarisation mone´taire, ou` l’adoption d’une monnaie
e´trange`re permet de surmonter les proble`mes de cre´dibilite´ du gouvernement et
d’hyperinflation, la monnaie est en ge´ne´ral e´mise par une institution centrale et
spe´cifique au pays. L’ouverture financie`re, sauf dans les cas de crise, ne remet pas
en cause le roˆle de facilitation des e´changes des institutions financie`res.
Au contraire, la troisie`me fonction, la diversification du risque, joue un roˆle
fondamental lors de la libe´ralisation financie`re. En effet, cette dernie`re offre des
possibilite´s supple´mentaires de diversification des risques et permet donc aux
agents de s’engager dans des projets plus risque´s et plus rentables. De meˆme,
l’inte´gration financie`re offre des perspectives de financement nouvelles pour les
pays en de´veloppement en leur donnant la possibilite´ d’utiliser l’e´pargne des pays
de´veloppe´s pour investir. Elle permet donc de pallier la difficulte´ des marche´s
financiers domestiques a` remplir la quatrie`me fonction, a` savoir mobiliser des
capitaux.
Ainsi, c’est en permettant la mobilisation de l’e´pargne e´trange`re d’une part, et
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par une meilleure diversification du risque d’autre part que les flux de capitaux sont
cense´s influencer la croissance. Quels en sont les me´canismes et qu’en est-il dans les
faits ?
La mondialisation financie`re est a priori cense´e apporter aux pays en de´veloppe-
ment des flux de capitaux lui permettant de croˆıtre plus vite. En effet, les capitaux
devraient aﬄuer des pays riches vers les pays pauvres car ces derniers ont un niveau
de capital par teˆte plus faible. Dans le cas d’une fonction de production ne´oclassique
ayant pour seuls argument le capital et le travail, cela implique que le rendement
marginal du capital est plus e´leve´ dans les pays pauvres, et que ces derniers devraient
donc attirer les capitaux des pays riches jusqu’a` que les rendements s’e´galisent.
La mondialisation des flux de capitaux permettraient donc des gains a` l’e´change
significatifs. Ainsi, d’apre`s Eichengreen and Mussa (1998), ”la libre circulation des
capitaux permet une meilleure allocation globale de l’e´pargne et des ressources vers
leurs usages les plus productifs”. De meˆme, Fischer (1998) affirme que ”de manie`re
abstraite, la libre circulation du capital facilite l’allocation efficiente de l’e´pargne et
aide a` acheminer les ressources vers leur usage le plus productif, et donc augmente
la croissance e´conomique et le bien-eˆtre”. Or, ces rendements marginaux, tels qu’ils
sont calcule´s du moins, ne s’e´galisent pas (Lucas, 1990)2.
Le paradoxe de Lucas peut s’expliquer notamment par la mauvaise spe´cification
de la fonction de production : celle-ci aurait d’autres arguments, comme le capital
humain, ou plus ge´ne´ralement la productivite´ globale des facteurs (PGF). Ainsi,
les rendements marginaux du capital s’e´galisent entre pays, sans que les niveaux
de capital par teˆte ne convergent. Cette diffe´rence est explique´e par le fait que la
production est plus efficace dans les pays riches que dans les pays pauvres.3 Des
2 Voir aussi Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995) et Manzocchi and Martin (1997)
3 Hall and Jones (1999) montrent en effet que les e´carts de production par teˆte entre pays sont
surtout dus aux e´carts de PGF, et non aux diffe´rences en termes de dotations de facteurs. Caselli
(2004) re´sume les sources potentielles de ces e´carts de PGF en niveau dans la litte´rature. Voir
aussi Mankiw (1995), Jorgenson (1995) et Easterly and Levine (2001).
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frictions peuvent e´galement cre´er des rentes4 qui affectent le rendement prive´ du
capital domestique, l’empeˆchant ainsi d’e´galer celui des pays industriels, ou alors
imposent des contraintes de cre´dit 5. Pour Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006), les gains
a` la libe´ralisation sont plus faibles que les gains potentiels d’une ame´lioration de la
productivite´ domestique, ou encore de la diminution des distorsions sur le rendement
du capital. En effet, si le niveau de capital par teˆte est faible dans les pays en
de´veloppement, ce n’est pas parce qu’il est loin de son niveau de convergence,
mais parce que le niveau de long-terme est lui-meˆme faible. Le paradoxe de Lucas
est en fait le paradoxe du faible investissement dans les pays en de´veloppement.
Comprendre pourquoi cet investissement est faible (i.e. pourquoi le niveau de capital
est faible) revient a` comprendre pourquoi il n’y a pas de flux de capitaux. Les flux de
capitaux n’ont pas lieu parce qu’ils n’ont justement pas lieu d’eˆtre, ce qui explique
le paradoxe de Lucas.
Les re´cents phe´nome`nes appele´s ”de´se´quilibres mondiaux” et caracte´rise´s par le
creusement du de´ficit de la balance des paiements des Etats-Unis, ont renforce´ le
paradoxe des flux Nord-Sud. En effet, il s’agit d’une illustration du paradoxe de
Lucas, puisque le de´ficit ame´ricain est finance´ en grande partie par des capitaux
originaires des pays e´mergents, notamment de l’Asie. Ainsi, ces phe´nome`nes ont
pu eˆtre rapproche´s de la “surabondance d’e´pargne” (saving glut) dans les pays
asiatiques.6 Les auteurs qui ont e´tudie´ les de´se´quilibres mondiaux de ce point de vue
de´signent en ge´ne´ral comme responsable le faible de´veloppement financier des pays
e´mergents mais lui donnent des interpre´tations diffe´rentes. Certaines sont similaires
a` celles qui ont e´te´ apporte´es pre´ce´demment dans la litte´rature, notamment les
asyme´tries d’information et les ale´as moraux (Ju and Wei, 2006, 2007), et les
contraintes de cre´dit (Aoki et al., 2006; Matsuyama, 2004, 2005; Caballero et al.,
2008). D’autres, notamment Mendoza et al. (2007a) et Mendoza et al. (2007b), en
4 Ces rentes peuvent eˆtre dues au risque moral (Gertler and Rogoff, 1990; Schleifer and Wolfenzon,
2002), ou a` l’asyme´trie d’information (Gordon and Bovenberg, 1996; Boyd and Smith, 1997).
5 Voir par exemple (Barro et al., 1995; Verdier, 2008).
6 Il ne s’agit pas de la seule explication. Chinn and Ito (2005), par exemple, soutiennent que la
raison principale est interne aux Etats-Unis et se situe dans leur de´ficit public excessif (”de´ficits
jumeaux”).
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conside´rant la capacite´ qu’ont les marche´s financiers domestiques a` mutualiser le
risque entre les agents, mettent l’accent sur l’e´pargne de pre´caution.
Paralle`lement a` ces de´veloppements, des travaux empiriques re´cents montrent
que les flux de capitaux sont plus pervers encore que ne le sugge`re le paradoxe de
Lucas. Prasad et al. (2007) montrent que, pendant les anne´es 2000, non seulement
les capitaux ont aﬄue´ des pays pauvres vers les pays riches, mais la croissance
est corre´le´e positivement avec les flux de capitaux sortants dans les pays en
de´veloppement, alors que la corre´lation est inverse´e pour les pays industriels. Ainsi,
“au premier abord, il y aurait une prime de croissance pour les pays [e´mergents]
ne recourant pas au financement e´tranger” (Prasad et al. (2007), p.205). Aizenman
and Pinto (2007) e´tablissent les meˆmes conclusions. Ces faits peuvent aussi eˆtre
rapproche´s des de´se´quilibres mondiaux. En effet, les pays e´mergents exportent leurs
capitaux vers les Etats-Unis, et ceci malgre´ le fait qu’ils aient cruˆ plus vite que ces
derniers. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) confirment ces re´sultats. Ils montrent ainsi
que le capital a aﬄue´ vers les pays ou` la croissance de la PGF a e´te´ relativement
plus faible, ce qui est a` contre-courant de la the´orie ne´oclassique. Pour le distinguer
du Paradoxe de Lucas, ils nomment ce phe´nome`ne le “paradoxe de l’allocation”, car
il concerne non le niveau des flux de capitaux Nord-Sud, mais leur allocation entre
pays du Sud. De plus, ils montrent que, contrairement au paradoxe de Lucas, ce
phe´nome`ne ne peut pas s’expliquer par des facteurs qui font baisser le rendement
prive´ du capital. En effet, meˆme en tenant compte de ces facteurs, les flux se
comportent a` l’oppose´ de ce qu’ont attendrait. C’est la` ou` l’investissement est le plus
faible que le capital a le plus aﬄue´. Ainsi, si le paradoxe de Lucas, qui peut se ramener
au paradoxe du faible investissement dans les pays e´mergents, peut s’expliquer par
des facteurs qui abaissent le niveau du capital de long terme, ce n’est pas le cas du
paradoxe de l’allocation, qui est un paradoxe de la de´connection de l’investissement
et des flux de capitaux.
Comme le soulignent Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007), des explications possibles du
paradoxe de l’allocation existent dans la litte´rature. Tout d’abord, la relation positive
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entre la croissance et le compte courant (i.e. les flux sortants) peut eˆtre relie´e a` la
litte´rature sur la relation positive entre e´pargne et croissance. Ce lien a e´te´ e´tabli au
niveau des pays par Carroll and Weil (1994) et plus re´cemment par Attanasio et al.
(2000). Deux grandes familles de mode`les peuvent expliquer ce lien : les mode`les a`
ge´ne´rations imbrique´es et les mode`les avec habitudes de consommation. Il convient
d’examiner chacune d’elles afin de de´terminer si elles peuvent eˆtre enrichies pour
tenir compte de la relation entre croissance et compte courant, qui est e´gal a` l’e´pargne
moins l’investissement. Premie`rement, l’hypothe`se du cycle de vie de Modigliani
(1986) a pour conse´quence que les pays a` forte croissance ont un taux d’e´pargne
plus e´leve´ car les me´nages jeunes, qui sont dans la phase d’e´pargne de leur cycle de
vie, sont plus riches que les me´nages aˆge´s, qui sont dans leur phase de de´se´pargne.
Cependant, dans l’approche de Modigliani, une croissance plus e´leve´e n’implique que
de plus grandes diffe´rences de revenus entre jeunes et vieux (effet de composition).
Or, au niveau individuel, la croissance augmente la richesse intertemporelle des
agents. Ceux-ci, afin de lisser leur consommation, doivent emprunter plus (effet
richesse). Carroll and Summers (1991) montrent que l’effet richesse domine l’effet
de composition. Ainsi, meˆme dans le cadre du cycle de vie, la croissance devrait
eˆtre corre´le´e ne´gativement avec l’e´pargne, et a` plus forte raison avec le compte
courant. Deuxie`mement, Carroll et al. (2000) mettent en valeur le roˆle de l’habitude
pour expliquer le lien positif entre croissance et e´pargne. Dans ce type de mode`le,
l’e´lasticite´ de substitution intertemporelle est plus e´leve´e, donc l’e´pargne est plus
sensible a` un changement de taux d’inte´reˆt. Cependant, cette proprie´te´ ne peut
aboutir a` une relation positive entre e´pargne et croissance qu’en e´conomie ferme´e,
ou` le taux d’inte´reˆt de´pend du rendement marginal du capital. Dans une e´conomie
ouverte, le canal du taux d’inte´reˆt est supprime´, puisque ce dernier est de´termine´
au niveau international.
La relation positive entre sorties de capitaux et croissance peut aussi eˆtre
aborde´e du point de vue du commerce. En effet, le compte courant est e´gal aux
exportations moins les importations. Or, des e´tudes relient la croissance de certains
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pays au roˆle be´ne´fique des exportations. Pour Dooley et al. (2004), Dooley et al.
(2005a), Rodrik (2006) et Rodrik (2007), les politiques visant a` promouvoir les
exportations, en particulier en maintenant un taux de change sous-e´value´, sont
favorables au secteur manufacturier. Cependant, ces e´tudes ne disent pas comment
la croissance a` son tour influence la balance commerciale. Cette dernie`re est souvent
conside´re´e comme exoge`ne. En effet, dans cette litte´rature, ce n’est pas tant son
solde que sa composition en termes d’importations et d’exportations qui compte.
La contribution d’Aghion et al. (2006b) peut eˆtre rapproche´e e´galement de cette
branche de la litte´rature, meˆme si, selon eux, ce sont les investissements directs
et non les exportations qui be´ne´ficient a` la croissance. Ces e´tudes ne tiennent pas
compte du comportement intertemporel des agents, autrement dit de la manie`re
dont ils ajustent leur e´pargne en re´ponse a` une croissance plus e´leve´e.
Ainsi, bien que le paradoxe de Lucas ait donne´ lieu a` une litte´rature abondante,
les nouveaux faits stylise´s sur les flux Nord-Sud, notamment le lien positif entre
sorties de capitaux et croissance, ne sont pas encore tre`s e´tudie´s.
Apre`s l’ouverture a` l’e´pargne exte´rieure, la diversification du risque est la
deuxie`me des voies majeures par lesquelles la libe´ralisation financie`re peut influencer
le de´veloppement. Mais, dans la litte´rature, c’est d’abord l’un des biais par lesquels
les syste`mes financiers participent a` la croissance en e´conomie ferme´e. Elle permet
de re´duire deux principaux types de risque : le risque de production et le risque
de liquidite´. Le premier peut eˆtre de´fini comme le risque inhe´rent au processus de
production ; il s’agit de l’ale´a portant sur le re´sultat final de ce processus. Pour King
and Levine (1993b), la diversification du risque de production permet aux agents
de s’engager dans des activite´s innovatrices mais risque´es, ce qui augmente le taux
d’innovation de l’e´conomie.7 Mais la croissance de l’e´conomie a aussi un effet sur le
7 Levine (1991) et Atje and Jovanovic (1993) conside`rent plus particulie`rement le roˆle des marche´s
d’actions dans la diversification des risques et la croissance. Lorsque la diversification affecte la
nature des projets mene´s par les entrepreneurs, celle-ci a un effet positif sur l’e´conomie.
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de´veloppement des marche´s financiers.8 Du fait de ces me´canismes de re´ciprocite´,
des e´quilibres multiples peuvent surgir et l’e´conomie peut eˆtre emprisonne´e dans
une trappe a` pauvrete´ ou au contraire s’engager dans un processus vertueux de
de´veloppement. Les gains potentiels au partage du risque sont d’autant plus e´leve´s
que le risque de production individuel est e´leve´ et que la diversification de ce risque
est a` l’origine faible. Or, meˆme dans les pays industriels, la diversification des risques
domestiques est faible. Par exemple, le taux de survie d’une firme prive´e ame´ricaine
apre`s 5 ans est infe´rieur a` 40% (Angeletos and Calvet, 2006). De meˆme, aux E´tats-
Unis, 75% des actions sont de´tenues par des me´nages dont elles constituent plus de
la moitie´ de la richesse (Vissin-Jørgensen, 2002).9
Le risque de liquidite´, quant a` lui, peut eˆtre de´fini comme ”l’incertitude associe´e a`
la conversion d’actifs en moyens d’e´change”(Levine, 2005). L’illiquidite´ est en ge´ne´ral
due a` des asyme´tries d’information ou a` des couˆts de transactions. Ainsi, des projets
rentables mais reque´rant un engagement financier de long terme, peuvent subir des
contretemps -des couˆts ale´atoires- au cours de leur mise en oeuvre. Ces projets
peuvent eˆtre abandonne´s en cours de route, meˆme si la valeur actualise´e du projet
est supe´rieur au couˆt, faute des fonds disponibles. Graˆce aux marche´s financiers, la
centralisation de nombreux actifs illiquides permet de ge´ne´rer des actifs liquides, en
particulier les actions, qui peuvent eˆtre de´tenus par les entreprises pour faire face
aux contretemps survenant pendant le processus de production. L’article fondateur
de Diamond and Dybvig (1983) montre qu’en pre´sence de couˆts de ve´rification, une
assurance contre le risque de liquidite´ ne peut pas se mettre en place. Un marche´
des titres peut alors remplacer le marche´ de l’assurance de´faillant afin de permettre
8 Dans l’article d’Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), plus le nombre de projets est e´leve´, plus les
possibilite´ de diversification sont importantes, plus le marche´ financier est efficace dans sa fonction
d’assurance, et plus les agents sont aptes a` s’engager a` leur tour dans de nouveaux projets risque´s.
Pour Saint-Paul (1992), la diversification du risque n’affecte pas le nombre des projets, mais les
choix technologiques des agents : elle encourage la division du travail qui suppose des projets
plus risque´s mais plus rentables. Comme dans la contribution d’Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997),
une spe´cialisation plus pousse´e permet en elle-meˆme des possibilite´s d’assurance accrues. Pour
Grenwood and Jovanovic (1990), le me´canisme par lequel la croissance influence le de´veloppement
financier tient dans les ressources supple´mentaires qui permettent de financer un syste`me financier
couˆteux.
9 Voir aussi a` ce sujet Hayashi et al. (1996) et Attanasio and Davis (1996).
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aux entrepreneurs de diversifier leur risque de liquidite´. Ces derniers peuvent alors
investir dans des projets moins liquides mais plus rentables.10 L’acce`s au cre´dit
durant le processus de production est e´galement un moyen d’ame´liorer la liquidite´ des
entreprises.11 Les contraintes de cre´dit, dans l’e´tude d’Aghion et al. (2005), jouent
ainsi un roˆle important dans l’allocation des investissements entre investissements de
court terme et de long terme, en particulier la recherche et de´veloppement (R&D),
au cours du cycle e´conomique. En effet, c’est au cours des re´cessions que les firmes
sont le plus incite´es a` investir dans la R&D, mais c’est aussi au cours de ces pe´riodes
qu’elles ont le moins acce`s au cre´dit, en particulier lorsque les marche´s financiers sont
peu de´veloppe´s. La volatilite´ e´conomique a ainsi un impact ne´gatif sur la croissance,
et ce d’autant plus que le syste`me financier est de´faillant.
La diversification des risques permet ainsi d’ame´liorer sans ambigu¨ıte´ la structure
de l’e´pargne. Toutefois, lorsque qu’elle affecte le taux d’e´pargne lui-meˆme, son impact
est ambigu. La litte´rature qui traite du risque idiosyncratique dans des mode`les
a` agents he´te´roge`nes et a` horizon infini est instructive a` ce sujet. En particulier,
les mode`les a` la Bewley (Aiyagari, 1994; Huggett, 1997; Krusell and Smith, 1998)
montrent que le risque idiosyncratique a un effet positif sur le niveau de capital
de long terme a` travers l’e´pargne de pre´caution. Ame´liorer la diversification entre
agents a donc un effet ne´gatif sur le de´veloppement. Or, dans ces mode`les, le risque
ne porte que sur les dotations. Lorsque le risque porte aussi sur le rendement du
capital, celui-ci doit satisfaire une prime de risque, ce qui a un effet ne´gatif sur le
stock de capital de long terme (Angeletos and Calvet, 2006). Ainsi, l’effet du risque
sur le niveau de´veloppement est ambigu : il de´pend de la re´sultante de l’effet de
l’e´pargne de pre´caution sur le taux d’inte´reˆt de long terme et de la prime de risque.
Si l’effet sur le taux d’inte´reˆt est infe´rieur a` l’effet sur la prime de risque, alors le
risque a un effet ne´gatif sur le niveau de production. Cependant, dans Angeletos and
Calvet (2006), mais aussi dans Angeletos (2007), le risque a un impact ne´gatif pour
10 C’est aussi l’argument de Bencivenga and Smith (1991) et Bencivenga et al. (1995), ou` un syste`me
financier plus efficace soutient ainsi le de´veloppement e´conomique.
11 Dans l’article de Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), des options permettant d’avoir acce`s a` une ligne
de cre´dit dans certains e´tats de la nature re´duit les proble`mes de liquidite´.
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des valeurs de parame`tres re´alistes, en particulier pour une e´lasticite´ de substitution
intertemporelle e´leve´e par rapport a` la part risque´e de la richesse (Angeletos, 2007).
En effet, dans ce cas, l’impact du risque sur le taux d’inte´reˆt est faible puisqu’il
suffit d’une faible variation pour e´quilibrer le marche´ des titres a` la suite d’une
augmentation de l’e´pargne de pre´caution.12 13
Ainsi, en permettant aux agents de diversifier leur risque de production, la
libe´ralisation financie`re devrait leur permettre de se spe´cialiser et par la` d’eˆtre plus
productifs, et ce d’autant plus qu’il existe des externalite´s sur l’accumulation du
capital. C’est le cas dans Obstfeld (1994). Devereux and Smith (1994) montrent
que l’effet de l’inte´gration sur l’e´pargne mondiale peut eˆtre ne´gatif et donc qu’elle
peut eˆtre pre´judiciable pour la croissance. Cependant, l’analyse de ces derniers peut
eˆtre soumise a` la critique d’Angeletos (2007). Ainsi, que ce soit en ame´liorant
la structure de l’e´pargne ou en agissant sur le niveau d’e´pargne lui-meˆme, la
diversification domestique et internationale des risques a, en the´orie, un effet positif
sur la croissance.
Toutefois, le partage international du risque reste en pratique limite´. En effet,
que ce soit du point de vue des moyens de la diversification (diversification des
portefeuilles) que de ses effets (corre´lation de la consommation entre pays et
stabilisation de la consommation), les e´tudes empiriques montrent que l’inte´gration
financie`re n’a pas permis de partager les risques de manie`re efficace. Le constat
que la majorite´ des actions de´tenues par les pays de´veloppe´s sont des actions
domestiques est un fait robuste (French and Poterba, 1991; Tesar and Werner,
1995), meˆme si ce ”biais domestique” a de´cru ces dernie`res anne´es (Chan et al.,
2005). Cette constatation a donne´ naissance a` de nombreuses recherches (cf. Lewis
(1999) pour une revue de la litte´rature), qui ont permis de proposer des explications
12 Dans l’article de Covas (2006), la re´duction du risque a un impact global ne´gatif sur l’accumula-
tion de capital, mais Angeletos (2007) montre que cela provient d’une mauvaise spe´cification du
mode`le et donc d’une mauvaise parame´trisation.
13 Le meˆme raisonnement s’applique aux mode`les AK (Krebs, 2003; Jones et al., 2005), a` la
diffe´rence pre`s que dans ce cas le risque affecte la croissance de long terme et non le niveau
de production.
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au biais domestique dans la de´tention d’actions.14 Paralle`lement, on constate que,
dans les faits, la dynamique de la consommation n’est pas conforme a` ce que
pre´dirait le partage international des risques. Notamment, les taux de croissance de
la consommation devraient eˆtre plus corre´le´s entre pays que les taux de croissance
de la production, or c’est l’inverse qui est observe´ (Backus et al., 1992; Devereux
et al., 1992). Dans l’absolu, les marche´s financiers sont donc peu efficaces en ce
qui concerne le partage des risques. Cependant, on peut encore se demander si
l’ouverture financie`re au cours du temps ne permet pas de relativement mieux assurer
la consommation. Les re´sultats des e´tudes sur la question sont mitige´s. Les e´tudes
montrent que la coordination des cycles nationaux a augmente´ pendant la pe´riode
de mondialisation (Stock and Watson, 2003; Bordo and Helbling, 2003; Imbs, 2006).
Cependant, en ce qui concerne la corre´lation de la consommation, les re´sultats sont
plus contraste´s. Imbs (2006) e´tablit que l’inte´gration financie`re est associe´e a` une
plus grande synchronisation de la consommation. Cependant, Kose et al. (2003)
montrent que, contrairement aux pre´dictions de la the´orie, la corre´lation inter-
pays de la croissance de la consommation n’a pas augmente´ pendant les anne´es
1990, pre´cise´ment au moment ou` la libe´ralisation financie`re aurait duˆ permettre
un meilleur partage des risques. D’autres e´tudes e´tablissent que la mondialisation
n’a pas permis non plus de stabiliser la consommation, notamment celle des pays
e´mergents (Prasad et al., 2003; Bekaert et al., 2006).
Jusqu’a` re´cemment, ces deux branches de la litte´rature, celle qui e´tudie les flux
Nord-Sud et celle qui e´tudie le partage du risque, ont e´volue´ de manie`re relativement
autonome, bien qu’elles aient toutes deux des implications en termes de flux de
capitaux. La premie`re met l’accent sur la dette et les flux nets, sans parvenir
a` reproduire les faits stylise´s. La deuxie`me s’est penche´e surtout sur le roˆle de
diversification du risque par les marche´s domestiques et internationaux. En ge´ne´ral,
14 Parmi ces explications, on peut citer la pre´sence d’un biais domestique dans la consommation
(Obstfeld, 2006; Coeurdacier, 2008), le roˆle d’assurance de la consommation domestique que
jouent les revenus du travail (Bottazi et al., 1996; Engel and Matsumoto, 2006) ou encore les
titres nominaux (Coeurdacier et al., 2007).
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cette dernie`re branche implique des flux de capitaux bilate´raux, en particulier en
termes d’actions, mais pas force´ment de flux nets. Cependant, s’il est vrai que les
marche´s financiers, notamment avec leur fonction de partage des risques, jouent un
roˆle positif dans le niveau de vie et la croissance, ce partage reste incomplet. Comme
il a e´te´ rappele´ plus haut, l’inte´gration internationale ne permet pas de comple´ter
significativement les lacunes des marche´s domestiques en termes de partage des
risques. Or, les freins a` la diversification des risques individuels et internationaux
ont une implication importante en termes de flux nets : comme le montrent Mendoza
et al. (2007a) et Mendoza et al. (2007b), c’est par la de´tention de titres sans risques,
par l’e´pargne de pre´caution, que les agents tentent de limiter leur risque individuel.
Or, cette e´pargne de pre´caution devrait jouer un roˆle tandis que les pays e´mergents
investissent dans leur production risque´e, et donc modifier la relation entre croissance
et flux de capitaux. Les deux premiers chapitres de cette the`se montrent qu’en
ouvrant le mode`le de croissance ne´oclassique aux apports de la litte´rature sur le
risque, les faits stylise´s sur les liens entre croissance et flux de capitaux peuvent eˆtre
mieux compris.
Les deux premiers chapitres de cette the`se traitent de cette relation entre flux de
capitaux et croissance. le premier met en paralle`le les de´se´quilibres mondiaux re´cents
et la croissance des pays e´mergents, en insistant sur le roˆle du risque de liquidite´ et
des choix technologiques. Le deuxie`me tente d’expliquer quant a` lui de la corre´lation
entre flux de capitaux et croissance dans les pays en de´veloppement, en introduisant
un risque de production individuel dans le mode`le de croissance ne´oclassique.
L’apport du premier chapitre re´side dans la mise en relation deux faits
ge´ne´ralement conside´re´s de manie`re inde´pendante : 1) les de´se´quilibres du compte
courant des pays industriels, en particulier des Etats-Unis, et 2) la croissance de
la productivite´ du travail dans les pays e´mergents depuis les anne´es 1990. Ces
deux faits peuvent eˆtre rattache´s chacun a` une litte´rature abondante : celle, sur
xxvi Introduction Ge´ne´rale
les de´se´quilibres mondiaux, de´ja` mentionne´e plus haut, et celle sur le rattrapage des
pays en de´veloppement. En particulier, dans les contributions the´oriques cherchant
a` expliquer les de´se´quilibres mondiaux, la croissance est en ge´ne´ral ignore´e, parfois
meˆme elle contredit les faits. Dans le mode`le de Mendoza et al. (2007a), par exemple,
le stock de capital est fixe et donc l’ouverture financie`re n’a aucun impact sur
la croissance. Dans les contributions de Mendoza et al. (2007b) et Matsuyama
(2005), l’ouverture financie`re fait augmenter la position exte´rieure nette des pays en
de´veloppement mais fait baisser l’investissement domestique. Or, on constate, qu’au
contraire, tandis que les pays e´mergents investissent dans les pays de´veloppe´s, leur
croissance est supe´rieure a` celle de ces derniers. Caballero et al. (2008) sont les seuls
a` expliquer les de´se´quilibres mondiaux tout en tenant compte de la croissance dans
les e´conomies e´mergentes. Dans leur mode`le, si les pays e´mergents exportent leurs
capitaux malgre´ leur croissance soutenue, c’est parce que leurs secteurs financiers ne
sont pas assez de´veloppe´s pour leur permettre de stocker de la valeur.
Ce chapitre tente de combler cette lacune en proposant un mode`le d’e´quilibre
ge´ne´ral ou` ces deux faits re´sultent de l’inte´gration financie`re entre deux pays, un
pays e´mergent et un pays industriel. Le me´chanisme repose sur (i) l’existence de
deux technologies, l’une plus productive mais plus fragile financie`rement ; et sur
(ii) l’he´te´roge´ne´ite´ des marche´s financiers domestiques dans les pays industriels et
e´mergents. Ainsi, l’inte´gration financie`re affecte non seulement la position exte´rieure
nette mais aussi l’allocation du capital domestique entre les deux technologies.
L’introduction de deux types d’investissements se justifie comme suit. Le compte
courant est e´gal a` l’e´pargne moins l’investissement. Du point de vue des pays
e´mergents, on observe dans les donne´es a` la fois une hausse du compte courant et de
la production par teˆte. Si l’on suppose qu’il n’existe qu’une technologie, toutes choses
e´gales par ailleurs, une hausse de la production par teˆte suppose une augmentation
de l’investissement. Ainsi, pour que le compte courant augmente, il faudrait que
l’e´pargne augmente encore plus que l’investissement. Or, si, comme on l’a expose´
plus haut, il existe bien des the´ories ou` l’investissement et l’e´pargne sont corre´le´s
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positivement, il n’est pas suˆr que ces meˆmes the´ories impliquent que l’e´pargne varie
plus que l’investissement. C’est une autre voie qui est explore´e ici : elle consiste a`
conside´rer non pas le niveau l’investissement, mais sa composition. Ainsi, ce n’est pas
la corre´lation entre compte courant et investissement total qui compte pour expliquer
le lien entre compte courant et croissance, mais la corre´lation entre le compte courant
et le ”bon”type d’investissement, c’est-a`-dire l’investissement le plus productif. Ainsi,
meˆme a` e´pargne constante, on pourrait avoir une augmentation du compte courant
et une augmentation de la productivite´ graˆce a` une meilleure allocation du capital.
Cette approche est appuye´e par le fait que la croissance des pays e´mergents n’est
pas due qu’a` l’accumulation du capital mais aussi a` une hausse de la PGF.
Ainsi, le mode`le est d’abord de´veloppe´ avec une e´pargne constante afin de mettre
l’accent sur les conse´quences de l’inte´gration financie`re en termes de flux de capitaux
et de re´allocation du capital dans les pays e´mergents. L’investissement le plus
productif est un investissement de long terme sujet a` des chocs de liquidite´ et a`
des contraintes financie`res. Par contre, l’investissement le moins productif, de meˆme
que le titre liquide, est un investissement de court terme qui peut eˆtre utilise´ comme
collate´ral. Ce mode`le est proche de celui d’Aghion et al. (2005). Il traduit l’ide´e
que les investissements les plus productifs, tels la R&D, ne´cessitent une dure´e plus
longue que les investissements classiques avant d’eˆtre rentables et sont soumis a` plus
de risques durant le processus de mise en oeuvre. Le me´canisme du mode`le est alors
le suivant. En autarcie, le pays e´mergent, ou` le secteur financier est peu de´veloppe´,
sur-investit dans le capital de court terme afin d’utiliser la production obtenue a`
partir de ce dernier pour satisfaire un e´ventuel choc de liquidite´. En conse´quence, il
sous-investit dans le capital de long terme, du fait des ressources excessives utilise´e
pour le capital de court terme. Lorsque les marche´s financiers s’inte`grent, c’est-a`-dire
lorsque les agents ont la possibilite´ d’e´changer des titres de dette liquides entre pays,
le pays industriel peut offrir des titres liquides mieux re´mune´re´s au pays e´mergent.
En effet, le pays industriel a un niveau de de´veloppement financier plus e´leve´. Il
peut donc mieux re´mune´rer les titres car les ressources y sont mieux alloue´es. Ainsi,
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le pays e´mergent substitue du titre au capital de court terme dans le collate´ral,
tandis qu’il peut investir plus dans le capital de long terme graˆce aux ressources
de´gage´es par l’augmentation du rendement des actifs utilise´ dans le collate´ral. Le
pays e´mergent connaˆıt donc a` la fois une augmentation du compte courant et une
re´allocation du capital qui se traduit par une hausse de la PGF.
Ce mode`le est ensuite e´tendu a` un cadre d’horizon infini ou` l’e´pargne s’ajuste.
La convergence vers l’e´tat stationnaire d’un pays e´mergent relativement peu dote´
en capital reproduit non seulement les flux de capitaux entre pays e´mergents et
industriels, mais implique aussi, comme dans les donne´es, des gains endoge`nes de
PGF et une augmentation de l’investissement agre´ge´, qui se traduisent par une
croissance plus forte dans les pays e´mergents.
Le deuxie`me chapitre aborde la question plus ge´ne´rale de la corre´lation des
flux de capitaux et de la croissance parmi les pays e´mergents. Il traite du paradoxe
de l’allocation mis en e´vidence par Aizenman and Pinto (2007), Prasad et al. (2007)
et Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007), a` savoir que les capitaux aﬄuent vers les pays ou`
la croissance de la productivite´ est la plus faible, et non la` ou` elle est la plus forte,
comme le pre´dit la the´orie ne´oclassique. En effet, la croissance de la productivite´
tire le rendement marginal du capital vers le haut et donc devrait inciter les agents
domestiques a` s’endetter afin d’investir dans leur production. Or, si les pays les plus
productifs sont bien ceux ou` le taux d’investissement est le plus e´leve´, ceux-ci ont
moins recours a` l’endettement. Alors que le paradoxe de Lucas peut se re´duire a` un
paradoxe sur l’investissement dans les pays e´mergents (c’est parce que la PGF est
moins e´leve´e qu’au Nord et qu’il existe des distorsions sur le rendement du capital
au Sud qu’il y a moins d’incitations a` investir et donc a` emprunter), le paradoxe de
l’allocation est un paradoxe de la de´connection, voire de la relation perverse, entre
investissement et flux de capitaux. En effet, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007), a` partir
du mode`le de croissance ne´oclassique standard, calculent le niveau de flux qui serait
cohe´rent au regard du niveau d’investissement observe´. Le paradoxe de Lucas est
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ainsi supprime´ en calibrant un niveau de distorsion (une taxe sur le rendement du
capital) de sorte que, par construction, le rendement prive´ du capital s’e´galise entre
pays. Malgre´ cela, le niveau pre´dit de flux entrants est corre´le´ ne´gativement avec les
flux observe´s.
Ce chapitre tente de re´soudre le paradoxe de l’allocation en introduisant
du risque d’investissement dans le mode`le de croissance ne´oclassique. En effet,
dans la version standard de ce dernier, on suppose que l’investissement productif
n’est pas risque´. Dans ce cas, aux yeux des investisseurs, les titres de dette et
l’investissement productif sont de parfaits substituts. Lorsque le rendement de ce
dernier est plus e´leve´ que celui du premier, il est optimal de s’endetter afin d’investir
dans la production. Ainsi, investissement et endettement devraient eˆtre corre´le´s
positivement, ce qui, comme on l’a vu, est contredit par les donne´es. Cependant,
comme il a e´te´ souligne´ plus haut, l’hypothe`se que l’investissement productif soit
sans risque est contestable. Le mode`le de croissance ne´oclassique est donc enrichi par
l’introduction de risque individuel dans la production, ce qui rend le rendement de
l’investissement productif risque´. On suppose aussi que ce risque, au moins en partie,
n’est pas assurable. Or, l’introduction d’un risque de production non assurable, fuˆt-il
minime, change radicalement la relation entre l’investissement prive´ et le titre de
dette dans le portefeuille des agents. Au lieu d’eˆtre des actifs identiques, ceux-ci
sont des substituts imparfaits. En effet, en l’absence de possibilite´s d’assurance du
risque individuel, c’est le titre de dette, sans risque, qui joue le roˆle d’auto-assurance.
Ainsi, en cas de choc ne´gatif important, la consommation est prote´ge´e d’une chute
trop substantielle par la pre´sence d’un stock d’actifs sans risque dans lequel les
agents peuvent puiser en cas de coup dur. Il s’agit d’une e´pargne de pre´caution. Par
conse´quent, lorsque les agents augmentent l’investissement en re´ponse a` une hausse
de la PGF, ils augmentent par la meˆme occasion leur stock d’actifs sans risque afin
de s’auto-assurer contre le risque supple´mentaire qu’ils prennent.
En suivant la me´thode de Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007), le mode`le est calibre´ de
sorte a` rendre parfaitement compte de l’investissement observe´ dans un e´chantillon
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de 66 pays e´mergents entre 1980 et 2000. Les flux pre´dits par le mode`le, avec ou sans
risque, sont alors compare´s aux flux observe´s entre 1980 et 2000. Les premiers sont
ne´gativement corre´le´s aux derniers lorsqu’on adopte l’approche sans risque, ce qui
renvoie aux re´sultats de Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007). Par contre, ils sont corre´le´s
positivement au sein de l’approche du portefeuille (avec risque). Ce renversement
des pre´dictions peut eˆtre rapproche´ de deux phe´nome`nes : (i) les flux sortants
observe´s sont positivement corre´le´s avec la croissance de la PGF, phe´nome`ne qui
est a` la source du paradoxe dans l’approche sans risque, mais qui est cohe´rent avec
l’approche du portefeuille, car la de´tention de titres e´trangers sans risque re´pond a`
l’investissement dans le capital domestique risque´ ; (ii) les pays avec une part plus
e´leve´e de capital dans leur portefeuille en de´but de pe´riode sont ceux qui ont connu
les plus petites entre´es de capitaux, conforme´ment a` ce que pre´dit l’approche du
portefeuille. Ceci s’explique par le fait que, contrairement a` l’approche sans risque,
les parts de capital et d’actifs sans risque dans le portefeuille sont de´termine´es a` long
terme et sont les meˆmes dans tous les pays. La convergence vers l’e´tat stationnaire
implique donc une plus petite augmentation de la part de capital dans les pays ou` il
compose de´ja` une part e´leve´e du portefeuille. Le niveau des titres sans risque devrait
donc moins diminuer dans ces pays.
Les deux premiers chapitres montrent que la faible capacite´ des marche´s
financiers des pays e´mergents a` ge´rer les risques de production et de liquidite´
des entreprises peut expliquer les faits stylise´s associe´s aux flux de capitaux,
ainsi que leur lien avec la croissance. Le de´veloppement financier peut e´galement
expliquer l’absence de relation empirique stable entre flexibilite´ du taux de change
et croissance. Le troisie`me chapitre montre ainsi qu’en pre´sence de contraintes de
cre´dit, qui rendent les entreprises plus vulne´rables a` leur risque de liquidite´, les pays
e´mergents qui souffrent du ”pe´che´ originel” (i.e. d’une dette dollarise´e) diminuent
leur potentiel de croissance s’ils ne fixent pas leur taux de change. Le manque de
robustesse des analyses empirique sur les performances des re´gimes de change peut
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ainsi eˆtre relie´ a` l’existence de non-line´arite´s dues a` la dollarisation. Cette approche
s’inse`re a` la fois dans la litte´rature sur les effets de la volatilite´ sur la croissance et
dans celle qui e´tudie les pays e´mergents et leur “peur du change flottant”.
La litte´rature sur les performances des re´gimes de change n’a pas mis en e´vidence
de relation empirique stable entre flexibilite´ du taux de change et croissance. Les
travaux sur la question concluent en ge´ne´ral soit a` la neutralite´ de la politique de
change, soit a` l’he´te´roge´ne´ite´ de ses effets dans les pays e´mergents et industriels.
Baxter and Stockman (1989) sont les premiers a` mettre en avant ce paradoxe de
l’instabilite´ des effets du re´gime de change. Depuis, la litte´rature n’a pas permis
d’e´tablir de lien clair entre volatilite´ du taux de change et croissance : Husain et al.
(2005) trouvent que la flexibilite´ du taux de change a des effets be´ne´fiques dans
les pays industriels et neutres dans les pays en de´veloppement. En utilisant une
classification diffe´rente des re´gimes de change, Dubas et al. (2005) trouvent qu’un
re´gime fixe a de bonnes performances e´conomiques dans ces derniers alors qu’il
est neutre pour les premiers. De meˆme, De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005) montrent
que la stabilite´ du taux de change est associe´e a` une croissance plus forte dans
les pays d’Europe centrale et orientale. L’effet estime´ de la flexibilite´ du taux de
change est donc en ge´ne´ral plus ne´gatif dans les pays de´veloppement que dans les
pays industriels. Cette instabilite´ des re´sultats empiriques peut eˆtre explique´e par
la non-line´arite´ de l’effet de la flexibilite´ du taux de change sur la croissance.
En particulier, Aghion et al. (2006a) sugge`rent que cette non-line´arite´ est due
au niveau de de´veloppement financier. Ainsi, c’est dans les pays ayant un secteur
financier peu de´veloppe´ que les effets de la flexibilite´ du taux de change s’ave`rent
ne´fastes. En effet, comme le de´fendent Aghion et al. (2006a), Aghion et al. (2007)
et Aghion and Marinescu (2007), lorsque les firmes font face a` des contraintes de
cre´dit, il est important de mettre en oeuvre des politiques qui stabilisent leur revenu,
y compris pour favoriser la croissance de la productivite´. En effet, dans la mesure
ou` les firmes ne be´ne´ficient pas autant des pe´riodes d’expansion qu’elles ne souffrent
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des pe´riodes de re´cession, la volatilite´ macroe´conomique a un impact ne´gatif sur
leur capacite´ a` financer des chocs de liquidite´. Comme ce sont les activite´s les plus
innovantes qui sont le plus souvent sujettes aux chocs de liquidite´, la stabilisation
des cycles macroe´conomiques a un impact positif sur la croissance, et a` plus forte
raison si les firmes ont un acce`s limite´ au cre´dit (Aghion et al., 2007; Aghion and
Marinescu, 2007). En e´conomie ouverte, ce proble`me se pose d’une manie`re d’autant
plus aigue¨ que les firmes sont soumises a` des chocs exte´rieurs. Ainsi, Aghion et al.
(2006a) montrent empiriquement que la stabilite´ du taux de change a un effet
d’autant plus be´ne´fique sur la croissance que le de´veloppement financier est faible.
L’argument the´orique est que le change fixe permet justement de stabiliser les profits
des entreprises.
Or, le de´veloppement financier n’est pas la seule source d’he´te´roge´ne´ite´ entre
pays industriels et en de´veloppement. Le “pe´che´ originel”, c’est-a`-dire l’incapacite´
des e´conomies e´mergentes a` emprunter dans leur propre monnaie, est aussi un
e´le´ment qui peut expliquer l’impact diffe´rent de la volatilite´ du taux de change.
La dollarisation financie`re est en effet fre´quemment pointe´e du doigt comme une
source de vulne´rabilite´ dans les pays e´mergents (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999;
Reinhart et al., 2003; Calvo et al., 2004). Elle est aussi souvent conside´re´e comme
e´tant a` la source de la “peur du change flottant” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).
En particulier, nous montrons que, comme le souligne Obstfeld (2008), l’inca-
pacite´ a` emprunter dans leur monnaie domestique empeˆche les pays e´mergents de
profiter pleinement des avantages de l’inte´gration financie`re. En effet, comme c’est
le cas dans notre mode`le, le re´gime de change fixe permet de stabiliser les revenus.
Il a donc des avantages en termes de stabilisation de la consommation, notamment
celle de biens non e´changeables. Le change flexible donne aussi une plus grande
marge de manoeuvre au sein du “trilemme” (Obstfeld, 2008; Obstfeld et al., 2008).
Il permet ainsi de viser des objectifs de politique inte´rieure, tandis que le re´gime de
change fixe, lorsque les capitaux peuvent circuler sans entraves, suppose l’abandon
de ces objectifs. Le change fixe souffre alors de cre´dibilite´ et peut traverser des crises
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si la politique inte´rieure est soumise a` des tensions trop fortes. Le change flexible
est donc le re´gime qui permet aux pays de profiter sans encombre des avantages
de la libe´ralisation financie`re (circulation des capitaux), sans souffrir de ses affres
(abandon des objectifs domestiques et crises). Or, a` cause de la dollarisation de la
dette, les pays e´mergents sont contraints dans leur re´solution du trilemme, et sont
re´duits a` une “peur du change flottant”.
Le troisie`me chapitre tient compte du roˆle de la dollarisation de la dette
sur l’impact de la volatilite´ du taux de change sur la croissance. Un mode`le est
d’abord de´veloppe´ afin d’en de´duire des hypothe`ses a` tester sur un panel de pays
indutriels et en de´veloppement. Dans le mode`le, comme dans l’article d’Aghion
et al. (2006a), les entreprises doivent financer un choc de liquidite´ transitoire pour
pouvoir innover. D’autre part, la volatilite´ du taux de change affecte celle des
revenus des firmes en pre´sence de rigidite´s nominales sur les salaires. Elle affecte
donc leur capacite´ moyenne a` innover. Pour pouvoir tenir compte de la dollarisation
financie`re, ce cadre est enrichi de deux hypothe`ses : 1) la production est partage´e
entre biens e´changeables et non e´changeables alors que le couˆt de liquidite´ est en
bien e´changeable ; 2) les revenus sont nets des inte´reˆts sur la dette, alors que dans le
mode`le d’Aghion et al. (2006a), ils ne sont compose´s que des profits bruts. Toutes
choses e´gales par ailleurs, une de´pre´ciation nominale fait baisser la valeur de la
production de biens non e´changeables en termes d’e´changeables, ce qui limite la
capacite´ des agents a` financer le couˆt de liquidite´. Cependant, si une partie de la
dette est de´nomme´e en monnaie locale, alors une de´pre´ciation nominale diminue les
paiements d’inte´reˆt, ce qui limite l’impact sur les revenus de la firmes et lui permet
donc de faire face plus facilement au couˆt de liquidite´. A priori, un taux de change
flexible est plus mauvais pour la croissance qu’un taux de change fixe lorsque la
dette est dollarise´e. Lorsque le niveau de dollarisation diminue, l’avantage relatif du
taux de change fixe diminue.
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Cependant, il ne va pas de soi que ce re´sultat subsiste en e´quilibre ge´ne´ral. Au
contraire, selon Milton Friedman, le re´gime de change flexible stabilise la production
en pre´sence de rigidite´s nominales. Toutefois, ce qui compte ici est la production
mesure´e en termes de monnaie e´trange`re. Or, celle-ci de´pend a` la fois de la production
en termes re´els et du taux de change re´el. Si le change flexible a bien un effet
relativement stabilisateur sur la production par rapport au change fixe dans notre
mode`le, il a un effet relativement de´stabilisateur sur le taux de change re´el. Ainsi, si
l’e´lasticite´ de substitution entre les biens e´changeables et non e´changeables est faible
(ce qui est couramment admis dans la litte´rature), c’est son effet de´stabilisateur sur
le taux de change re´el qui l’emporte. Les pre´dictions e´voque´es restent donc valables
a` l’e´quilibre ge´ne´ral. Celles-ci sont teste´es et confirme´es sur un e´chantillon de 77
pays industriels et e´mergents entre 1995 et 2004.
Chapitre I
Financial Integration,
Technological Change in Emerging
Markets and Global Imbalances
1 Introduction
This paper tries to explain four stylized facts. The first one has fueled heated
debates among economists : 1) the US have run a persistent current account deficit
since the beginning of the 1990’s. Figure I.1 (a) shows that the aggregate deficit of the
US, Australia and the UK (U) is no longer compensated by surpluses in Europe and
Japan (J), but rather by surpluses elsewhere, notably in emerging countries (EM)1.
I confront this fact to another one, illustrated in Figure I.1 (b) : 2) labor productivity
increased in the EM relatively to U between the early 1990’s and the mid-2000’s.
Namely, Figure I.1 (b) shows that the relative output per worker increased steadily
during the period, and in 2003 the gains reached 25% as compared to 1990. Figure
I.2 analyzes the sources of the relative growth of emerging markets by presenting the
1 I follow Caballero et al. (2008) in defining the country groups.
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relative evolution of their capital per worker and total factor productivity (TFP)2.
It appears that 3) the relative level of capital per worker increased during the period
and is 21% higher in 2003 than in 1990. In the meantime, 4) the relative TFP surged
during the period and was 12% higher in 2003 than in 1990. Therefore, the strong
growth of emerging markets is partly due to TFP growth, and not only to capital
accumulation. TFP growth even explains two thirds of the relative growth of EM.3
On the one hand, the first fact has drawn a lot of attention in the literature, but
the second one is at best ignored or taken as exogenous, at worst contradicted. On
the other hand, the study of productivity catch-up has given birth to a huge strand
of literature, but, except some exceptions, ignore the first fact. This chapter aims at
fueling this gap by providing a general equilibrium framework to explain these two
facts as the endogenous outcome of financial integration. I focus on the interaction
between U and EM since, according to Figure I.1 (a), the current account surpluses
in the EM constitute most of the counterpart of the U deficits. When explaining
Facts 1 and 2, I will also be attentive at taking into account Facts 3 and 4, that is :
relative growth in emerging countries is originated in both capital accumulation and
TFP growth.
Consider the conjunction of labor productivity growth and current account
surpluses in emerging markets (Facts 1 and 2). The main challenge of the study is
to generate a model where financial globalization triggers both a rise in the current
account and in labor productivity. The key feature of the framework is the interaction
between financial development, financial globalization and technological change. The
focus on technological change can be motivated as follows. Consider the definition
2 Capital stocks in EM and U are estimated with the perpetual inventory method, using the
procedure of Caselli (2004). In order to calculate TFP, I start from the following definition of
production per worker : y = Axα, where x is the level of capital per worker. TFP values in EM
and U are then estimated as yi/(xi)α, i ∈ {EM,U}, where α = 0.36.
3 The share of relative growth in EM due to TFP is calculated as ln
(
AEM2003/A
U
2003
AEM1990/A
U
1990
)
/ ln
(
yEM2003/y
U
2003
yEM1990/y
U
1990
)
.
Indeed, the relative growth in EM can be decomposed as follows : ln
(
yEM2003/y
U
2003
yEM1990/y
U
1990
)
=
ln
(
AEM2003/A
U
2003
AEM1990/A
U
1990
)
+ α ln
(
xEM2003/x
U
2003
xEM1990/x
U
1990
)
.
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Fig. I.1 – Stylized facts - Global imbalances and relative growth in emerging
countries
(a) Global imbalances
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(b) Productivity growth in emerging markets
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Source : World Bank (World Development Indicators) and Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston et al.,
2006).
U : United States, Australia, United Kingdom.
J : Japan, Eurozone.
EM : Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Hong Kong,
India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia,
Singapore, Thailand and Venezuela.
of the current account surplus (CA) :
CA = S − I
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Fig. I.2 – Stylized facts - Sources of growth
(a) Capital accumulation in emerging markets
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(b) TFP growth in emerging markets
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Source : Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006).
U : United States, Australia, United Kingdom.
J : Japan, Eurozone.
EM : Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Hong Kong,
India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia,
Singapore, Thailand and Venezuela.
Capital stocks in EM and U are estimated with the perpetual inventory method, using the procedure
of Caselli (2004). TFP values in EM and U are estimated as yi/(xi)α, i ∈ {EM,U}, where α = 0.36,
yi and xi are respectively output per worker and capital per worker in i.
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where S denotes savings and I investment. For a given amount of savings, a higher
current account surplus means less investment. Therefore, to be consistent with
the facts (that is a positive current account and growth in EM), savings should
increase more than investment in the emerging economies. Some theories that link
savings to growth can account for the positive comovement between S and I but,
as Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) argue, it is not clear why S should move more
than I. The limits of these theories have been detailed in the general introduction
(namely, Modigliani’s OLGmodel (Modigliani, 1986), the infinite horizon model with
habit formation proposed by Carroll et al. (2000)). Trade-related growth (Dooley
et al., 2004, 2005a; Rodrik, 2006, 2007) is also a potential candidate to explain the
correlation between CA and I, since the current account is the financial counterpart
of the trade balance. However, as argued in the general introduction, these theories
are in general concerned with the structure of trade, and not with trade balance.
In this chapter, the focus is not on the correlation between CA and I itself. A
different route is taken : the idea is that it is not the quantity but the composition of
investment that matters. When there are different technologies, a positive correlation
between CA and productivity does not suppose necessarily that CA and I are
positively related at the aggregate level. Rather, CA should be related to the right
type of investments, that is the most productive. This idea is rendered by introducing
two technologies, one more productive than the other but submitted to idiosyncratic
liquidity risk and credit constraints, as in Aghion et al. (2005). In this framework, the
composition of investment depends on the availability of liquid assets used for self-
insurance purposes. Since international markets are more developed financially, they
provide a better access to these assets. Therefore, financial globalization can trigger
a better allocation of investment in the developing economy by enabling domestic
agents to hold more liquid assets in the industrial economy. This translates into
higher productivity and a positive current account, even with given savings S.
For pedagogical issues and in order to convey the main intuition, the model is
first developed with a constant level of savings S. The mechanism can be summed
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up as follows. Under autarky, the liquidity risk cannot be perfectly insured in
the emerging economy and the agents invest in the less productive technology
for precautionary purposes. There is an overaccumulation of the less productive
capital and the autarky interest rate is low relative to the industrial economy. As
a result, when financial globalization occurs, the emerging economy experiences an
interest rate rise. This has two effects on the emerging economy : on the one hand,
it triggers a substitution between foreign assets and the less productive capital,
which was in excess ; on the other hand, it lowers the cost of self-insurance and thus
allows the agents to invest more in the productive technology. In the developing
country, CA increases and I decreases, but the composition of I changes in favor
of the more productive technology. If the productivity differential between the two
technologies is high, the country is poor and financial development is low, then
the economy experiences a productivity surge. Therefore, production and foreign
assets can rise simultaneously in the emerging market while maintaining the level of
savings constant. As a corollary, the industrial economy experiences a decline in its
external position. This framework therefore can fit the two stylized facts highlighted
above (Facts 1 and 2). In particular, growth in the emerging country is due to TFP
(Fact 4). These results still hold when the savings rate is made endogenous in a
dynamic Ramsey growth model. Besides, in the calibration analysis, the relative
capital accumulation in the emerging country (Fact 3) can be replicated when it is
capital-scarce before financial integration.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows : Section 2 reviews in more
details the related literature ; Section 3 lays down a static model to convey the main
intuitions while section 4 extends it to a dynamic Ramsey model ; finally, Section 5
considers the outcome of the Ramsey model in terms of medium-run dynamics and
uses a calibration approach to confront the results to the four facts.
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2 Related literature
This chapter is related to the literature on capital composition and capital
misallocation. Economists have highlighted the importance of capital quality in
explaining the differences in TFP across countries (Caselli and Wilson, 2004; Caselli,
2004). Others (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Hsieh and Klenow, 2007; Restuccia and
Rogerson, 2007) have stressed the potential gains associated with a better allocation
of capital to more productive uses. In particular, some have highlighted the role of
financial development in the composition of investment and technology adoption.
In Obstfeld (1994), more productive technologies are riskier. As a consequence, the
economy benefits from financial globalization through a greater access to insurance.
Other notable contributions in that field are Matsuyama (2007), Aghion et al.
(2005) and Aghion et al. (2007). A common assumption is that more productive
investments are also more financially demanding. They show that endogenous
changes in investment technologies can occur along the business cycle and on the
equilibrium growth path. Here, I study the implication of this approach in terms of
comovement of growth and current account, using the framework of Aghion et al.
(2005). This approach based on capital misallocation is supported by the two last
facts, illustrated in Figure I.2 : 3) relative capital accumulation and 4) relative
TFP growth in emerging countries. In this chapter’s approach, growth in emerging
markets is due to the convergence of the level of capital per head to its steady state,
but also to the endogenous reallocation of capital to the more productive technology,
which translates into a higher aggregate TFP. In the calibration analysis, I will keep
track of these two additional facts.
This study is also related to the recent and rich debate on the ”saving glut”,
concerned with the first stylized fact, that is the decline in the US current account
and the matching rise in emerging countries. Some argue that the main reason is
the twin deficits led by the rise in the US public deficit (Chinn and Ito, 2005) ;
others that the origin lies in emerging markets excess savings. The latter point to
the poor financial markets in emerging countries as the origin of global imbalances,
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but this explanation has been interpreted in different manners. First, for some, the
main aspect is the incapacity of developing economies to protect themselves from
episodic financial crises. Among them, Bernanke (2005) points to the role of the
credit crunch that took place in the mid-90’s in emerging markets and aroused
the will to build reserve war-chests against future turmoils. This view has been
also explored by Gruber and Kamin (2007), Obstfeld et al. (2008) and Rancie`re
and Jeanne (2006). Others, as Caballero et al. (2008), view the financial crises as
affecting the financial intermediation system itself, which increases the demand of
emerging markets investors for foreign assets. Second, for others, it is the last wave
of financial liberalization that revealed the flaws of the financial system of emerging
markets. Mendoza et al. (2007a) and Mendoza et al. (2007b) focus on the financial
integration of countries with a high demand for assets due to thin domestic financial
markets. Matsuyama (2005) and Ju and Wei (2006, 2007) rely on a similar argument
to explain the ”uphill flows” phenomenon.
This last approach is the closest to mine. It presupposes that financial crises
episodes are not at the core of the stylized facts. To back that view, consider again
Figures I.1 and I.2. The general picture remains unaffected when excluding the
countries that were primarily affected by the Asian crisis (Thailand, Korea, Indonesia
and the Philippines). We also go further by excluding other countries that went
through financial crises during the period (Brazil, Argentina and Russia). The main
trends are unchanged. The reason is that China, which accounts for most of the
stylized facts, did not suffer a crisis. In support of my approach, consider also Figure
I.3. This graph is constructed using the data on current account liberalization from
Chinn and Ito (2007). Their index of financial openness is averaged across the U, J
and EM countries (the average is weighted by GDP) and rescaled in order to be equal
to 100 in 1970. Compared to the 1970’s, the 1980’s are more integrated financially,
but the 1990’s globalization surge is way more marked. The previous stylized facts
could therefore be related to financial globalization. My approach is also backed by
the empirical results of Forbes (2008) : she finds that financial development and
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capital controls are the main determinants of investment in US assets.
Fig. I.3 – Financial integration
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Source : Chinn and Ito (2007) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).
Figures are the GDP-weighted average across a sample including the countries in U, J and EM
whose data are available for the whole period.
Some of the papers I review could be confronted to the above stylized facts. The
common idea is that the low degree of financial development in emerging markets
introduces a wedge between the social and private return to capital. This wedge
induces domestic investors to turn to foreign financial markets. In Mendoza et al.
(2007a) and Mendoza et al. (2007b), this wedge is due to the risk premium created
by precautionary savings. In Matsuyama (2005), it comes from the presence of
credit constraints among entrepreneurs. In Ju and Wei (2006, 2007), it comes from
informational rents. These approaches are successful in explaining the first fact.
However, they miss the second one, that is the relative TFP growth in developing
countries. Others are more successful. In Caballero et al. (2008), high growth
economies can still export capital if their level of development is sufficiently low.
In Aghion et al. (2006b), foreign investment has positive externalities on growth
and is favored by domestic savings because it constitutes a collateral. However, both
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studies respectively take the growth rate and the savings rate as exogenous, whereas
empirical evidence suggests that they cause one another (Attanasio et al., 2000). It
is also doubtful that growth is constant during long periods and that savings do not
react to growth perspectives. The strength of my approach is that growth, savings
and investment behaviors are determined endogenously.
3 Static model
This section focuses on the impact of financial globalization on portfolio choices
for one period, taking the whole amount invested as given. This helps grasping
the main intuition before switching to the dynamic environment with endogenous
savings. This analysis is applied to an economy with two countries in which the bond
market integrates.
3.1 Economic environment
There are two countries indexed by i ∈ {I, E}, I denoting the industrial country
and E the emerging one. For the moment, the countries’ index is neglected since
we are interested first in their individual behavior. Each country is populated by
a continuum of identical entrepreneurs of length one who live one period. Each
entrepreneur is endowed with wealth w. He makes his portfolio decisions at the
beginning of the period and consumes the yield of his portfolio at the end of the
period. As in Aghion et al. (2005), he can invest in three different types of assets :
the bond b, the short-term investment k and the long-term investment z.
Timing : The detailed timing is the following :
– Morning : the entrepreneur invests his wealth w in b, k and z.
– Noon : the bond yields Rb, the short-term investment yields f(k), with f ′ > 0
and f ′′ < 0.
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– Evening : the production activity in which the long-term investment z is
involved is compromised by a transitory liquidity cost shock. With probability
1
2
, the liquidity shock is equal to Φ > 0 and the entrepreneur has to pay Φ
(bad shock). If the cost is paid, then the long-term investment yields g(z)+Φ,
with g′ > 0, g′′ < 0 and g > f . If not, then the whole production is lost. With
probability 1
2
, the entrepreneur receives Φ and the long-term investment yields
g(z)− Φ (good shock).
– Night : the entrepreneur consumes the return of his portfolio : either Rb +
f(k) + g(z) or Rb+ f(k), depending on the nature of the shock that occurred
in the evening and on the decision to finance it.
The distribution of the liquidity cost implies that there is no aggregate risk :
1
2
Φ− 1
2
Φ = 0. The fact that the entrepreneur recovers the liquidity cost at the end
of the period ensures that the shock is transitory and that the liquidity shock is
neutral regarding ex post profits. In other words, Φ affects the decision to invest
only through the possibility to lose g(z).
z can be viewed as a long-term investment, involving more time than the short-
term investment k. It is more productive than k, but it is also more risky and
submitted to possible hazards. This kind of investment can be interpreted as R&D
expenses, or as the cost of adopting a new technology which has to be adapted or
a technology which involves more human capital. The liquidity cost can be viewed
as a shock threatening the completion of the investment process. For example, the
new machines have to be adapted to a new legislation or the entrepreneur that has
acquired new skills falls ill. In either case, all the investment expenditure can be lost
if the liquidity shock is not overcome.
Insurance : Since there is no aggregate risk, the liquidity shock can be perfectly
hedged. But, because of imperfect financial markets, only a fraction 1 − ρ ≤ 1 can
be insured. The entrepreneur thus faces a liquidity shock φ = ρΦ with probability
1
2
and receives φ with probability 1
2
. φ is therefore the resulting perceived liquidity
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shock. It summarizes the level of financial markets incompleteness.
Financing constraints : At noon, there are no credit markets, so the entrepre-
neurs who suffer from the liquidity cost cannot pay except if :
φ ≤ f(k) +Rb
The other entrepreneurs receive φ so they do not face any financing constraint.
Therefore, because it is more risky, the long-term investment is more financially-
demanding and more vulnerable than the short-term one. On the contrary, f(k) and
the yield from b can be used to secure the long-term production. (k, b) can therefore
be viewed as the ”liquid portfolio”, because it can be liquidated without cost in order
to pay for the transitory shock.
3.2 Individual decisions
Entrepreneurs maximize their end-of-period expected consumption :
max
{k,b,z}
Rb+ f(k) +
1
2
g(z) + 1{f(k)+Rb≥φ}
1
2
g(z) (I.1)
s.t b+ k + z ≤ w
With probability 1
2
, entrepreneurs face the good shock and consume Rb+ f(k)+
g(z). With probability 1
2
, they face the bad shock and consume Rb+ f(k) + g(z) if
they can pay φ (f(k)+Rb ≥ φ). If they cannot (f(k)+Rb < φ), then they consume
Rb+ f(k). If φ is small, then the entrepreneur would choose the first best portfolio
maximizing Rb + f(k) + g(z). But if φ is high, then the first best portfolio would
violate the financing constraint. The entrepreneur would have to choose whether
to satisfy the constraint and get g(z) or to violate the constraint and get g(z)
only with probability 1
2
. Indeed, if z is sufficiently productive with regards to the
liquid portfolio, it can be profitable to choose not to satisfy the constraint, even at
the expense of the risk of losing g(z). This program is therefore not standard. To
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understand individual decisions, I consider first the case in which the entrepreneurs
want to overcome the bad shock. In that case, they have to satisfy the financing
constraint. The corresponding program can be written as :
max{k,b,z}Rb+ f(k) + g(z) (I.2)
s.t.
 b+ k + z ≤ w (λ ≥ 0) (BC)φ ≤ f(k) +Rb (γ ≥ 0) (FC)
(BC) and (FC) are respectively the budget and financing constraints and λ and
γ are the corresponding Lagrange multipliers. The first-order conditions associated
with this program yield the following results :
f ′(k) = R
g′(z) = R(1 + γ)
The marginal productivity of the short-term investment must be equal to the
return of the bond, which determines k, whether (FC) is binding or not. This comes
from the fact that (FC) does not interfere with the arbitrage between k and b. In
other words, the return of the liquid portfolio (k, b) must be maximized, either to
optimize the entrepreneur’s consumption or to satisfy the financing constraint (FC).
Either (FC) is not binding (γ = 0) and g′(z) = R, or (FC) is binding (γ > 0)
and φ = f(k)+Rb. In that case, g′(z) > R : the entrepreneur cannot invest as much
as he would like in the long-term investment z.
There are two possible solutions :
– If f(k∗) + Rb∗ ≥ φ, (FC) is not binding and the solution is the first best one,
labeled (k∗, z∗, b∗) :
k∗ = f
′−1(R), z∗ = g
′−1(R), b∗ = w − k∗ − z∗
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– If f(k∗) + Rb∗ < φ, the first best allocation is not implementable so (FC) is
binding. The solution is the constrained one, labeled (k¯, z¯, b¯) :
k¯ = k∗, b¯ = φ−f(k
∗)
R
, z¯ = w − k∗ − b¯
For a given R, if the entrepreneur is constrained, we have b¯ > b∗ and z¯ < z∗. The
entrepreneur under-invests in the more productive technology as compared to the
first-best solution because he has to hold an additional amount of bonds in order to
satisfy the financing constraint.
Consider next the case where entrepreneurs anticipate that they will not be
able to overcome the bad shock, which means that φ > f(k) + Rb. Therefore, they
anticipate that they will get Rb + f(k) + g(z) with probability 1
2
(good shock) and
Rb+ f(k) with probability 1
2
(bad shock). They solve the following programme :
max{k,b,z}Rb+ f(k) +
1
2
g(z) (I.3)
s.t. w ≥ b+ k + z
The first order conditions lead to the following results :
f ′(k) = R
g′(z) = 2R
which yields the following solution :
k∗∗(R) = k∗(R), z∗∗(R) = g′−1(2R), b∗∗(R) = w − k∗ − z∗∗
(k∗∗, z∗∗, b∗∗) is labeled the ”risky” allocation. The production of the long term
investment is less efficient so the entrepreneur invests less in z than in the first best
case : z∗∗(R) < z∗(R).
The following lemma shows when this risky allocation can be ruled out :
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Lemma 3.1 (General case) :
For a given R, if g′
(
w − f ′−1(R)− φ−f
′−1(R)
R
)
≤ 2R, then the solution to
Problem (I.1) is the solution to Problem (I.2) :
k(R) = k∗(R), z(R) = min(z∗(R), z¯(R)), b(R) = max(b∗(R), b¯(R))
Proof : If z∗(R) ≤ z¯(R), then the first best is implementable and the solution is
z∗(R). If z∗(R) > z¯(R), then the solution is either z¯(R) (the entrepreneur chooses
to satisfy the financial constraint) or z∗∗(R) (the financial constraint is violated and
the entrepreneur takes into account the fact that the long-term production is less
efficient).
If z¯(R) ≥ z∗∗(R), then, since k∗(R) = k¯(R) = k∗∗(R), b¯(R) ≤ b∗∗(R). As
a consequence, φ = Rb¯(R) + f(k∗(R)) ≤ Rb∗∗(R) + f(k∗(R)) : the financing
constraint is satisfied for z∗∗(R). Besides, g′(z∗∗(R)) > R. If z = z∗∗(R), the
entrepreneur could be better-off by increasing z without violating the financing
constraint. Therefore, the entrepreneur would prefer z = z¯(R) over z = z∗∗(R).
Finally, according to the definitions of z∗∗(R) and z¯(R), z¯(R) ≥ z∗∗(R) is equivalent
to g′
(
w − f ′−1(R)− φ−f
′−1(R)
R
)
≤ 2R.4 ¥
Provided that z¯(R) ≥ z∗∗(R), the risky allocation can be ruled out and the
entrepreneurs’ program can be reduced to a standard constrained maximization
problem, which corresponds to Problem (I.2). If, besides, z∗(R) > z¯(R), which means
that g′ (z¯(R)) > R, then the constrained allocation is chosen. Therefore, the range
of w and φ over which the entrepreneurs choose the constrained allocation is defined
by
R < g′
(
w − f ′−1(R)− φ− f
′−1(R)
R
)
≤ 2R
On the one hand, if the entrepreneur is poor (w low) and faces large liquidity
shocks (φ high), he might not be able to choose the first best allocation because he
4 Note that if z¯(R) < z∗∗(R), the financing constraint is binding for z∗∗(R). The entrepreneur has
the choice between investing z¯(R) with a higher productivity (g(z)) or investing a higher amount
z∗∗(R) with a poorer average technology ( 12g(z)). This case is inconclusive : depending on the
parameters and on R, z¯(R) or z∗∗(R) could be chosen.
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would not be able to overcome the bad shock. On the other hand, if the entrepreneur
is too poor and faces too large liquidity shocks, then it could be too costly to satisfy
the financing constraint and the entrepreneur might choose the risky allocation. For
intermediary levels of w and φ, he chooses the constrained allocation.
3.3 Comparative statics
The approach here is to compare the investment decisions under autarky and
financial globalization, defined by cross-border trade in bonds. As in Mendoza et al.
(2007a), the two countries are supposed to be identical, except for the level of
market incompleteness φ. The industrial country I is financially developed while
the emerging one E is not. In order to be more specific, I define the two following
cases :
– Perfect financial markets (PFM) : φ = 0. The entrepreneurs are perfectly
insured against liquidity shocks so the first-best decisions apply.
– Imperfect financial markets (IFM) : the parameters of the model are such that
the PFM allocation is not implementable under autarky : f(k∗(Ra∗)) < φ,
where Ra∗ is the autarky interest rate that would prevail under PFM.
We assume then that the industrial country I has PFM, while the emerging
country E has IFM.
Two types of equilibria are compared :
– The autarky equilibrium, defined by the zero-net demand for bonds in each
country : bI = bE = 0.
R¯a denotes the autarky interest rate under IFM (that is in E) and Ra∗ the
autarky interest rate under PFM (that is in I).
– The financial globalization equilibrium, defined by the ability to trade bonds
between countries. It implies a world zero-net demand for bonds : bI + bE = 0.
We are interested in the way financial globalization affects the net external
position b, investment in both kinds of capital k and z, and production in both
countries.
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3.3.1 Autarky
Consider the investment decisions under perfect and imperfect financial markets
when the economy is under autarky. For any variable X, Xa∗ denotes its autarky
value under PFM and X¯a its autarky value under IFM.We solve first for the portfolio
choices and then derive a proposition for I and E.
Under PFM :
Under autarky, ba∗ = 0 so za∗ = w − ka∗, according to the resource constraint.
The optimal allocation satisfies g′(w − ka∗) = f ′(ka∗), which defines the level of
short term investment ka∗. Then we can infer the level of long-term investment
za∗ = w − ka∗ and the autarky interest rate Ra∗ = f ′(ka∗).
Under IFM :
By definition of IFM, f(k∗(Ra∗)) < φ. This means that the first-best portfolio
cannot be implemented under autarky, so the solution is either the constrained or
the risky one. Let’s consider the constrained solution : under autarky, b¯a = 0 so,
since the credit constraint is binding, f(k¯a) = φ, which defines k¯a as k¯a = f−1(φ).
Then we can infer R¯a = f ′(f−1(φ)) and z¯a = w − f−1(φ).
In order to rule out the risky allocation under autarky in E, we make the following
assumption :
Assumption 3.1 (Ruling out the risky allocation under autarky in E) :
g′(w − f−1(φE)) < 2f ′(f−1(φE)).
Assumption 3.1 insures that z¯(R¯a) ≥ z∗∗(R¯a) in E, which is sufficient to rule out
the risky allocation (Lemma 3.1) for R = R¯a. It requires that wealth w is not too
low and that the degree of market incompleteness φ is not too high. Otherwise, the
financing constraint could be so stringent that the entrepreneur would rather violate
it, even if the long-term production is at risk. Under Assumption 3.1 and IFM, the
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constrained solution exists in autarky.
Proposition 3.1 (General case) : Autarky
Under Assumption 3.1, the constrained allocation is a solution in E under
autarky while the first-best allocation is chosen in I. If the constrained allocation
is indeed chosen in E, the autarky stock of k is higher, the stock of z is lower and
the interest rate is lower in E than in I.
Proof :
By definition of IFM, f(k∗(Ra∗)) < φE, which implies that f(k∗(Ra∗)) <
f(k¯(R¯a)). This yields k∗(Ra∗) < k¯(R¯a) (or, alternatively, ka∗ < k¯a).
As a corollary, since z = w − k, z∗(Ra∗) > z¯(R¯a) (or, alternatively, za∗ > z¯a).
Similarly, R = f ′(k), so R¯a < Ra∗.
Finally, I has PFM, so the first best allocation is chosen. E has IFM, and
Assumption 3.1 rules out the risky allocation in E for R = R¯a, according to Lemma
3.1. Therefore, the constrained allocation is compatible with autarky. ¥
Figure I.4 illustrates the mechanism. It represents the demands for bonds and
for short-term and long-term capital in a country with perfect financial markets
(the industrial country) and a country with binding financing constraints (the
emerging country). These countries differ only with regards to the level of financial
development. The short-term investment k is decreasing in R and it is identical in
both countries since it follows the same optimality rule. The bond b is increasing
with R in both countries, but, for a given interest rate, the demand for bonds is
higher in the constrained economy because of the precautionary hoarding motive.
As a corollary, the demand for long-term investment is lower, because less resources
are available. In order to equilibrate the domestic bond market, the autarky interest
rate has to be lower in the constrained country than under PFM so that bond
holdings are discouraged. The corresponding level of short-term capital is higher in
Financial Integration, Technological Change in EM and Global Imbalances 19
the constrained country than in the IFM one since b and k are substitutes, while the
level of long-term capital is lower.
The consequence of the binding financing constraint in the emerging country
is that there is an over-accumulation of the short-term investment k. Because of
financial markets imperfections, it has to be used as a store for liquidity to avoid
compromising the production involving the long-term investment. As a consequence,
because of the resource constraint, there is an under-accumulation of the long-term
investment z.
3.3.2 Financial globalization
What is the effect of the possibility to trade bonds between countries on foreign
assets, investment and production, from a comparative statics point of view ? In
order to answer this question, remember that Proposition 3.1 showed that R¯a < Ra∗.
For the world bond market to clear, the world interest rate Ro will lay between
the two autarky interest rates. We will thus have : R¯a < Ro < Ra∗. When capital
markets integrate, the industrial country experiences a drop in its interest rate while
the emerging one experiences a rise in its own rate.
Investment
Proposition 3.2 (General case) : Effect of financial integration on investment
Under Assumption 3.1, a solution where the constrained allocation is chosen
under general equilibrium in E exists and exhibits the following features :
– When financial markets integrate, I experiences a drop in the interest rate.
Besides, k and z rise and b becomes negative.
– When financial markets integrate, E experiences a rise in the interest rate.
Besides, k falls, z rises and b becomes positive.
The formal proof is provided in the appendix.
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As for the effect of financial markets integration in the industrial country, the
intuition is as follows : when financial markets integrate, the industrial economy
experiences a drop in the interest rate, so the entrepreneurs take advantage of the
new financing opportunities by increasing their debt and reallocating their resources
in favor of the productive investments.
For the effect of financial globalization in the emerging country, the mechanisms
are different. Differentiating the financing constraint (FC) with respect to R yields :
∂b¯
∂R
= − ∂k¯
∂R︸ ︷︷ ︸
Substitution effect>0
− b¯
R︸︷︷︸
Wealth effect <0 or >0
The first term of the derivative represents the substitution effect and it is positive.
When the bond return R rises, there is a substitution between the bond and the
short-term investment in favor of the former. The second term represents the wealth
effect and depends on the sign of the amount invested in the bond. If the entrepreneur
is indebted, then a rise in R increases debt repayments. In order to satisfy the
financing constraint, a further decrease in the debt level is therefore required (i.e.
a further increase in b). The wealth effect is then positive. If, on the opposite,
the entrepreneur holds positive claims, then an increase in R would stimulate
his revenues. Therefore, he does not need to raise b a lot to satisfy the financing
constraint. The wealth effect is then is negative. Notice that in this particular case
where b¯ starts from zero, b¯ becomes positive after an increase in the interest rate,
since there is no wealth effect around b¯ = 0.
Similarly, differentiating the budget constraint (BC) with respect to R and
replacing the derivative of b yields :
∂z¯
∂R
= − ∂k¯
∂R
− ∂b¯
∂R
=
b¯
R
The interest rate has an impact on z¯ through a wealth effect opposite to that of b¯.
To understand, consider again the effect of a rise in R. According to what have been
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said above, if the entrepreneur is indebted (b¯ < 0), then he must increase b¯ more
than he must decrease k¯ (∂b¯+ ∂k¯ > 0) to keep the financing constraint satisfied, so
z¯ has to diminish (∂z¯ < 0), according to the resource constraint. If he holds positive
claims (b¯ > 0), then he can increase b¯ less than he decreases k¯ (∂b¯ + ∂k¯ < 0), so
z¯ has room to increase (∂z¯ > 0). In this particular experiment where the economy
starts from autarky and experiences a rise in the interest rate when financial markets
integrate, the bond level b¯ increases and becomes positive so the wealth effect on z¯
is positive.
To sum up, in the emerging economy, R rises after financial globalization, because
its demand for bonds is higher than in the industrial country. Since R rises, k
diminishes and b rises, but not as much as k falls, so z can increase without
violating the resource constraint. This comes from the fact that b is substituted
to the previously excessive k inside the liquid portfolio and becomes positive. Thus,
thanks to the now positive external assets, the rise in R generates a positive wealth
effect that enables the entrepreneur to increase z while still satisfying the financing
constraint. The overall effect of a rise is then to lower the cost of hoarding, so there is
room for an increase in z. Therefore, because of the financing constraint, the external
wealth b and the long-term investment are complements in the emerging economy,
whereas they are substitutes in the industrial one, which has PFM.
In the appendix, it is also shown that Assumption 3.1, which rules out the risky
allocation for R = R¯a in the developing country, is also sufficient to rule out the risky
allocation for R¯a < R < Ra∗. Indeed, R rises in the emerging economy as compared
to autarky, so z∗∗(R) decreases. Therefore, since z¯(R) increases, z∗∗(R) ≤ z¯(R)
is still verified. Notice also that the definition of IFM, which rules out the first
best allocation under autarky, is also sufficient to rule out the first best solution
under general equilibrium, because the first-best autarky interest rate is the same as
under the first-best general equilibrium. This implies that, when the bond markets
integrate, the equilibrium with a constrained allocation in E, though not necessarily
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unique (in some cases, E could switch to the risky allocation), is a valid one.
Fig. I.4 – Investment under PFM and IFM 
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 Nota : This example is obtained with the following calibration : w = 0.6, α = 0.36, φ = 0.65 and
A = 2.
The analysis of Figure I.4 can now be complemented. Finally, while in the
industrial country the long-term investment z is decreasing in R (as k), in the
emerging one, it is decreasing when b is negative, but increasing when b is positive.
This reflects the wealth effect described earlier. Any world interest rate between
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the two autarky rates would then imply a rise in debt and in both investments
in I because their marginal return are higher than the world interest rate. In E,
investment in k decreases and b increases because the marginal return of the short
term investment is lower than the world interest rate. In the meantime, z increases
because of the positive wealth effect. Finally, the general equilibrium is fixed between
the two autarky interest rates in order to satisfy bI = −bE, leading to the result
described in Proposition 3.2.
As a preliminary conclusion, Facts 1 and 4 are satisfied. On the one hand, the
industrial country experiences a deterioration of its external position which results
in a current account account deficit. On the other, the aggregate TFP increases in
the emerging country, since the less productive investment diminishes while the more
productive one increases. Fact 3 is not satisfied in the static framework since the
aggregate level of investment diminishes. This is a consequence of the assumption
that savings w are fixed : if the external position in E becomes positive after financial
integration, the resource constraint implies that the aggregate level of investment
k + z diminishes. Fact 2 remains to be examined.
Production In the industrial country, both investments increase thanks to the
decrease in the interest rate (∂R < 0). As a consequence, the production increases
after financial markets integration :
∂y∗ = f ′(k∗)
∂k∗
∂R︸︷︷︸
<0
∂R︸︷︷︸
<0
+g′(z∗)
∂z∗
∂R︸︷︷︸
<0
∂R︸︷︷︸
<0
> 0
In the emerging country, the impact of financial markets integration on pro-
duction is ambiguous, because of the rise in the interest rate (∂R > 0) implies a
diminution in the short-term investment and a rise in the long-term investment :
∂y¯ = g′(z¯)
∂z¯
∂R︸︷︷︸
>0
∂R︸︷︷︸
>0
+f ′(k¯)
∂k¯
∂R︸︷︷︸
<0
∂R︸︷︷︸
>0
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The overall effect on production depends on whether the gains from increasing z
compensate for the losses from decreasing k. Notice that the evolution of production
can be decomposed as follows :
∂y¯ = f ′(k¯)
[
∂z¯
∂R
+
∂k¯
∂R
]
∂R︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate investment effect (<0)
+ [g′(z¯)− f ′(k¯)] ∂z¯
∂R
∂R︸ ︷︷ ︸
Investment composition effect (>0)
The impact on production of a rise in R depends both on the aggregate quantity of
investment z¯ + k¯, but also on the quality of investment, represented by the amount
of long-term investment z¯. The impact of the latter depends on the productivity
differential between both technologies g′(z¯) − f ′(k¯), which is positive since the
financing constraint is binding. As for the impact on aggregate investment, it is
negative according to Proposition 3.2.
Interestingly, a certain amount of disconnection between aggregate investment
and production appears. Even though the aggregate level of investment is negatively
related to the external position in E, production does not necessarily respond
negatively to the increase in bond holdings. It can even be positively related to
the external position as long as the investment composition effect is strong enough.
Indeed, this effect is proportional to the productivity differential g′(z¯)−f ′(k¯), which
measures the amount of investment misallocation. Fact 2 can therefore be accounted
for if the parameters are such that the investment composition effect compensates
for the aggregate investment effect.
To understand what happens to production under IFM, I use a Cobb-Douglas
specification : f(k) = kα, g(z) = Azα, with 0 < α < 1 and A > 1. In order to
simplify the analysis, I abstract from general equilibrium effects on the interest rate,
which I consider as second-order phenomena. I focus on the impact of a given rise
in the interest rate.
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Proposition 3.3 : Effect of an interest rate rise on production (Cobb-Douglas
case)
If the constrained allocation holds in E, if A and φE are high, if w is small, then
a rise in the interest rate has a positive effect on production in E.
Proposition 3.3 comes from the fact that A, φE and w have an impact on the
amount of capital misallocation g′(z¯)− f ′(k¯). When the relative productivity of the
long-term investment A is high, the long-term investment is much more productive
than the short-term one, so the overall impact is positive, even if the short-term
investment diminishes. If the liquidity requirement φE is high, the entrepreneur
accumulates more short-term capital k under autarky because he needs a higher
amount of hoarding. As a consequence, the level of the long-term investment is
small and its marginal productivity is high relative to the short-term one. This is
also the case when the entrepreneur’s wealth w is low. Consequently, the gains in
terms of output from increasing the long-term investment are high and are more
likely to overcome the losses from decreasing the short-term one. In other words, the
higher the extent of the capital misallocation, the higher the potential gains from
globalization.
Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 show that a global economy where the emerging
markets are less developed financially can reproduce the stylized facts highlighted
in the introduction, except Fact 3. After financial markets integrate, the industrial
economy hosts capital inflows as a response to the increase in the foreign demand
for bonds. This is Fact 1. On the opposite, in the emerging economy, financial
globalization implies capital outflows. This increase in the external position enables
the developing country to produce more by reallocating investment to the more
productive technology, despite the fall in aggregate investment. In other words, the
increase in production takes place through an investment composition effect, which
results in an improvement in aggregate TFP and compensates for the deterioration
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in the total investment level. Since the composition of investment in the industrial
country remains identical, there are relative TFP gains in the emerging country.
This is Fact 4. However, it is unclear whether the production gains are higher in
the developed or in the developing country. The quantitative section will enable us
to establish Fact 2 more precisely. As for Fact 3, it is not verified since aggregate
investment diminishes in the emerging country while it increases in the industrial
country. However, this is because we assumed constant savings for pedagogical
purposes and in order to yield the main intuitions. This is an unrealistic hypothesis
that we will relax in the remainder of the chapter. The next section thus extends this
static model to an intertemporal Ramsey framework to take into account endogenous
saving behavior and to analyze the long-term effects of financial integration. The
dynamic version will also enable us to run a quantitative analysis.
4 The Ramsey framework
4.1 Economic environment
It is assumed that an entrepreneur lives infinitely and maximizes his intertem-
poral utility :
∑∞
s=0 β
s log(ct+s) with ct his consumption in period t. Each period
t, he chooses how much to consume out of his wealth and how much to invest
in each of the three assets described earlier : kt+1, zt+1 and bt+1. The production
processes are the same as in the one period model. The continuum of entrepreneurs
is of length one. We rely on the Cobb-Douglas example with partial depreciation δ :
f(k) = kα + (1− δ)k and g(z) = Azα + (1− δ)z, A > 1, 0 < δ < 1.
4.2 Individual decisions
4.2.1 Individual program
Let wt denote wealth in period t. The entrepreneur solves the following program :
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V (wt) = max{kt+1,zt+1,bt+1}
log(wt − bt+1 − kt+1 − zt+1) (I.4)
+β[(1
2
+ 1
2
1{f(kt+1)+Rt+1bt+1≥φ})V (Rt+1bt+1 + f(kt+1) + g(zt+1)) +
1
2
1{f(kt+1)+Rt+1bt+1<φ}V (Rt+1bt+1 + f(kt+1)]
In period t, wt is given and the entrepreneur chooses how much to invest in
(kt+1, zt+1, bt+1). He consumes wt − bt+1 − kt+1 − zt+1 in period t. In period t + 1,
his wealth wt+1 is equal to Rt+1bt+1 + f(kt+1) + g(zt+1) if the good shock occurs
(with probability 1
2
) or if the bad shock occurs and is overcome (with probability 1
2
if f(kt+1) + Rt+1bt+1 ≥ φ, 0 otherwise). It is equal to Rt+1bt+1 + f(kt+1) if the bad
shock occurs and is not overcome (with probability 1
2
if f(kt+1) + Rt+1bt+1 < φ, 0
otherwise).
As in the previous section, the entrepreneur’s program is not standard. Consider
first the simpler program where the entrepreneur chooses to satisfy the financing
constraint f(kt+1) + Rt+1bt+1 ≥ φ. We will show afterwards the conditions under
which this actually happens. In that case, the entrepreneur solves a standard
constrained maximization problem :
V (wt) = max{kt+1,zt+1,bt+1}
log(wt− bt+1− kt+1− zt+1)+βV (Rt+1bt+1+ f(kt+1)+ g(zt+1))
(I.5)
s.t. f(kt+1) +Rt+1bt+1 ≥ φ (γt+1 ≥ 0)
where γt+1 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the financing constraint in
t+ 1.
The first-order conditions associated with this program are the following :
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
/k 1
Ct
= βf
′(kt+1)
Ct+1
+ γt+1f
′(kt+1)
/z 1
Ct
= βg
′(zt+1)
Ct+1
/b 1
Ct
= βRt+1
Ct+1
+ γt+1Rt+1
which yields the following results :
f ′(kt+1) = Rt+1
g′(zt+1) = Rt+1 + γt+1
Ct+1Rt+1
β
Ct+1
Ct
= βg′(zt+1)
If the entrepreneur is not constrained (γt+1 = 0), then g
′(zt+1) = Rt+1. If on
the opposite he is constrained (γt+1 > 0), then f(kt+1) + Rt+1bt+1 = φ. Besides,
g′(zt+1) > Rt+1 and
Ct+1
Ct
> βRt+1, which means that, on the one hand, there is an
under-accumulation of the long-term asset, and, on the other hand, the bond and
the short-term asset are in excessive demand, because of their hoarding function, as
in the static model.
In the remainder of the analysis, only two cases will be considered : the case where
the entrepreneur is always constrained (f(kt+1) +Rt+1bt+1 = φ) and the case where
the level of long-term investment is always optimal (g′(zt+1) = Rt+1). Appropriate
conditions such that these solutions exist for the particular experiment that I will
conduct will be explicited later.
4.2.2 Individual dynamic system
For a given sequence of interest rates Rt, the entrepreneur faces the following
dynamic system :
Ct+1
Ct
= βg′(zt+1) (I.6)
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Ct = g(zt)− zt+1 + f(kt)− kt+1 +Rtbt − bt+1 (I.7)
(I.6) is the Euler equation. Equation (I.7) is derived from the budget constraint.
When the entrepreneur is unconstrained, there are four variables, Ct, bt, kt and
zt. However, kt and zt can be pinned down to Rt using f
′(kt) = g′(zt) = Rt, so the
number of variables is reduced to two.
When the entrepreneur is constrained, there are four variables, Ct, bt, kt and zt.
Here, only kt can be pinned down to Rt using the fact that f
′(kt) = Rt. However, we
can use the fact that bt = [φ − f(kt)]/Rt when the financing constraint is binding,
so the number of unknown variables is reduced to two.
4.3 The experiment
We focus on the impact of financial integration on the long-term external
position, the interest rate, capital accumulation and growth. There are still two
countries, I, with perfect financial markets, and E, with imperfect financial markets.
Now, for calibration purposes, I and E not only differ with respect to their level of
financial incompleteness φi, but also with regard to their initial endowment in capital
per head xi0 = k
i
0 + z
i
0, and to their size, that is the length n
i of their continuum of
entrepreneurs. It is assumed that financial globalization (i.e. trade in bonds) occurs
at t = 0. When financial globalizzation occurs, that is when cross-border trade in
bonds is allowed, the world aggregate demand for bonds must be equal to zero at
each date t > 0 : nIbIt + n
EbEt = 0. We assume that I and E are in autarky before
t = 0, which implies that bI0 = b
E
0 = 0.
We denote respectively z∞ and k∞ the values of long-term and short-term capital
such that g′(z∞) = f ′(k∞) = 1β . They correspond to the first-best steady-state
levels of long-term and short-term capital. The two kinds of financial institutional
environment are defined as follows :
– PFM, for which φ = 0 so the first-best decisions apply.
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– IFM, for which φ satisfies f(k∞) < φ.5 This condition means that the
constraint is necessarily binding at steady state. We will show later that it
is also a sufficient condition for the first best allocation to be ruled out for the
particular experiment conducted here.
Additionally, in order to rule out the risky allocation in the emerging economy,
the following assumption is made :
Assumption 4.1 (Ruling out the risky allocation) : xE0 > k¯
E
0 + g
′−1(f ′(k¯E0 ))
where k¯E0 satisfies : f(k¯
E
0 ) = φ
E
Assumption 4.1 states that, for the given amount of capital xE0 in E, and for
the autarky interest rate that would prevail under the constrained allocation, the
constrained solution for zE0 , which is x
E
0 − k¯E0 , is larger than the risky one, which is
g′−1(f ′(k¯E0 )). This insures, for arguments similar to Lemma 3.1, that the constrained
solution is a valid one at t = 0. As we will show, Assumption 4.1 is also a sufficient
condition for the validity of binding financing constraints all along the transition
path, at least for the experiment conducted here. It requires that xE0 is not too small
and that φE is not too high.
It is assumed first in what follows that the financing constraint is binding in
the emerging economy, which has IFM. It will be shown later that this assumption
defines a valid equilibrium under Assumption 4.1.
The industrial economy is in steady state at t = 0 : zI0 = z∞ and k
I
0 = k∞. The
emerging economy is assumed to be capital-scarce as compared to the industrial one
at the date of financial integration. To represent this fact, I impose xE0 < x∞ =
k∞ + z∞. As we have additionally that φE > f(k∞), the first-best allocation is not
implementable at t = 0. According to Assumption 4.1, the risky allocation is also
ruled out in E at t = 0. As a consequence, the financing constraint is binding in
5 That is, as a function of the parameters : φ > (α/[1/β−(1−δ)]) α1−α +(1−δ)(α/[1/β−(1−δ)]) 11−α
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E at t = 0. Therefore, the amount of short-term capital kE0 in E is equal to k¯
E
0
(so f(kE0 ) = φ
E). We have then kE0 > k∞, since φ
E > f(k∞). As a corollary, we
have zE0 < z∞, since x
E
0 < x∞. Thus, E is scarce in z, but not in k : at the date of
financial integration, the emerging market is over-endowed with short-term capital,
because of its liquidity needs. As in the static model, the demand for liquid assets
is greater in E than in I. This translates into a lower autarky interest rate in E :
f ′(kE0 ) < f
′(k∞).
4.4 General equilibrium dynamic system
Assume first that the financing constraints are binding in E (we will show later
that this is indeed the case). Applying Equations (I.6) and (I.7) in I and E, where
the entrepreneurs are not constrained, and in E, where they are, and using the fact
that Rt = g
′(zIt ), f
′(kIt ) = Rt and n
IbIt = −nEbEt = −nE 1Rt [φ− f(kIt )], we find :
CIt+1
CIt
= βg′(zIt+1) for t ≥ 0 (I.8)
CIt = g(z
I
t )− zIt+1 + f(f ′−1(g′(zIt )))− f ′−1(g′(zIt+1))
−n
E
nI
[φ− f(f ′−1(g′(zIt )))] +
nE
nIg′(zIt+1)
[φ− f(f ′−1(g′(zIt+1)))] for t > 0 (I.9)
and on the date of financial integration, since bI0 = 0 :
CI0 = g(z
I
0)− zI1 + f(f ′−1(g′(zI0)))− f ′−1(g′(zI1)) + n
E
nIg′(zI1)
[φ− f(f ′−1(g′(zI1)))]
CEt+1
CEt
= βg′(zEt+1) for t ≥ 0 (I.10)
CEt = g(z
E
t )− zEt+1 + f(f ′−1(g′(zIt+1)))− f ′−1(g′(zIt ))
+[φ− f(f ′−1(g′(zIt )))]−
1
g′(zIt+1)
[φ− f(f ′−1(g′(zIt+1)))] for t > 0 (I.11)
and on the date of financial integration, since bE0 = 0 :
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CE0 = g(z
E
0 )− zE1 + φ− f ′−1(g′(zI1))− 1g′(zI1) [φ− f(f
′−1(g′(zI1)))]
Equations (I.8) and (I.9), which govern the dynamics of the developed economy,
are independent from the rest of the system, since they only involve zI and cI . Once
the dynamics of zI and cI is solved using this independent dynamic sub-system
with 2 variables and 2 equations, the dynamics of zE and cE can be inferred using
Equations (I.10) and (I.11).
4.5 Effect of financial globalization in the long run
Here, I examine the long-run impact of financial integration at t = 0.
Proposition 4.1 : Effect of financial markets globalization in the long run
Under Assumption 4.1, the solution where the emerging economy satisfies the
financing constraint at t = 0 and at steady state exists and exhibits the following
features :
(i) The emerging economy experiences in the long run an increase in the more
productive investment, a decrease in the less productive investment and a
positive external position. On the whole the investment level increases.
(ii) The industrial economy experiences no change in its investment levels in the
long run, but exhibits a negative external position.
Assume first that the financing constraint is satisfied in the emerging economy
at steady state. The dynamics is characterized by Equations (I.8)-(I.11). According
to Equation (I.8), the steady state in I is characterized by constant consumption
and by a constant marginal return to z equal to 1/β. Therefore, the marginal return
to k converges also to 1/β, and so does the interest rate. With trade in bonds, from
the point of view of the emerging economy, the world interest rate converges to 1
β
.
As a consequence, the emerging economy’s short-term capital adjusts to 1/β in the
long run. As for its long-term capital, the constancy of consumption implies that
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it adjusts to the inverse of the time discount factor 1/β. Therefore, with trade in
bonds, the steady state in both I and E is characterized by a constant interest rate
equal to 1/β and by identical investment levels : zI∞ = z
E
∞ = z∞ and k
I
∞ = k
E
∞ = k∞.
How do these steady-state outcomes compare to the initial conditions ?
Consider first (i). The intuition for the emerging economy is as follows. Before
financial markets integrate, the demand for liquid assets is higher in E than in
I. Under autarky, the only available liquid asset is k. As a consequence, E holds
excessive short-term capital (kE0 > k∞). However, when financial markets integrate,
the financing constraint can be satisfied by holding external bonds, while k can
adjust to the world interest rate. In the long run, k is equal to k∞, since the steady-
state interest rate is defined by I’s discount factor, which is identical to E’s. Put
differently, thanks to financial integration, the steady-state level of short-term capital
is equal to the first-best one, since the world interest rate is pinned down to the
industrial country’s, which does not suffer from any financing constraint. E then
experiences a decline in the less productive investment. As for the external position of
E, it is necessarily positive to satisfy the financing constraint, since the steady-state
level of short-term investment is not sufficient to satisfy the liquidity requirements
(f(k∞) < φ). Besides, at t = 0, the country is scarce in long-term investment z, which
means that zE0 < z∞ by assumption. Therefore, the emerging market experiences a
rise in the more productive investment. The rise in the investment level comes from
the assumption that E is capital-scarce in t = 0 : xE0 = x∞.
(ii) is straightforward : the industrial country experiences no changes in its capital
stocks in the long run compared to their initial levels, since they start at steady state.
However, in general equilibrium, its external position should be the counterpart of
the emerging country’s. Since the emerging country runs a positive external position,
the industrial economy is necessarily indebted in the long run.
Finally, we have to show that this solution is possible. We have shown earlier
that under Assumption 4.1, the case where E satisfies the financing constraint at
t = 0 exists. In this case, kE0 > k∞, which implies that the steady-state interest rate
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is higher than the autarky interest rate in E at t = 0. Therefore, the risky allocation
is lower at steady state than at t = 0. Since zE0 is lower than z∞, which is the value of
the long-term investment in the long run when the financing constraint is satisfied,
then the risky allocation is lower than the constrained one, and it is not optimal for
the entrepreneurs to switch to the risky level. Thus, the steady state solution where
E satisfies the financing constraint does exist.
Now these results can be confronted to the stylized facts. Fact 1 to 4 are
satisfied, as long as we compare the starting point to the ending one. We note : 1) a
deterioration of the external position in I, 2) an increase in individual productivity
in E relative to I due to : 3) a relative increase in the aggregate level of capital
per head and 4) a relative increase in TFP. This last outcome is due to the switch
from the less productive technology to the more productive one in E, while the
technological structure is unchanged in I. What is left is to determine whether the
medium-term patterns are respected qualitatively and whether the model is able to
reproduce the facts in terms of the order of magnitude. This is the object of the
next section.
5 Effect of financial globalization in the medium
run
In this section, I study the qualitative and quantitative implications of the model
in the medium run. The goal is to apply the experiment detailed in the preceding
section. In other words, I evaluate the impact of financial globalization in a world
composed of two countries, one, I, which is at its stationary equilibrium on the date
of financial integration and which benefits from perfect financial markets, and the
other, E, which is capital-scarce and suffers from poor domestic financial markets.
We should be particularly attentive to the impact of financial globalization on the
external asset position, the current account, growth and its different sources : capital
Financial Integration, Technological Change in EM and Global Imbalances 35
accumulation or TFP growth driven by capital reallocation. The purpose here is not
to match the data exactly, but rather to reproduce the right patterns (qualitative
fit) and check whether the magnitude of the trends are reasonable (quantitative fit).
The first country (I) is representative of the U group, mainly composed of
the United States, but which includes also Australia and the United Kingdom.
The second one (E) aggregates countries in the EM group, which is composed
of a significant number of emerging economies : Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapore,
Thailand and Venezuela. I assume that financial markets integrate in 1990 and
observe the economic behavior in I and E in order to confront them to the data for
the period 1990-2003.
5.1 Calibration
α is set to 0.36, β to 0.96, δ to 10%, as is common in the literature. The ratio
of workers nE/nI is set so that the steady state share of U’s GDP (nIyI) in the
world GDP (defined as nIyI + nEyE), which is also the share of U’s workers in the
world population when convergence is achieved, is equal to 60%, its value in the last
observed period (2003). This gives a ratio of 1.5.
The baseline value for A is set to 2. This value is in the range of firms
productivities estimated by Banerjee and Duflo (2005) and Restuccia and Rogerson
(2007). Besides, it yields a standard error for the logarithm of TFP equal to 0.3 at
steady state, which is close to the one measured by Bartelsman et al. (2006) for the
US.
The initial level of capital per head in EM in the beginning of period xE0 is set
such that the share of EM capital in the world stock (nExE0 /[n
ExE0 +n
Ix∞] according
to the model) is equal to 47%, its observed value in the beginning-of-period (1990).
This gives a level of capital per head in EM xE0 equal to 60% of the level of capital
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per head in U x∞. Capital stocks in EM and U are estimated with the perpetual
inventory method, using the procedure of Caselli (2004).
One important parameter, EM’s initial share of long-term capital in total capital
zE0 /x
E
0 , remains to be defined. Two methods are used to set this value. The first
method, which is the baseline one, consists in fixing this value in order to match the
observed relative change in EM’s TFP between 1990 and 2003 (+12%). TFP is not
measured as the productivity average across technologies weighted by the investment
or production shares of these technologies, but as y/xα, which corresponds to the
stylized facts of Figure I.2. As we do not have real estimates for z and k, we must
use a measure based on aggregate investment, and not on its components in order
to compare the outcome of the model to the data. The resulting initial share of
long-term capital in EM zE0 /x
E
0 varies with A. When A = 2, it represents 38% of
the corresponding variable in U. For the sensitivity analysis, we also use another
benchmark to set zE0 /x
E
0 : the observed end-of-period external position in U as a
share of GDP (-22%). The external position in U as a share of GDP is simply given
by bI/yI after 13 periods.
The baseline parameter set as well as the variables that were used to define them
is summed up in Table I.1.
Tab. I.1 – Baseline parameter set
Parameter Value Target Source
α 0.36
β 0.96
δ 0.10
A 2 σ(ln(TFP )) = 0.3 Bartelsman et al. (2006)
nE/nI 1.5 nI/(nI + nE) = 60% Penn World Tables 6.2
xE0 /x∞ 60%
nE(kE0 +z
E
0 )
nE(kE0 +z
E
0 )+n
I(k∞+z∞)
= 90% Penn World Tables 6.2
zE0 /x
E
0
x∞/x∞ 38% (A
E
T /A
E
0 )/(A
I
T/A
I
0) = 12% Penn World Tables 6.2
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5.2 Qualitative fit
Here, I determine whether the medium-term patterns of Figures I.1 and I.2 are
recovered. The results are showed analytically for the linear approximation of the
dynamic system (I.8)-(I.11) and illustrated using the baseline calibration.6
The dynamic system (I.8)-(I.11) is linearized around the steady state. The
evolution of the industrial economy boils down to a linear dynamic system of two
equations and two unknown, CIt and z
I
t . Once the dynamics of z
I is solved using this
independent dynamic sub-system with 2 variables and 2 equations, the dynamics of
zE can be inferred using the log-linearized version of Equations (I.10) and (I.11).
The appendix provides the results of the log-linearization in more detail.
Proposition 5.1
If the emerging country is constrained and if |φE − f(k∞)| is sufficiently close to
zero, then, after financial integration, the industrial country experiences first a drop
and then progressive increase in the interest rate. It experiences a sharp increase
and then a declining path for z and k. The same pattern holds for y.
The formal proof is available in the appendix.
The intuition of the dynamics is as follows. Before financial globalization, because
of financial frictions and its need for liquidity, the emerging country holds excessive
amounts of short-term capital. This is apparent in Figure I.5, which represents the
behavior of some key variables. In particular, graphs (a) and (b) show that the level
of short-term capital is higher in E than in I. As a consequence, the autarky interest
rate is lower, as graph (c) illustrates it. Therefore, when financial markets integrate,
the world interest rate adjusts in between. From the industrial country’s point of
view, the interest rate falls, which stimulates investment and production. This is
apparent in graphs (a) and (e). After this initial shock, the interest rate begins
6 Even if the model is solved analytically in the appendix in order to establish Propositions 5.1
and 5.2, the simulations are obtained using DYNARE (Juillard, 1996) in order to be consistent
with the extension with capital installation costs.
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to rise progressively towards its long-run value. As a corollary, the investment and
production levels decrease towards their steady-state after the initial rise.
Note that the hypothesis that |φE − f(k∞)| is small is made to insure that the
trajectory of zI is unique.7
What does this imply for capital accumulation in the developing country ?
Proposition 5.2
Under Assumption 4.1, if ∆zE0 < 0, if |φE − f(k∞)| and |φE − f(k∞)|/|∆zE0 | are
sufficiently close to zero, then, after financial integration :
(i) The solution with permanently binding financing constraints in the emerging
economy exists and is unique.
(ii) The emerging country experiences a sharp, then progressive increase in the
interest rate. It experiences a growing path for b and z and a decreasing path
for k. The path for y, after an initial adjustment, is increasing in the early
stages of transition.
(iii) The production in the emerging country is increasing relative to the industrial
one along the transition path, after an initial adjustment.
The formal proof is available in the appendix.
(i) derives from the fact that if the entrepreneurs anticipate the interest rate
path consistent with binding financing constraints, then the constraints are actually
binding, since this path is unconsistent with both the first-best and risky solutions
for zE. The argument is similar to the one for Proposition 4.1 and relies on the fact
that the interest rate and the constrained zE are increasing on the constrained path
for the corresponding set of assumptions.
Consider (ii). Assume that the financing constraint is binding all along the
transition path in the emerging economy : bEt = [φ
E − f(f ′−1(Rt))]/Rt, where Rt is
7 As in Woodford (1986), the cohabitation of two kinds of agents, one constrained and the other
unconstrained, can generate instability.
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the world intrest rate. The external position in E is therefore determined exactly as
in the static model, and its derivative with respect to R is the same :
∂bE
∂R
= − ∂k
∂R︸ ︷︷ ︸
Substitution effect>0
−b
E
R︸︷︷︸
Wealth effect <0 or >0
The sign of the effect of the interest rate on bE depends on the relative magnitude
of the wealth and substitution effects. Wealth and substitution effects determine
the impact of the variation in interest rate in exactly the same fashion as in the
static model : on the one hand, if the interest rate rises, then the external bond is
substituted to the short-term capital, which makes the level of bonds increase ; on
the other hand, if the level of bonds is positive, then the increase in the interest rate
eases the liquidity requirements, so the level of bonds does not need to rise a lot. If
this wealth effect is high, the level of bonds might even decrease. Therefore, since
the external position is small (φE close to f(k∞)), the substitution effect dominates
and the level of bonds increases with the interest rate (∂bE/∂R). Consider now the
path of the interest rate Rt from the point of view of the emerging country : as
illustrated by graph (c) of Figure I.5, it is set above the initial autarky interest rate
after financial integration because the demand for bonds is lower in I, and then
continues to increase as it converges to its steady state level. As a result, the bond
level is increasing in E, as graph (b) shows. As a counterpart, the external position
of the industrial country bIt is declining, as illustrated in graph (a). Therefore, E will
exhibit current account surpluses on the transition path while I will exhibit deficits,
as graph (d) indicates.
zE follows an increasing path for two reasons : initial scarcity and wealth effects
similar to the ones discussed in the static case. First, since the level of bond holdings
is constrained, zE does not adjust immediately to the world interest rate and behaves
rather as under autarky. Namely, because it is in a scarce supply, it follows an
increasing path towards its steady state. Second, the world interest rate is increasing
steadily from the point of view of E, which eases the credit constraint more and more
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at each period, enabling entrepreneurs in E to invest more in the long-term capital
zE. Indeed, since the bond level is positive, an increase in the interest rate stimulates
the yield of the liquid portfolio ”mechanically”, and the amount of resources necessary
to satisfy the financing constraint diminishes. This wealth effect provides therefore
additional resources which are then dedicated to the long-term investment. This
last effect contributes up to 5% of the growth in he long-term investment in E. The
resulting increasing path for zE is provided in graph (b).
On the opposite, kE, which adjusts to the world interest rate, follows a decreasing
path, as illustrated in graph (b). The result is therefore ambiguous for yE. However,
it can be shown that when |φE − f(k∞)| is small relative to |∆zE0 |, yE is increasing
in the early stages of transition, as illustrated in grph (e). Indeed, |φE−f(k∞)| gives
the extent of the interest rate adjustment at the date of financial integration and the
distance to steady state of the new world interest rate. By extension, it also gives
the distance of kE to its steady state. Therefore, the hypothesis that |φE − f(k∞)|
is small relative to |∆zE0 | implies that zE is further from its steady state than kE. It
thus converges more rapidly and production benefits more from the increase of the
long-term capital than it suffers from the fall in short-term investment.
(iii) states that, despite the fact that yE is not always growing, it is increasing as
compared to yI . Indeed, the growth of yE is reversed for high ts only because of the
decline in short-term investment, which affects yI in the same way. As a consequence,
E and I differ only with regards to the long-term investment, which is increasing in
E and decreasing in I. Therefore, in relative terms, yE is growing as compared to
yI , as illustrated in graph (f). However, the graph shows that this is true only at the
date of financial integration, where the production in E falls relatively to I. This
comes from the sharp initial adjustment in short-term capital, also visible in graph
(f).
Proposition 5.2 implies that, under the specified conditions, the equilibrium
with permanently binding financing constraints in the emerging market exists and
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Fig. I.5 – Effect of financial integration at t = 0
(a) On I’s portfolio (b) On E’s portfolio
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(c) On the interest rate in I and E (d) On I’s CA balances-GDP ratio
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Nota : This simulation is obtained with the baseline parametrization summed up in Table I.1.
that in this equilibrium, the developing country exhibits current account surpluses,
which are the counterpart of deficits in the industrial one (Fact 1). Besides, the
production per head (entrepreneur) is increasing in the emerging country relative
to the industrial one (Fact 2). This relative increase takes place thanks to capital
accumulation (Fact 3), but also through aggregate TFP gains due to capital
reallocation (Fact 4). Relative TFP increases smoothly in the calibration (graph (f)
of Figure I.5), as in the data (Figure I.2), but relative aggregate capital and relative
production per capita exhibit an initial fall in the simulation, while it increases
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steadily in the data (Figures I.1 and I.2). This can be explained by the fact that,
in the emerging country, the adjustment in short-term capital is sharp, while the
adjustment in long-term capital is smooth, as graph (b) shows. This shortcoming
can be limited by adding capital installation costs.
Overall, the qualitative implications of the model in terms of qualitative
adjustment of the variables of interest are globally satisfying, except for the initial
adjustment. This issue will be tackled later by adding capital installation costs.
Another question is whether the calibration of the model yields the adequate orders
of magnitude for the stylized facts.
5.3 Quantitative fit
The results of the baseline method are reported in columns (a)-(c) of Table I.2
for A = 2, the baseline value for A, but also for A = 1.7 and A = 3, for robustness
analysis. In column (d), zE0 /x
E
0 is set such that the external debt is equal to 22% of
GDP on average between 1990 and 2003, with A = 2. The inferred share of initial
long-term capital in total capital is not shown directly, but as a ratio of U’s :
zE0 /x
E
0
z∞/x∞ .
The following values are also reported for each calibration : TFP growth, the growth
of capital per worker, the growth of production per worker in E, all relative to I ;
the share of growth in E attributable to growth in relative TFP ; the end-of-period
external position as a share of GDP and average current account as a share of GDP
in I. Because of the lack of data on k and z, each calibration method uses a key
stylized fact to determine zE0 . However, it is still possible to confront the model to
the other facts. For example, when zE0 is set to match the observed TFP growth, I
examine bI/yI and the share of growth that is due to TFP (columns (a)-(c)) ; when
it is set to match the US’s external position, I examine TFP growth and the share of
growth that is due to TFP (column (d)). Last, column (e) gives the observed values
of the corresponding variables. The variables that were set to their observed values
in the calibration columns are presented in bold characters.
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Tab. I.2 – Calibration results
Baseline Sensitivity Data
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
A 2 1,7 3 2 Unobservable
zE0 /x
E
0
z∞/x∞ 38% 34% 46% 64% Unobservable
TFP growth of E relative
to I 12% 12% 12% 4% 12%
Growth of capital per
worker in E relative to I 44% 47% 38% 52% 21%
Growth of production per
worker in E relative to I 28% 29% 26% 21% 18%
% of relative growth due
to TFP 46% 44% 49% 19% 68%
End-of-period bI/yI -61% -53% -73% -22% -22%
Average ∆bI/yI 4,8% -4,1% -5,7% -1.7% -2,6%
Source : World Bank (World Development Indicators), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) and Penn
World Tables 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006).
I corresponds to U : United States, Australia, United Kingdom.
E corresponds to EM : Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt,
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Russia, Singapore, Thailand and Venezuela.
Period : 1990-2003.
Capital stocks in EM and U are estimated with the perpetual inventory method, using the procedure
of Caselli (2004). TFP values in EM and U are estimated as yi/(xi)α, i ∈ {EM,U}, where α = 0.36,
yi and xi are respectively output per worker and capital per worker in i.
In the baseline calibration with fixed growth in relative TFP (column (a) of
Table I.2), the growth in relative output per worker is 1.5 times higher than in the
data. This is a consequence of the fact that the model over-estimates the amount of
growth in relative capital per worker by more than twice. As a result, the share of
growth attributable to TFP is not as high as in the data : it is one third smaller.
The amounts of end-of-period external debt and average current account deficit
in I are over-estimated respectively by a factor of three and two. However, given
the parsimony of the model, these are not bad results : the estimates are in the
right order of magnitude. In the model, the external position and capital adjust too
quickly. With appropriate installation costs on investment, the model could fit the
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data better. In other words, the bias of the model goes in the right direction : making
it more realistic by adding adjustment costs could make it closer to the data. We
check this in the extension with capital installation costs.
Consider now the additional columns (b) and (c) of Table I.2, which give the
calibration results for different values of A. Notice that, in columns (a)-(c), the
estimated share of long-term capital in total capital is increasing in A relatively to
the steady state : the higher the productivity of the long-term investment compared
to the short-term one, the lower the amount of misallocation needed to generate
a given growth in aggregate TFP. Notice also that the higher A, the higher the
growth in relative capital per worker. This is a composition effect : when A is large,
the share of z in aggregate capital is higher at steady state. Since, in E, z grows while
k decreases, it implies that the share of growing investment is high, which results in a
higher growth in aggregate investment. I’s indebtment level is increasing in A. This
is because, when A is high, the steady-state level of capital is high, which implies
that, to be consistent with the observed initial share of E in world’s capital, the
inferred initial level of aggregate capital in E is large, including k. Therefore, when
financial markets integrate, the adjustment in E’s external position is large. The
same holds for average current account deficits. As a consequence, the results which
are closer to the data, as far as the external position is concerned, are obtained with
A = 1.7.
In the calibration with fixed external position in I, summed up in column (d)
of Table I.2, the better fit in terms of capital flows is compensated by a worse
fit in terms of growth as compared to column (a). The average current account
deficit in I corresponds quite well to the data, but growth in relative TFP is
underestimated. This is intuitive : the external debt of I is an indirect measure
of the initial misallocation in E, because it gives the amount of the adjutment in
short-term capital in E after financial integration. In column (d), the external debt
of I is smaller than in (a), which implies that the initial misallocation in E is not
as strong, so the aggregate gains in TFP due to a better allocation of capital are
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smaller. A corollary of this limited misallocation is that the fall in short-term capital
is mitigated, which leads to a higher aggregate growth in investment. As a result,
the share of growth due to TFP is even lower. Still, as before, the introduction of
capital installation costs could make these results closer to the data. Besides, our
interpretation of the origins of TFP growth is not exclusive of others, for example
knowledge transfers from North to South. Put differently, calibrating the model in
order to match the external position of U gives an amount of TFP growth due to
capital reallocation smaller than in the data, which is compatible with other sources
of TFP growth.
5.4 Adding capital installation costs
In this section, the model is enriched with capital installation costs in order to
make the model fit better the data. In particular, I check whether : (i) the initial
fall in investment in E is limited, making the dynamics of relative aggregate capital
stocks and productions look more like in the data ; (ii) the external position and
current account adjustments in I are quantitatively closer to the data when matching
the parameters to account for the observed TFP growth.
Define ik as the investment in short-term capital and iz as the investment in
long-term capital. The entrepreneur’s program is modified by the introduction of
capital installation costs. It can be written as follows :
V (kt, zt, bt) =
max
{kt+1,zt+1,bt+1,ikt ,izt}
log
(
f(kt) + g(zt) +Rtbt − bt+1 − kt+1 − zt+1 − ktΨ
(
ikt
kt
)
− ztΨ
(
izt
zt
))
+βV (kt+1, zt+1, bt+1) (I.12)
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s.t.

f(kt+1) +Rt+1bt+1 ≥ φ
ikt = kt+1 − (1− δ)kt
izt = zt+1 − (1− δ)zt
The installation costs per unit of capital are defined in the standard following
way :
Ψ (x) =
ψ
2
(x− δ)2 (I.13)
Equation (I.13) implies that any change in the stock of capital is costly, whether
it has to be increased or decreased. It also implies that installation costs are zero
when the firm’s investment is at its steady state level δ. Besides, this specification
entails that it is not only costly to change the stock of aggregate capital, but also
to transfer capital from one technology to the other. ψ is the key parameter of the
installation costs. It represents their size.
This program is solved using DYNARE (Juillard, 1996), with the baseline
calibration of Table I.1. Only
zE0 /x
E
0
z∞/x∞ changes slightly in order to fit the observed
increase in TFP in E. For this purpose, it is set to 37%. The baseline calibration for
ψ, the installation cost parameter, is set to 1. This specification is chosen to match
the estimates of Gilchrist and Sim (2007) and Eberly et al. (2008) on firm-level
data8. Gilchrist and Sim (2007) find estimates of ψ which are robustly close to 1.
The estimates of Eberly et al. (2008) range between 0.8 and 1.8. For the sensitivity
analysis, I also set ψ to 0.5, 2 and 5. The results are reported in Figure I.6 and Table
I.3.
Graph (c) in Figure I.6 presents both the interest rate and the cost of capital.
The initial fall in the interest rate in I increases the incentives to invest for domestic
agents. However, the fall in the cost of capital is limited by the increase in the
installation cost. The cost of capital therefore stays temporarily above the interest
8 Gilchrist and Sim (2007) used Korean data and Eberly et al. (2008) relied on US data.
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Fig. I.6 – Effect of financial integration at t = 0 - Capital installation costs
(a) On I’s portfolio (b) On E’s portfolio
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(c) On the interest rate in I and E (d) On I’s CA balances-GDP ratio
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(e) On production per worker (f) On relative growth
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Nota : This simulation is obtained with the baseline parametrization summed up in Table I.1,
except for z
E
0 /x
E
0
z∞/x∞
, which is set to 37%.
rate. In E, because of the initial increase in the interest rate, the agents want
to hold more short-term capital. However, the installation costs incurred by the
diminution in the stock of short-term capital decrease the incentives to diminish the
stock of capital. The cost of short-term capital therefore stays temporarily below
the interest rate. Consequently, as graphs (a) and (b) show, the introduction of
installation costs makes the adjustment in the capital stocks smoother. In particular,
the stock of short-term capital does not fall sharply in E when financial markets
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integrate. Similarly, the initial adjustment in the capital stocks in I is delayed. As
a consequence, the relative stock of aggregate capital is almost flat at the date
of financial integration and the relative production per capita increases from the
beginning to the end of the period (graph (f)).
Noticeably, graph (b) of Figure I.6 shows that, as bonds are substituted to short-
term capital in E’s liquid portfolio, E’s external position increases progressively. The
progressive increase in E’s assets is matched by the progressive increase in I’s debt.
The adjustment in the current account of I is therefore smoother than in the baseline
case.
Tab. I.3 – Calibration results - Capital installation costs
Baseline Sensitivity Data
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
A 2 2 2 2 Unobservable
zE0 /(k
E
0 +z
E
0 )
z∞/(k∞+z∞) 37% 37% 36% 35% Unobservable
ψ 1 0.5 2 5 Unobservable
TFP growth of E relative
to I 12% 12% 12% 12% 12%
Growth of capital per
worker in E relative to I 37% 40% 33% 26% 21%
Growth of production per
worker in E relative to I 25% 26% 24% 21% 18%
% of relative growth due
to TFP 50% 49% 53% 57% 68%
End-of-period bI/yI -60% -61% -57% -49% -22%
Average ∆bI/yI -4,7% -4,8% -4,5% -3.9% -2,6%
Source : World Bank (World Development Indicators), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) and Penn
World Tables 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006).
I corresponds to U : United States, Australia, United Kingdom.
E corresponds to EM : Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt,
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Russia, Singapore, Thailand and Venezuela.
Period : 1990-2003.
Capital stocks in EM and U are estimated with the perpetual inventory method, using the procedure
of Caselli (2004). TFP values in EM and U are estimated as yi/(xi)α, i ∈ {EM,U}, where α = 0.36,
yi and xi are respectively output per worker and capital per worker in i.
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As for the quantitative results shown in Table I.3, the end-of-period indebtment
of I is only slightly decreased. Only for very high, unrealistic adjustment costs is
the external position significantly affected. The results of column (d), drawn with
the extreme hypothesis that ψ = 5, give a level of debt which is still twice as high
as in the data. These disappointing results are due to the fact that the installation
costs are effective only during the transition. As the level of capital converges to
its steady state, the installation costs disappear. This is illustrated by the fact that
the cost of capital in graph (c) of Figure I.6 converges towards the interest rate. At
the end of the period, given our time span, this convergence is close to be achieved.
Consistently, the other quantities are also unaffected for realistic levels of installation
costs.
6 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the presence of financing constraints on the more
productive technology in emerging markets can account, at least qualitatively, both
for their capital outflows (Fact 1) and for their relative growth since 1990 as
compared to the industrial countries, in particular the US (Fact 2). This growth
is due both to the convergence of the level of capital to its steady state (Fact 3),
but also to TFP growth (Fact 4). The latter is due to a better allocation of capital
enabled by the replacement of the less productive, short-term capital with external
bonds in the portfolio of the emerging countries. Indeed, since the developed world
has better financial markets, its demand for liquid assets for hoarding purposes is
lower than that of the developing countries ; as a result, when financial globalization
occurs, the emerging economies hold US bonds in order to use it as a hoard.
Qualitatively, in particular when accounting for capital installation costs, the
model fits rather well the observed trends in the US current account, relative TFP
growth and capital accumulation in emerging countries (hence their relative labor
productivity growth). Quantitatively, when the model is fitted on the observed
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relative TFP growth, the level of debt and current account deficits in the US is
over-estimated as well as the share of growth due to capital accumulation. However,
the order of magnitude is partly captured. Besides, when the model is fitted on the
US external position, the implied TFP growth due to capital reallocation is smaller
than in the data, which is compatible with other sources of TFP growth.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.2
First, I examine how k, z and b vary with R under PFM and IFM. Then I show
how the interest rate adjusts after the financial integration of I and E. Finally,
depending on how the interest rate varies from the point of view of E and I, I
determine how the portfolio adjusts in both countries.
Under PFM :
∂k∗/∂R = 1
f ′′(f ′−1(R)) < 0 and ∂z
∗/∂R = 1
g′′(g′−1(R)) < 0 : k
∗ and z∗ are decreasing
in R because of decreasing marginal returns. As a consequence, since b∗(R) = w −
k∗(R)− z∗(R), b∗ is increasing in R.
Under IFM :
First, assume that the constrained allocation is chosen.
Because even for the constrained allocation the entrepreneur chooses k¯ optimally,
k¯ is decreasing in R because it becomes relatively less efficient than b¯ : ∂k¯/∂R =
1
f ′′(f ′−1(R)) < 0.
Differentiating (FC) with respect to R, and using the optimality condition
f ′(k¯) = R, we obtain ∂b¯/∂R = −∂k¯/∂R − b¯
R
, which is positive when b small,
since ∂k¯/∂R < 0.
Differentiating (BC) with respect to R, we find ∂z¯/∂R = −∂k¯/∂R − ∂b¯/∂R.
Replacing ∂b¯/∂R, this yields : ∂z¯/∂R = b¯
R
.
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We have b¯(R¯a) = 0, so when R = R¯a, we have ∂b¯/∂R = −∂k¯/∂R > 0. Therefore,
in the neighborhood of R¯a, if R < R¯a, then b¯ < 0, so ∂b¯/∂R > 0. b¯ is therefore always
negative when R < R¯a, and we have ∂b¯/∂R > 0 and ∂z¯/∂R > 0. However, when
R > R¯a, ∂b¯/∂R has an ambiguous sign. Still, for R > R¯a, it can be shown that
b¯ > 0 and as a consequence ∂z¯/∂R > 0. Indeed, it can be seen that, when b is high,
b can decrease with R but it never becomes negative : if b falls a lot, then ∂k¯/∂R
will eventually become predominant, and b would start to rise again.
Adjustment of R after financial integration :
For R < R¯a, both b∗ and b¯ are negative. For R > Ra∗, both b∗ and b¯ are positive.
For R¯a ≤ R ≤ Ra∗, b∗ ≤ 0 and b¯ ≥ 0, so, if there exists a solution Ro such that
b∗(Ro) = −b¯(Ro), it is necessary in the [R¯a, Ra∗] interval. Such a solution exists by
continuity of b∗ and b¯ since b¯(R¯a) = 0, b¯(Ra∗) ≥ 0, b∗(R¯a) < 0 and b∗(Ra∗) = 0.
Now, we can show that for R = Ro, the credit constraint is still binding in the
emerging economy by ruling out the first-best allocation and the risky one. First, a
sufficient condition for ruling out the first-best allocation is z∗(Ro) ≥ z¯(Ro). This
condition is equivalent to w − f(k ∗ (Ro))− b∗(Ro) ≥ w − f(k¯(Ro))− b¯(Ro), which
corresponds to b∗(Ro) ≤ b¯(Ro). We have shown that b∗(R) ≤ 0 and b¯(R) ≥ 0 for
all R ∈ [R¯a, Ra∗], and since Ro ∈ [R¯a, Ra∗], we have necessarily b∗(Ro) ≤ b¯(Ro).
Therefore, the first-best allocation is not implementable for R = Ro. Similarly,
Assumption 3.1 implies that z¯(R¯a) > z∗∗(R¯a). Besides, we have shown that for
R > R¯a, ∂z¯/∂R > 0. On the other hand, ∂z∗∗/∂R < 0. Therefore, z¯(Ro) > z∗∗(Ro),
which implies that the allocation for R = Ro is the constrained one.
As a conclusion, a solution with a binding financing constraint in the emerging
markets exists and is characterized by an interest rate Ro in the [R¯a, Ra∗] interval.
Adjustment of the portfolio after financial integration :
Consider the general equilibrium solution characterized by R = Ro.
52 Financial Integration, Technological Change in EM and Global Imbalances
Since the industrial economy experiences a drop in the interest rate when
financial markets integrate, k∗ and z∗ rise and b∗ decreases.
Since the emerging economy experiences a drop in the interest rate when financial
markets integrate, k¯ falls while z¯ and b¯ rise. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3.3
We consider the solution satisfying Assumption 3.1 highlighted in Proposition
3.2, with a binding financing constraint in E. In the Cobb-Douglas case :
k¯ =
(
α
R
) 1
1−α , b¯ = Φ
R
− 1
α
(
α
R
) 1
1−α , z¯ = w − Φ
R
+ 1−α
α
(
α
R
) 1
1−α
Then the derivatives can be inferred :
∂k¯/∂R = − 1
1−α
α
1
1−α
R
2−α
1−α
, ∂b¯/∂R = − Φ
R2
+ 1
1−α
α
α
1−α
R
2−α
1−α
, ∂z¯/∂R = Φ
R2
− α
α
1−α
R
2−α
1−α
Which implies :
∂y¯/∂R > 0
⇔ Aα
(
w − Φ
R
+
1− α
α
(α
R
) 1
1−α
)−(1−α)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
g′(z¯)
(
Φ
R2
− α
α
1−α
R
2−α
1−α
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂z¯/∂R
+ R︸︷︷︸
f ′(k¯)
(
−1
1− α
α
1
1−α
R
2−α
1−α
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂k¯/∂R
>
0
⇔ Aα
 ΦR2 − α
α
1−α
R
2−α
1−α︸ ︷︷ ︸
b/R(>0)
 > 11−α ( αR) 11−α
w − ΦR + 1− αα (αR) 11−α︸ ︷︷ ︸
z(>0)

(1−α)
Which is true if A or Φ high, or if w small.
If the above condition is satisfied, that is if A and φE high, if w small, then
∂y¯/∂R > 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5.1
The (I.8) and (I.9) system that characterizes the dynamics of the industrial
country is linearized around the financial globalization steady state (z∞, CI∞) :
∆CIt+1 = ∆C
I
t − β
[
κ+ (1− β)n
E
nI
[φ− f(k∞)]g′′(z∞)
]
∆zIt+1 for t ≥ 0 (I.14)
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∆CIt =
χ
β
∆zIt − (χ+ β2g′′(z∞)
nE
nI
[φ− f(k∞)])∆zIt+1 for t > 0 (I.15)
and at t = 0 :
∆CI0 = −
(
χ+ β2g′′(z∞)
nE
nI
[φ− f(k∞)]
)
∆zI1 +
nE
nI
[φ− f(k∞)] (I.16)
where κ = (1 + A
−1
1−α )
(
1
β
− [1− δ(1− α)]
)(
1
β
− [1− δ]
)
and χ = 1 + 2A
−1
1−α > 1.
Equations (I.14), (I.15) and (I.16), which govern the dynamics of the industrial
economy, are independent from the rest of the system, since they only involve zI and
CI . Once the dynamics of zI is solved using this independent dynamic sub-system
with 2 variables and 2 equations, the dynamics of zE can be inferred using Equations
(I.10) and (I.11).
We replace ∆CIt+1 and ∆C
I
t in (I.14) using (I.15). We obtain the following second-
order difference equation for ∆zI :
∆zIt+2−
1 + χ
β(χ+ β2g′′(z∞)n
E
nI
[φ− f(k∞)])
+
β
(
κ+ (1− β)nE
nI
[φ− f(k∞)]g′′(z∞)
)
χ+ β2g′′(z∞)n
E
nI
[φ− f(k∞)]
∆zIt+1
+
χ
β(χ+ β2g′′(z∞)n
E
nI
[φ− f(k∞)])
∆zIt = 0
The characteristic polynomial of this difference equation is :
PI(x) = x
2−
1 + χ
β(χ+ β2g′′(z∞)n
E
nI
[φ− f(k∞)])
+
β
(
κ+ (1− β)nE
nI
[φ− f(k∞)]g′′(z∞)
)
χ+ β2g′′(z∞)n
E
nI
[φ− f(k∞)]
x
+
χ
β(χ+ β2g′′(z∞)n
E
nI
[φ− f(k∞)])
= 0
Under the condition χ > −β2g′′(z∞)nEnI [φ − f(k∞)], the above second-order
polynomial has two positive roots, one above one and denoted λ′I , and the other
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below one and denoted λI . The former is irrelevant because it leads to a path for
∆zIt that is explosive. Then we know that, for all t > 0 :
∆zIt+1 = λI∆z
I
t
with ∆zI1 =
nE
nI
φ−f(k∞)
λ′I
as an initial condition, derived from Equation (I.16). At
impact, zI thus increases in the industrial country and then slowly decreases towards
its steady state.
If the emerging country is credit constrained all along the transition path, then
the industrial country’s dynamics is well described by the previous equations. If
φ − f(k∞) is small, then χ > −β2g′′(z∞)nEnI [φ − f(k∞)]. Therefore, as said before,
∆zI admits a unique trajectory towards the steady state.
Since φ > f(k∞) and λ′I > 1, ∆z
I
1 =
nE
nI
φ−f(k∞)
λ′I
> 0. This yields the dynamics
for zI when the emerging country is constrained, but also for kI , yI and the world
interest rate Rt, since ∆k
I
t = A
−1
1−α∆zIt , ∆y
I
t = 1/β(1 + A
−1
1−α )∆zIt and ∆Rt =
g′′(z∞)∆zIt . ¥
Proof of Proposition 5.2
Equations (I.10) and (I.11) are log-linearized around the steady state (z∞, CI∞) :
∆CEt+1 = ∆C
E
t − β
(
κ− 1− β
β
g′′(z∞)[φ− f(k∞)]
)
∆zEt+1 for t ≥ 0 (I.17)
∆CEt =
1
β
∆zEt −∆zEt+1 + β2g′′(z∞)[φ− f(k∞)]∆zIt+1 for t ≥ 0 (I.18)
Evolution of zEt :
Replacing ∆CEt+1 and ∆C
E
t in Equation (I.17) using (I.18), we find that ∆z
E
t is
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defined implicitly by the following second-order difference equation :
∆zEt+2 −
(
1
β
+ β
(
κ− 1− β
β
g′′(z∞)[φ− f(k∞)]
)
+ 1
)
∆zEt+1 +
1
β
∆zEt
= −β2g′′(z∞)[φ− f(k∞)](1− λI)∆zIt+1 (I.19)
The characteristic polynomial of the homogeneous equation is
PE(x) = x
2 −
(
1
β
+ β
(
κ− 1− β
β
g′′(z∞)[φ− f(k∞)]
)
+ 1
)
x+
1
β
= 0
This polynomial has two positive roots, λ′E > 1, and λE, which is positive and lower
than one. The only relevant root is therefore λE. A particular solution to the general
equation is of the form : ∆zEt = v∆z
I
t+1. v must satisfy :
v
[
λ2I −
(
1
β
+ β
(
κ− 1− β
β
g′′(z∞)[φ− f(k∞)]
)
+ 1
)
λI +
1
β
]
= −β2(1− λI)g′′(z∞)[φ− f(k∞)]
As a result : v = −β
2(1−λI)g′′(z∞)[φ−f(k∞)]
(λE−λI)(λ′E−λI) .
The general, converging solution for ∆zEt is then of the following form ∆z
E
t =
λtE∆z
′
0 + v∆z
I
t+1. Here, ∆z0 is given so ∆z
′
0 must satisfy ∆z
E
0 = ∆z
′
0 + v∆z
I
1 , so we
have :
∆zEt = λ
t
E(∆z
E
0 − v∆zI1) + λtIv∆zI1 (I.20)
To study the evolution of zE, we have to determine the sign of v, which is the same
as λE − λI . Consider the case where φE = f(k∞) : PI(λ)− PE(λ) = βκ(1− 1/χ)λ.
We have χ > 1, so, for λ > 0, PI(λ) > PE(λ). As a result, PI(λE) > PE(λE) = 0.
Since PI is decreasing on the [0, 1] interval, and PI(λI) = 0, then λI > λE. This is
still the case by continuity when φE close to f(k∞). Therefore, v < 0.
As a consequence, since ∆zI1 is of the same sign as φ
E−f(k∞), which is positive,
the second term of the RHS is negative. Since, additionally, ∆zE0 < 0 and ∆z
I
1 and
v are proportional to |φE − f(k∞)|, which is small compared to |∆zE0 |, the second
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term is also negative. Therefore, ∆zEt is always negative and z
E is increasing in t.
Existence of the constrained solution : We now show that the solution
defined by Equation (I.20) under the hypothesis of forever binding financing
constraints does exist. We have to prove first that if zEt follows (I.20), then the
entrepreneurs are indeed constrained. It is the case as long as ∆zIt > ∆z
E
t .
φE > f(k∞) implies that ∆zIt > 0. It has been shown also that ∆z
E
t < 0. As a
consequence, ∆zIt > ∆z
E
t for all t > 0.
Second, we have to prove that under Assumption 4.1, the risky allocation is not
a better choice along the transition path with binding financing constraint. First,
recall that Assumption 4.1, the risky z is below the constrained one for the interest
rate corresponding to the constrained allocation. When the constraint is binding
on the convergence path, zE increases. Besides, the interest rate increases, so the
corresponding risky allocation decreases. The constrained allocation is still above
the risky one, so the latter is ruled out along the constrained transition path.
Evolution of bEt :When the economy is constrained, ∆b
E
t evolves according to :
∆bEt =
(
−β2g′′(z∞)[φ− f(k∞)]− A
−1
1−α
)
∆zIt
When φE−f(k∞) is small, the substitution effect dominates so ∆bEt is of the opposite
sign of ∆zIt , which is positive : b
E
t is below its steady state and is increasing in t.
Evolution of kEt : After the integration of financial markets, k
E
t follows the
same path as kIt , since f
′(kEt ) is equal to the world interest rate.
Evolution of yEt : According to Equation (I.20) and since ∆k
E
t = A
−1
1−α∆zIt =
A
−1
1−αλtI∆z
I
1/λI , the evolution of y
E is given by the following equation :
∆yEt =
1
β
[
λtE(∆z
E
0 − v∆zI1) + λtI
(
v +
A
−1
1−α
λI
)
∆zI1
]
v is proportional to φE − f(k∞). Therefore, if φE is close to f(k∞), then the second
term is positive. On the opposite, as we have already shown, the first term is negative.
However, ∆zI1 is proportional to φ
E−f(k∞), so when φE−f(k∞) is small as compared
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to |∆zE0 |, the RHS is negative and increasing in t for small values of t. However, since
λI > λE, as we have shown, the first term becomes negligible for large values of t,
and the RHS becomes positive and decreasing in t.
Evolution of yEt /y
I
t : Up to a linear approximation, y
E
t /y
I
t evolves in the same
direction as ∆yEt −∆yIt . Besides, we have :
∆yEt −∆yIt =
1
β
[
λtE(∆z
E
0 − v∆zI1) + λtI
(
v − 1
λI
)
∆zI1
]
All the terms of the RHS are negative and increasing in t, so ∆yEt −∆yIt is increasing
in t. ¥
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Chapitre II
A Reappraisal of the Allocation
Puzzle through the Portfolio
Approach
1 Introduction
The neoclassical growth model (Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans) predicts that a country
whose marginal return on capital is above the world’s interest rate and that opens
to international bond markets increases its investment level through international
borrowing. More precisely, when the return on domestic capital is higher than the
cost of borrowing, it is optimal to borrow from the rest of the world to finance
domestic investment. Under decreasing marginal returns, this takes place until the
marginal return on capital equals the world’s interest rate. The higher the initial
discrepancy between both returns, the more the country invests and the more it
has to borrow. This should generate a positive cross-country correlation between
investment and capital inflows.
Two main elements can account for the difference between a country’s marginal
return on capital and the international interest rate : capital-scarcity and total factor
productivity (TFP) gains. If the level of capital is low when financial markets open,
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then its marginal return is high relatively to the world’s interest rate. Similarly,
starting from equal domestic and foreign returns, an increase in TFP pushes the
former above the latter. In both cases, both investment and foreign borrowing
increase. Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2004) show that TFP remains the
main source of cross-country differences in income. Therefore, according to the
textbook growth model, countries with higher productivity growth should attract
more capital.
This prediction has recently been challenged by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007).
Using a calibrated neoclassical growth model in the spirit of the development
accounting literature on a sample of 69 non-OECD economies between 1980 and
2000, they show that not only the model fails to predict the correct amount of
capital inflows, but the predicted flows are negatively correlated with the actual ones.
They call this paradox the ”allocation puzzle”. This puzzle comes from the fact that
productivity growth is negatively correlated to capital inflows. Put differently, the
more productive countries receive less capital from abroad. According to the model,
countries with higher productivity growth should (i) invest more in their technology
in order to keep up with productivity growth, and (ii) borrow from the rest of the
world to finance their investment. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) show that these
countries do invest more, but instead of borrowing more, they lend more. This puzzle
is summarized by Figure II.1, which presents the cross-country correlation between
the growth rate of GDP per worker and the average current account balances during
1980-2000 on the one hand (upper graph), and between the average investment rate
and the average current account balances during the same period on the other hand
(lower graph). The figure shows that capital outflows are positively related to both
growth and investment1. Explaining the puzzle thus necessitates to account for this
positive correlation between investment and capital outflows.
In this paper, I introduce investment risk in the neoclassical model used by
1 The significant positive correlations are robust to the exclusion of China in the upper panel and
Singapore in the lower panel. The resulting t-statistics are respectively 1.98 and 1.83.
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Fig. II.1 – Growth of GDP per worker and investment rate against current account
balances, 1980-2000
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Source : Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006), CHELEM database.
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) to explain the positive correlation between investment
and capital outflows. Two cases are then considered : the particular case where the
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level of risk is zero and the case where it is strictly greater than zero. The first
case corresponds to the ”riskless” approach and is similar to Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2007), while the second case corresponds to a portfolio choice approach. In the
riskless approach, private capital and bonds are perfect substitutes : if the marginal
productivity of private capital is higher than the world interest rate on bonds, then
it is optimal to borrow from the rest of the world in order to invest in private capital.
In the portfolio approach, the composition of the portfolio matters. In particular,
in the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) case, bonds and private capital are
constant shares of the portfolio. Intuitively, one part of the portfolio (riskless bonds)
are used to self-insure against the riskiness of the other part (risky capital). In this
case, a more productive domestic capital makes a country more willing to invest in
private capital, but in order to invest more it has to hold a higher amount of bonds.
In the long term, this is possible because a higher productivity makes the country
richer. It is therefore possible to exhibit a negative correlation between productivity
growth and capital inflows (i.e. a positive correlation between productivity growth
and capital outflows).
The two approaches are developed and calibrated on the same sample as
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007). When using the riskless approach, the same negative
correlation between predicted and observed flows as in Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2007) is found. As expected, the allocation puzzle is recovered. When relying on
the portfolio approach, a positive correlation between predicted and observed flows
is found. Therefore, the portfolio approach outperforms the riskless one in terms of
capital flows allocation. Two main facts contribute to this result : (i) countries with
higher TFP growth tend to experience smaller capital inflows ; (ii) countries with
larger capital shares in their portfolio at the beginning of period also experience
smaller capital inflows. Fact (i) is at the core of the puzzle when using the riskless
approach while it is consistent with the portfolio approach, according to the intuition
developed above. Fact (ii) makes sense only within the portfolio approach and
also contributes to solve the puzzle. This is because, contrasting with the riskless
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approach, the share of capital and safe assets in the portfolio at steady state is
determined and unique across countries. Convergence towards the steady state then
implies a smaller rise in the capital share in countries where capital is already a
large part of the portfolio. Therefore, the level of bonds should decrease less in those
countries. These two facts contribute strongly to the success of the portfolio approach
in reproducing the right direction of flows. However, in assessing the magnitude
of flows, the portfolio approach fares worse than the riskless one. Capital inflows
to developing countries are over-estimated by several order of magnitude. Some
extensions are developed in order to diminish this discrepancy.
As for the first chapter, some theories can be related to the puzzle : on the one
hand, Modigliani’s life-cycle hypothesis (Modigliani, 1986) and the habit-formation
model (Carroll et al., 2000), which account for the positive correlation between
growth and savings ; on the other hand, the export-led growth theories (Dooley et al.,
2004, 2005a; Rodrik, 2006, 2007). The general introduction has already exposed the
limits of these approaches in accounting for the positive correlation between current
account balances and growth.
However, it is worth reminding how the contributions on global imbalances can be
related to the allocation puzzle. The explanations that highlight the role of financial
development are potential candidates to account for the allocation puzzle. Dooley
et al. (2005b), Mendoza et al. (2007a), Matsuyama (2007) and Ju and Wei (2006,
2007) explain how low financial development in the South, through production risk,
credit constraints or a poor financial intermediation system can lead to ”uphill flows”,
that is, positive lending to the North. As stressed in the general introduction, these
approaches can be related to the Lucas puzzle. However, as highlighted in the general
introduction, the allocation puzzle cannot be reduced to the Lucas paradox, since
the latter is about the magnitude and not the direction of flows. The Lucas puzzle
points to the fact that the capital flows that would enable the marginal productivity
of capital to equalize across countries do not take place. It can be explained by the
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presence of an unobserved capital wedge which depends on the country’s institutions.
This wedge can explain why the observed marginal productivity, measured by the
capital to labor ratio, does not adjust. In fact, the ex-post, unobserved private
returns, impaired by the capital wedge, do adjust. Even if this wedge is taken into
account, as in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007), capital should still flow where the level
of investment is higher, that is in countries where the wedge-adjusted productivity
is higher. The contributions on global imbalances, which explain uphill flows by the
presence of a wedge between the marginal return to capital and the rate of return,
fail to explain the allocation puzzle.
Some other studies on global imbalances show a concern for growth. Caballero
et al. (2008) build an intergenerational model where low financial development, that
is the inability of the economy to store value, increases the demand for foreign assets.
As a consequence, high growth economies can still export capital if they cannot
generate enough assets. This model provides a convincing explanation for the joint
phenomenon of the US deficit and Asian savings glut. But growth still has a negative
impact on the long-term current account and external position because it increases
the domestic supply of assets. In Aghion et al. (2006b), domestic savings constitute
a collateral and thus favors foreign investment, which has positive externalities on
growth. But the consequences in terms of correlation between growth and the current
account, that is savings minus investment, are unclear. Besides, they take the savings
rate as exogenous, whereas empirical evidence suggests that they cause one another
(Carroll and Weil, 1994; Attanasio et al., 2000).
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows : Section 2 presents the model
with the two approaches and their properties ; Section 3 calibrates the model and
confronts the predicted capital flows according to both approaches to the data ;
Section 4 provides some extensions.
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2 Amending the neoclassical growth model
In this section, I build on the neoclassical growth model developed by Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2007), in which capital flows are determined by their productivity path
relative to the world technology frontier. The model features a small open economy
and the rest of the world. The latter is unaffected by the small country’s dynamics.
What is examined specifically here is how investment risk modifies portfolio decisions
and in particular capital flows.
Time is continuous, indexed by t ∈ [0,∞). There is a continuum of length 1 of
infinitely-lived households, or families, indexed by i. Each household is composed of
Nt members, and each member is endowed with 1 unit of labor. Labor is supplied
inelastically in a competitive labor market. Each household owns a firm which
employs labor in the competitive labor market. Households can invest only in the
-risky- capital of their own firm or in a riskless bond. All uncertainty is idiosyncratic,
and hence all aggregates are deterministic.
2.1 Firms and technology
Denote household i’s net capital income by dQit. It evolves according to :
dQit = (1− τ)[F (Kit , AtN it )− wtN it ]dt− δKitdt+ σK itdvit (II.1)
where Kit is the household’s holdings in private capital, At the exogenous and
deterministic level of productivity, N it the amount of labor the firm hires in the
labor market, wt the wage rate, which is not firm-specific since the labor market is
competitive. The parameter τ is a wedge on the gross capital return, that is, before
subtracting capital depreciation. This is a deviation from Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2007), where the wedge is on capital returns net of depreciation. This specification
is chosen only for practical reasons2 and does not change the results dramatically.
As in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007), this wedge can be interpreted as a tax on
2 The resulting amount can be expressed as a fraction of production.
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capital income, or as the result of other distorsions that would introduce a difference
between social and private returns. We assume that this tax on capital return is
distributed equally among households. The parameter δ is the depreciation rate.
The production function F is assumed to follow a Cobb-Douglas specification :
F (K,AN) = Kα(AN)1−α, α ∈ (0, 1). The technology is exactly identical to
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007), except that time is continuous and that investment
risk is introduced through a standard Wiener process dvit. This process is assumed
to be iid across agents and time. It satisfies E[dvit = 0] and E[(dv
i
t)
2] = 1 for all i
and E[dvitdv
j
t ] = 0 for all i, j, i 6= j. This risk can be interpreted as a production or a
depreciation shock that affects the return on capital. It is assumed that this shock is
averaged out across households, that is :
∫ 1
0
dvit = 0. The parameter σ measures the
amount of individual risk. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007)’s specification is nested
when σ = 0.
We show now that the capital income is linear in K it . Denote k˜
i
t = K
i
t/(AtN
i
t ) the
capital per efficient unit of labor and y˜it = F (K
i
t , AtN
i
t )/(AtN
i
t ) = f(k˜
i
t) = k˜
iα
t the
production per efficient unit of labor. Employment is chosen after the capital stock
has been installed and the shock has been observed. Therefore, at each period t, the
firm chooses employment in order to maximize F (Kit , AtN
i
t )−wtN it , where wt is the
competitive wage per unit of labor. This yields wt = (1 − α)At(k˜it)α. Because the
competitive wage is constant across firms k˜it, the ratio of capital to efficient labor, is
also constant across firms. Denote k˜t = k˜(w˜t) = w˜
1/α
t /(1−α), where w˜ = w/A is the
wage per efficient unit of labor. Using this result, we can write the capital income
as follows :
dQit = rtK
i
tdt+ σK
i
tdv
i
t
where rt = r(w˜t, τ) = (1− τ)αk˜(w˜t)α−1− δ is the private net return on capital. The
net capital income is therefore linear in Kit , which makes the analysis tractable when
σ > 0.
The country has an exogenous, deterministic productivity path {At}t=0,...,∞,
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which is bounded by the world productivity frontier :
At ≤ A∗t = A∗0eg
∗t
The world productivity frontier is assumed to grow at rate g∗. Following Gou-
rinchas and Jeanne (2007), we define the difference between domestic productivity
and the productivity conditional on no technological catch-up as follows :
epit =
At
A0eg
∗t (II.2)
We assume that pi = limt→∞pit is well defined. Therefore, the growth rate of
domestic productivity converges to g∗.
2.2 The household’s program
The household’s preferences follow expected utility. Instantaneous utility is
logarithmic. We assume, as Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995), that the representative
member of the household is altruistic and maximizes the welfare of his descendants
along with his own. He therefore maximizes the following family’s welfare function :
U it = Et
∫ ∞
t
Ns ln c
i
se
−ρ(s−t)ds (II.3)
where ρ > 0 is the discount rate and cit is the individual consumption of the members
of household i in period t. The growth rate of population is supposed to be exogenous
and equal to n :
Nt = N0e
nt
For the utility function to be well defined, we must have n < ρ.
We now turn to the household’s budget constraint.
Let Bt denote the household’s holdings in riskless bond and Ht his human wealth
defined as the present discounted value of future labor income and tax product :
68 A Reappraisal of the Allocation Puzzle through the Portfolio Approach
Ht =
∫∞
t
e−(s−t)R
∗
(Nsws + Zs)ds where R
∗ is the international interest rate and
Zt =
∫ 1
0
τ [F (K it , AtN
i
t ) − wtN it ]di = ταk˜(w˜t)α−1Kt is the tax product, with Kt =∫ 1
0
Kitdi . We thus have :
dHt = (R
∗Ht −Ntwt − Zt)dt (II.4)
Define effective wealth as the sum of financial wealth Bit+K
i
t , and human wealth :
Ωit = B
i
t +K
i
t +Ht
The evolution of the household’s financial wealth obeys to :
d(Bit +K
i
t) = dQ
i
t + [R
∗Bit +Ntwt + Zt − Cit ]dt (II.5)
It follows from (II.1), (II.4) and (II.5), that the evolution of effective wealth, in
per capita terms, can be described by :
dωit = [rtk
i
t +R
∗(bit + ht)− cit − nωit]dt+ σkitdzit (II.6)
where lower case letters, except n, the population’s growth rate, stand for per capita
(i.e. per family member) values. For each variable X it (Xt), x
i
t (xt) stands for X
i
t/Nt
(Xt/Nt).
A key element is that the return to capital is linear in Kit . This translates to
the linearity of effective wealth. The household maximizes his utility with respect
to (II.6). When we set σ = 0, the framework corresponds to that of Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2007). Otherwise, the investment rules follow the classical portfolio choice
rules with CRRA utility.
This framework is similar to Kraay and Ventura (2000) and Kraay et al. (2005),
who, among others, apply the portfolio choice model to an open economy. But the
portfolio approach has been applied only in AK contexts, which cannot account
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for such phenomena as decreasing returns and human wealth effects. Here, we use
a transformation of the budget constraint introduced by Angeletos and Panousi
(2007) in order to make it linear in wealth and apply the portfolio approach to the
neoclassical growth model.
2.3 Household’s behavior
The linearity of the evolution of the budget constraint along with the homothe-
ticity of preferences ensures that the household’s problem reduces to a homothetic
problem a` la Samuelson and Merton. It follows that the optimal policy rules are
linear in wealth.
Lemma 1 : Define φit = k
i
t/ω
i
t, the fraction of effective wealth invested in private
capital. For a given interest rate R∗ and a given sequence of wages {Wt}, the policy
responses of the household i are given by :
cit = (ρ− n)ωit (II.7)
φit = φt =
rt −R∗
σ2
(II.8)
Equation (II.7) shows the familiar result that consumption per capita equals the
annualized value of wealth, taking into account population growth. It is a direct
consequence of the log utility.
Equation (II.8) is the portfolio choice rule. It says that the risky share of the
portfolio is increasing in the risk premium rt − R∗ and decreasing in the amount
of risk σ. When σ is large, the share of risky assets is low, while the share of safe
assets is high. The share of safe assets can be viewed as a way for the household to
self-insure against the potential bad shocks to the risky part of the portfolio. Even
if the return on the safe assets is lower than the yield of private capital on average
(R∗ < rt), they play the role of buffer-stock savings against uncertainty. Bonds are
therefore held not only for their return but also for their insurance function.
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Human wealth ht and bond holdings bt are both safe assets and are substitutes.
Notice that Equation (II.8) implies that bit = (1 − φt)ωit − ht. When the household
expects large labor and tax revenues in the future (ht is large), he can borrow more
(bit decreases). This is the human wealth effect.
The share of capital in the portfolio φt is all the more reactive to the risk premium
that σ is small. In the extreme case, when σ = 0, φt goes to infinity as long as the
return on private capital is strictly higher than the return on bonds (rt > R
∗).
The individual rules (II.7) and (II.8) are linear in wealth and can therefore be
written in aggregate terms : ct = (ρ − n)ωt and kt = φtωt, where yt =
∫ 1
0
yitdi is
the aggregate value for yit. By dividing each side by At, they can also be written in
terms of efficient units of labor. The following Lemma follows :
Lemma 2 : Let x˜t =
∫ 1
0
x˜itdi denote the aggregate value of x˜
i
t, where x˜
i
t =
X it/(AtN
i
t ) is the value of X
i
t in efficient labor terms. For a given interest rate R
∗,
the aggregate dynamics of the economy is characterized by :
˙˜ct
c˜t
= R¯t − ρ− (p˙it + g∗) (II.9)
with R¯t = φ
i
trt + (1− φit)R∗, the average return on portfolio,
˙˜kt +
˙˜bt = f(k˜t)− δk˜t +R∗b˜t − c˜t − (n+ p˙it + g∗)(k˜t + b˜t) (II.10)
and :
(i) If σ > 0 :
k˜t =
φt
1− φt (h˜t + b˜t) (II.11)
where φt satisfies (II.8) and :
˙˜ht = (1− α + τα)f(k˜t)− (n+ p˙it + g∗ −R∗)h˜t (II.12)
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(ii) If σ = 0 :
k˜t = k˜
∗ =
(
α(1− τ)
R∗ + δ
) 1
1−α
(II.13)
Equation (II.9) is obtained by differentiating Equation (II.7) with respect to
time and using the portfolio rule (II.8). It corresponds to the Euler equation of the
economy. Consumption growth per efficient unit of labor increases with R¯t, the mean
return to savings and decreases with p˙it + g
∗, the growth of TFP.
Equation (II.10) is obtained from the aggregation of the individual budget
constraints (II.6). Equation (II.11) is a rewriting of the portfolio choice rule (II.8).
Finally, Equation (II.13) derives from the no-arbitrage condition rt = R
∗
between bonds and domestic capital when σ = 0. This no-arbitrage condition is
an equilibrium outcome that derives from the infinite elasticity of private capital
demand to the return differential between capital and bonds. The concavity of the
production function insures that this no-arbitrage condition is satisfied. This fixes
the level of capital so that its private return equals the world interest rate. In this
case, the average return on portfolio R¯t is simply equal to the world interest rate on
bonds R∗.
The labor market clears so the labor force is identical in all firms : N it = Nt for
all i. To recover aggregate values, the per worker or per efficient units of labor values
must therefore be multiplied by AtNt.
When σ = 0, Equations (II.9), (II.10) and (II.13), along with k0, b0 and the no-
Ponzi conditions, characterize entirely the dynamics of the economy. When σ > 0,
Equations (II.9), (II.10), (II.11) and (II.12) along with k0, b0 and the no-Ponzi
conditions, characterize the dynamics. In that case, we must keep track of an
additional variable, h˜t, because households’ wealth matters for investment.
2.4 Steady state
We define the steady state by ˙˜k/k˜ = 0 and p˙it = 0. This condition implies different
constraints on the world interest rate depending on σ.
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Proposition 1 :
(i) If σ > 0, the open economy steady state exists if and only if R∗ − g∗ < ρ and is
defined by :
(1− τ)f ′(k˜∗)− δ −R∗ =
√
σ2(ρ−R∗ + g∗) (II.14)
k˜∗ =
φ∗
1− φ∗
[
(1− α+ ατ)f(k˜∗)
R∗ − g∗ − n + b˜
∗
]
(II.15)
with φ∗ =
√
ρ−R∗+g∗
σ2
.
(ii) If σ = 0, the open economy steady state exists if and only if R∗− g∗ = ρ and is
defined by :
(1− τ)f ′(k˜∗)− δ = R∗ (II.16)
b˜∗ = −k˜∗ − (1− α+ ατ)f(k˜
∗)− c˜0e−pi
ρ− n (II.17)
with c˜0 = (ρ− n)
[
(1− α+ ατ)f(k˜∗) ∫∞
0
e−(ρ−n)t+pitdt+ k˜0 + b˜0
]
.
Equation (II.14) derives from the stationarity of consumption in efficient labor
terms and the Euler equation (II.9). It states that, in the steady state equilibrium,
the risk premium (LHS) is constant and depends positively on the amount of risk
σ and on the difference between the discount factor ρ and the world interest rate
adjusted for the growth of the world productivity ρ− (R∗ − g∗). Equation (II.16) is
another way to write the no-arbitrage condition rt = R
∗ when capital is not risky,
but it can also be viewed as a particular case of Equation (II.14), where σ = 0.
Equation (II.15) is the steady-state version of the portfolio allocation rule (II.11),
while Equation (II.17) derives from the long-term version of the budget constraint
(II.10) and from the Euler equation (II.9). In the presence of risk, safe assets,
including bond holdings, are a constant share of the portfolio which depends only
on the parameters of the model. But in the absence of risk, the amount of bonds is
determined only by initial wealth k˜0 + b˜0. Notice that in both cases, φ
∗ > 0 since
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wealth and capital are necessarily positive, but we do not have necessarily φ∗ < 1.
This is equivalent to h∗ + b∗ > 0, which is not necessarily the case in a small open
economy, since b∗ can be negative. When σ = 0, the steady-state share of capital
in the portfolio φ∗ depends on initial conditions and thus can take any value above
zero. When σ > 0, it depends on the parameters. However, if σ is not too small
(namely, if σ > ρ−R∗ + g∗), then φ∗ < 1.
Equations (II.14) and (II.15) on the one hand, and (II.16) and (II.17) on the
other, are sufficient to determine k˜∗ and b˜∗, the steady-state values for capital and
bond holdings per efficient unit of labor. Equations (II.14) and (II.16) determine k˜∗
unambiguously and these values can be replaced respectively in Equations (II.15)
and (II.17) to determine b˜∗.
2.5 Capital flows
Following the method of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007), the model is confronted
with the data observed over a finite period [0, T ]. However, before deriving the level
of bonds predicted by the model, some assumptions must be made. First, we abstract
from unobserved future developments in productivity by assuming that all countries
have the same productivity growth rate g∗ after time T .
Assumption 1 : pit = pi for all t ≥ T .
When σ = 0, k˜t = k˜
∗ for all t. The steady state is reached immediately. However,
when σ > 0, k˜t is contingent on time, which makes it impossible to abstract on T
from future k˜t, except if k˜T is sufficiently close to the steady state. In particular, for
T sufficiently high, k˜T is close to k˜
∗, since k˜ converges to its steady state3. In the
remainder of the analysis, it is therefore assumed that T is sufficiently large to be
able to make the following approximation : k˜t = k˜
∗ for all t ≥ T .
3 See Angeletos (2007) and Angeletos and Panousi (2007) for the transitional dynamics of this
kind of model.
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Denote by ∆B/Y0 = (BT − B0)/Y0 the amount of capital flows between 0 and
T . In order to distinguish the predicted capital flows according to the riskless and
portfolio approaches, denote the former ∆B/Y0 and the latter ∆̂B/Y0.
Proposition 2 : Under Assumption 1 and for T sufficiently large, the ratio of
cumulated capital inflows to initial input is given by :
(i) If σ = 0 :
∆B
Y0
=
k˜0 − k˜∗
k˜α0
e(n+g
∗)T +
(
e(n+g
∗)T − 1) b˜0
k˜α0
− (epi − 1) k˜
∗
k˜α0
e(n+g
∗)T
−epi+(n+g∗)T (1− α + ατ)k˜
∗α
k˜α0
∫ T
0
e−(ρ−n)t(1− epit−pi)dt (II.18)
(ii) If σ > 0 :
∆̂B
Y0
=
1− φ∗
φ∗
k˜∗ − k˜0
k˜α0
+
1− φ∗
φ∗
k˜∗
k˜α0
(
epi+(n+g
∗)T − 1)+ k˜0
k˜α0
(
1
φ∗
− 1
φ0
)
+epi
(1− α + ατ)k˜∗α
k˜α0
∫ T
0
e−(R
∗−(n+g∗))tepit−pi
k˜αt
k˜∗α
dt (II.19)
where φ0 = k˜0/(k˜0 + h˜0 + b˜0) is the initial share of capital in portfolio, with
h˜0 = (1 − α + τα)
[∫ T
0
e−[R
∗−(n+g∗)]T+pit k˜αt dt+
k˜∗α
R∗−(n+g∗)
]
the initial human
wealth.
Equations (II.18) and (II.19) give the predicted capital outflows as a function of
n, g∗, ρ, R∗, τ , the sequence of productivity catch-up {pit}t=1,..,T and initial values b˜0
and k˜0. Note that k˜
∗ is also a function of the parameters. In the risky environment,
the sequence of capital per efficient unit of labor {k˜t}t=1,..,T 4 and the initial share of
capital in wealth φ0 depend also on these parameters.
4 By solving the (II.9), (II.10), (II.11) and (II.12) system.
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Equation (II.18) is the continuous-time version of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007).
It can be decomposed into the same components. The same vocabulary and notations
are therefore used here. Consider the first term :
∆Bc
Y0
=
k˜0 − k˜∗
k˜α0
e(n+g
∗)T
The difference k˜0−k˜∗ is the amount immediately borrowed by the country to equalize
its private return to capital to the world’s interest rate. Following Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2007), we call it the convergence term.
The second term,
∆Bt
Y0
=
(
e(n+g
∗)T − 1) b˜0
k˜α0
represents the impact of the initial external position in the presence of trend growth
(n + g∗ > 0). It reflects the amount of capital outflows (or inflows) required to
maintain the ratio of external position to output constant.
The third term,
∆Bi
Y0
= −(epi − 1) k˜
∗
k˜α0
e(n+g
∗)T
reflects the impact of productivity catch-up on investment. Positive long-term
productivity catch-up (pi > 0) implies further needs in investment. It contribute
negatively to the external position, because the country has to borrow from abroad.
Finally, the fourth term,
∆Bs
Y0
= −epi+(n+g∗)T (1− α + ατ)k˜
∗α
k˜α0
∫ T
0
e−(ρ−n)t(1− epit−pi)dt
reflects the impact of savings on the external position. It represents the consumption
smoothing behavior. Indeed, the households adjust their consumption according to
their intertemporal wealth, which depends on their discounted flow of deterministic
revenue w˜t + z˜t. The path of those revenues depends on (1− α+ ατ)k˜∗α and on the
path of pit. All these components correspond exactly to those analyzed by Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2007).
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Consider now Equation (II.19), which represents the predicted flows according
to the portfolio approach, that is when σ > 0. The sign of φ∗/(1− φ∗) is critical to
determine the sign of the first and second terms. We have seen that the steady-state
share of capital in wealth φ∗ is strictly positive but that it is not necessarily below
one in the general case. Namely, the parameter σ must be high enough, and more
precisely follow the following assumption :
Assumption 2 : σ > ρ−R∗ + g∗
This assumption is maintained in the remaining analysis.5 Some of the compo-
nents of ∆̂B
Y0
can have the same interpretation as in the riskless approach. The first
component,
∆̂Bc
Y0
=
1− φ∗
φ∗
k˜∗ − k˜0
k˜α0
represents the impact of convergence. If k˜0 < k˜
∗, the country increases its capital
stock. But contrary to the riskless approach, this does not imply a decrease in the net
external position. On the opposite, the increase in wealth following the accumulation
of private capital induces a rise in foreign assets, which are a constant fraction of
wealth.
5 The constraint that φ∗ < 1 and equivalently that φ∗/(1 − φ∗) > 0 can be rationalized by the
following general equilibrium argument. Consider a world composed by a continuum of countries
indexed by j, j ∈ [0, 1]. Each country taken individually is small and is negligible regarding the
others taken as a whole, which corresponds to our small open economy framework. Countries can
differ with respect to τ and n, but have the same level of idiosyncratic risk σ (as we will assume
in the calibration section). As a result, they have the same steady-state share of capital in the
portfolio φ∗, according to Proposition 1. Summing (II.15) across countries, we obtain :∫ 1
0
k˜∗jdj =
φ∗
1− φ∗
[∫ 1
0
(1− α+ ατ j)f(k˜∗j)
R∗ − g∗ − nj dj +
∫ 1
0
b˜∗jdj
]
Since the world bond market clears, we have
∫ 1
0
b˜∗jdj = 0. Therefore, φ∗/(1− φ∗) is necessarily
positive as long as σ > 0. This is made possible by the adjustment of the world interest rate
R∗ in order to clear the bond market. It is therefore consistent with the portfolio approach to
assume that φ∗/(1− φ∗) > 0.
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The second term,
∆̂Bi
Y0
=
1− φ∗
φ∗
k˜∗
k˜α0
(
epi+(n+g
∗)T − 1)
reflects long-term productivity catch-up. Again, the sign of the contribution of this
term when pi > 0 is opposite to the riskless approach. The intuition is the same
as for the convergence term. The increase in investment induced by productivity
growth increases wealth and makes the external position rise.
The third term,
∆̂Bp
Y0
=
k˜0
k˜α0
(
1
φ∗
− 1
φ0
)
is the portfolio structure term. It reflects the impact of changes in the structure of
portfolio on external bond holdings. If, for example, the share of capital increases
(φ∗ > φ0), then, holding everything equal, external bond holdings should decrease.
Finally, the fourth term,
∆̂Bh
Y0
= epi
(1− α + ατ)k˜∗α
k˜α0
∫ T
0
e−(R
∗−(n+g∗))tepit−pi
k˜αt
k˜∗α
dt
is the human wealth term. It represents the impact of changes in human wealth
between the beginning and the end of period. Holding the amount of safe assets
constant, a decrease in human wealth must be compensated by an increase in
bonds. This term can be related to the consumption smoothing term in the riskless
approach, because it features the discounted sum of safe revenues. Notice that,
contrary to the riskless approach, it does not only depend on the path of pit, put
also on the path of k˜t. This is because, in the portfolio approach, the level of capital
does not immediately adjust to its steady state value : it depends on the current
level of wealth and not only on the world’s interest rate. As a consequence, the path
of deterministic revenues w˜t+ z˜t and therefore the consumption smoothing term are
contingent on both the path of productivity catch-up pit and the path of efficient
capital k˜t.
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2.6 The role of productivity
Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2004) show that TFP is a major source
of the cross-country differences in income. Consistently, Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2007) find that productivity growth is the main source of the allocation puzzle. It is
therefore instructive to compare how it affects bond holdings in both approaches. It
has been already noticed that pi has opposite effects on the catch-up term in the two
approaches, ∆B
i
Y0
and ∆̂B
i
Y0
. However, ∆B
s
Y0
and ∆̂B
h
Y0
depend in a more complicated way
on pi and the path of pit. In order to simplify the problem, the following assumption
is made :
Assumption 3 : pit = pi − f(t) where f(.) is common across countries and
satisfies f(t) > 0 and limt→∞ f(t) = 0.
Under Assumption 3, we can rewrite ∆B
s
Y0
as :
∆Bs
Y0
= −epi+(n+g∗)T (1− α + ατ)k˜
∗α
k˜α0
∫ T
0
e−(ρ−n)t(1− e−f(t))dt
which is negative and proportional to the long-run productivity catch-up epi. Faster
relative productivity growth implies higher future income, leading to an increase in
consumption and a decrease in savings. As a result, the external position deteriorates,
including in the long run.
Similarly, ∆̂B
h
Y0
can be rewritten as follows :
∆̂Bh
Y0
= epi
(1− α+ ατ)k˜∗α
k˜α0
∫ T
0
e−(R
∗−(n+g∗))te−f(t)
k˜αt
k˜∗α
dt
which is proportional to epi but positive, as opposed to ∆B
s
Y0
. Faster relative
productivity growth here increases the level of capital outflows. This is because
higher expected revenues in the future encourage the households to borrow more
both in t = 0 and in t = T , but the flow of revenues between 0 and T weighs only
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on borrowing in t = 0. Faster productivity growth between these dates will thus
have a positive impact on borrowing at t = 0, thus increasing the level of capital
outflows between 0 and T . A key element here is that in the portfolio approach, the
beginning-of-period level of debt is wiped out at steady state by wealth effects. On
the opposite, in the riskless approach, the long-run level of debt is contingent on
the inherited one, so the amount of consumption-smoothing that took place in the
beginning persists in the long run.
This results in the following proposition, which is an extension of the corollary
of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) :
Proposition 3 : Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 3 are satisfied and consider
two countries A and B, identical except for their long-run productivity catch-up pi :
(i) If σ = 0 : country A sends more capital outflows than country B if and only
if country A catches up less than country B towards the world technology
frontier :
∆BA > ∆BB if and only if piA < piB
(ii) If σ > 0 : under Assumption 2 and if T is sufficiently large, country A sends
more capital outflows than country B if and only if country A catches up more
than country B towards the world technology frontier :
∆BA > ∆BB if and only if piA > piB
To summarize, the presence of risk reverses completely the predictions of the
neoclassical growth model in terms of capital flows. In the absence of risk, in line
with Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007), countries growing faster should borrow more.
In the presence of risk, the opposite holds : countries growing faster should borrow
less. Both the investment and consumption channels are reversed.
In order to get an intuition of what approach is more likely to fit the
reality, consider Figure II.2, which plots actual capital outflows against potential
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Fig. II.2 – Actual capital outflows between 1980 and 2000 (as a share of initial
GDP), against their determinants : capital gap ((k˜∗− k˜0)/k˜0), long-run productivity
catch-up (pi), initial external position to GDP ratio (b˜0)/y˜0) and initial share of
capital in the portfolio (φ0)
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determinants. The initial net external position b˜0/y˜0 is positively correlated with
actual capital outflows, which is consistent with the riskless approach, in particular
with the trend component. The initial capital share φ0 is also positively correlated,
which is consistent with the portfolio approach, in particular with the portfolio
component. However, each of these two determinants is specific to one approach,
and is not exclusive of the other. The other determinants are more discriminant. The
capital gap (k˜∗− k˜0)/k˜0 does not seem to be correlated in any way to actual capital
flows, so it cannot be used, at least at this stage, to assess the predictive power of
the model. However, the productivity catch-up pi is positively correlated with capital
outflows. According to Proposition 3, this is the case only in the portfolio approach
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(σ > 0). In the riskless approach (σ = 0), the correlation should be negative. The
former approach should therefore be a better candidate to account for capital flows
to developing countries. However, to confirm that, one should take into account
all the determinants of capital flows together. Next section extends the calibration
method used by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) in order to confront both approaches.
3 Capital flow accounting and calibration
In this section, we compare the two models’ predictions in terms of capital flows
to the data. Do developing countries with faster productivity growth and larger
initial capital scarcity receive more capital flows, as the riskless approach predicts,
or the opposite, as the portfolio approach suggests ? More generally, we investigate
whether the portfolio approach fares better than the riskless one in explaining capital
flows to developing countries. This requires, for each country, estimates for the levels
of initial capital scarcity and for productivity growth.
In order to facilitate the comparison with Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007), the
same time span (1980-2000) and the same sample of 69 emerging countries is used6.
The parameters which are common across countries also follow their paper : the
discount rate ρ is set to 4%, the depreciation rate δ to 6%, the capital share of
output α to 0.3 and the growth rate of world productivity g∗ to 1.7%. Given these
parameters values, the world’s interest rate R∗ is equal to 5.7% when σ = 0, that is
when the riskless approach is used.
In the portfolio approach, the amount of risk σ is set to 0.3, which is an amount
of entrepreneurial risk commonly reported by empirical studies in the US and the
6 This sample includes : Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina
Faso, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, the Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Coˆte
d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Arab Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji,
Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica,
Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico,
Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic,
Taiwan,Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay and
Venezuela.
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Euro area (Campbell et al., 2001; Kearney and Poti, 2006). The world’s interest rate
is then set so that the implied steady-state ratio of capital to wealth φ∗ matches the
US capital share in 2000. This gives φ∗ = 0.08 and R∗ = 5.64%.
The country-specific data are the paths for output, capital, productivity and
working-age population. These data come from Version 6.2 of the Penn World Tables
(Heston et al., 2006). Following Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) and Caselli (2004),
the capital stock is constructed with the perpetual inventory method from time series
data on real investment. The level of productivity At is calculated as (yt/k
α
t )
1/(1−α)
and the level of capital per efficient unit of labor k˜t as (yt/kt)
1/(1−α). The level of
TFP At and the capital per efficient unit of labor k˜t are filtered using the Hodrik-
Prescott method in order to suppress business cycles. The parameter n is measured
as the annual growth rate of the working-age population. Under Assumption 1, the
long-term catch-up pi can be measured as ln(AT )− ln(A0)− Tg∗.
Finally, in order to determine the capital wedge τ , we proceed differently from
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007). They compute numerically a mapping from the
average investment rate to the capital wedge τ , for given productivity catch-up pi
and population growth n. Their method cannot be extended easily to the portfolio
approach, where the investment rate cannot be written explicitly as a simple function
of the steady-state level of capital per efficient unit of labor k˜∗ but is contingent on
its whole path {k˜t}t=1...T . More simply, τ is calibrated here in order to replicate the
ratio of steady-state capital relative to the US, where τUS = 0. The capital wedge τ
must therefore be interpreted in relative terms to the US. If τ is positive (negative),
it means that the capital wedge is higher (lower) than in the US. Besides simplicity,
this method has the advantage to yield identical capital wedges in both approaches,
which facilitates the comparison. Indeed, in both cases, k˜∗/k˜∗US = (1 − τ)1/(1−α).
We use the fact that, assuming that T = 20 is a sufficiently large number, k˜∗ is
approximately equal to k˜T . We thus take k˜
∗ = k˜T . This method assigns a high
capital wedge to countries with low end-of-period capital per efficient unit of labor
relative to the US. The introduction of τ shuts down the Lucas paradox since this
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parameter is used to adjust the private marginal return to capital to the world
interest rate.
Jordan and Angola are removed from the sample because their working-age
population does not satisfy n < ρ. The Syrian Arab Republic is also removed because
it is an outlier : its predicted outflows according to the portfolio approach are well
below the sample range. The sample is therefore reduced to 66 countries.
3.1 Some key parameters
Table II.1 sums up some key parameters given by the calibration method. It
presents the steady-state capital stocks per efficient unit of labor k˜∗, measured by
their end-of-period value, and the levels of capital wedge τ compatible with these
steady-state values. It also provides some potential determinants : the long-term
productivity catch-up pi, the beginning-of-period ratio of external position to output
b˜0/y˜0, the beginning-of-period capital share in the portfolio φ0, the initial level of
capital k˜0 and the growth rate of capital (k˜
∗ − k˜0)/k˜0. Countries are classified by
income group (World Bank classification based on 2007 GNI per capita) and by
region. Finally, for robustness checks, some potential outliers (China, India, Africa)
are excluded.
Consider column (2) of Table II.1. The average wedge τ on capital return is equal
to 36%, which is consistent with the average wedge on capital return of 12% found
in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007). This is because the definition of capital return
differs : they consider the gross capital return, but net of depreciation, while we
consider the net capital return, but before depreciation.7 Despite using a different
method to compute the capital wedge, the results are comparable. The net return
varies between 64% in low income countries and−9% in high income countries, which
corresponds to 14% and −4% for the gross return. Notice that the capital wedge τ
and the end-of-period level of capital k˜∗ (column (1)) are respectively decreasing and
7 This deviation from Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) is due to the use of a continuous-time
framework.
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increasing with income, except for middle-income countries : upper-middle-income
countries have a lower end-of-period level of capital than lower-middle-income. This
is not inconsistent with the income classification since the revenue is not defined
only by capital, but also by TFP. Generally, countries that achieved a higher level
of income are those who maintained a higher end-of-period capital level k˜∗ thanks
to a lower wedge τ . Africa, which has the smallest end-of-period capital level, has
therefore the highest estimated capital wedge, while Asia’s estimated capital wedge
is the smallest, since it benefits from a high end-of-period capital level.
Tab. II.1 – Long-term capital per efficient unit of labor, capital wedge and potential
determinants of capital flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
k˜∗ τ pi b˜0y˜0 φ0 k˜0
k˜∗−k˜0
k˜0
Obs.
Non-OECD† 1,88 36,37% -6,87% -29,91% 1,37% 2,24 -3,53% 66
Low income‡ 0,80 64,44% -15,69% -31,72% 0,65% 0,98 1,28% 23
Lower middle income‡ 2,24 26,76% -12,75% -35,23% 1,46% 2,56 -2,2% 22
Upper middle income‡ 2,11 28,31% -4,88% -34,42% 1,66% 2,68 -13,61% 14
High income‡ (non-OECD†) 3,87 -9,49% 36,59% 1,82% 2,85% 4,51 -3,38% 7
Africa 1,27 52,66% -13,04% -39,75% 0,99% 1,77 -12,39% 27
Latin America 2,06 30,38% -32,36% -32,66% 1,95% 2,50 -3,9% 22
Asia 2,62 18,27% 35,92% -10,71% 1,22% 2,65 11% 17
Excluding China and India 1,88 36,39% -10,11% -30,79% 1,39% 2,24 -3,16% 64
China and India 1,80 35,81% 96,6% -1,57% 0,78% 2,20 -15,45% 2
Excluding Africa 2,31 25,1% -2,6% -23,09% 1,63% 2,57 2,6% 39
The figures are unweighted country averages.
† : Includes also Korea, Mexico and Turkey.
‡ : World Bank classification based on 2007 GNI per capita.
Consider now the long-run productivity catch-up pi in column (3) of Table
II.1. On average, non-OECD countries have fallen behind in terms of productivity.
When looking into details, only high income economies have caught up with the
world productivity. Consistently, countries with intensive catch-up ended up richer
at the end of period. In particular, upper-middle-income countries show a less
negative productivity catch-up than the lower-middle-income group, which might
have compensated for their lower end-of-period capital k˜∗. As for the geographical
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pattern, it seems that only Asia’s productivity has caught up with the world’s level.
Both Africa and Latin America fell behind.
It appears that the initial level of external position b˜0/y˜0 (column (4)) is negative
on average : non-OECD countries started with an average debt of 30% of GDP.
All regions started with debt, only Asia had a smaller initial level : 11% versus
respectively 40% and 33% in Africa and Latin America.
The average initial share of capital in portfolio φ0 (column (5)) is very low :
less than 2%. This is because human wealth accounts for an extremely large part
of the household’s portfolio : not only is it an infinite discounted sum, but it is
also inflated both by labor and productivity growth. Additionally, the net external
position is small in absolute value. All this results in a small share of capital in
the portfolio. It appears that this share is increasing with income (from 0.65% to
2.85%). This can be explained by the fact that initial capital k˜0 is increasing with
income too, as column (6) shows. Among regions, Africa has a very low share of
capital : 0.99% versus respectively 1.95% and 1.22% in Latin America and Asia.
The lower share of capital in Latin America than in Asia can be explained by lower
productivity catch-up and therefore lower human wealth in Latin America.
Column (6) of Table II.1 presents initial capital per efficient unit of labor k˜0. The
main observation is that the final stock of capital is usually close to the initial one.
There is no change in hierarchy due to convergence : countries with low initial capital
ended up with low capital. This also appears when considering the capital global
growth rates in column (7) : they are rather small in absolute value. Notice also
that the capital stock decreased on average. This suggests that developing countries
started with a stock of capital per efficient unit of labor above the steady-state, that
is with too much capital. Consistently to Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006), emerging
countries were not capital-scarce but capital-abundant. Among regions, only Asia
increased its capital per efficient unit of labor.
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3.2 Capital flows
We now turn to the confrontation of actual and predicted capital flows. In order
to achieve this, actual capital flows are computed, using net foreign asset data from
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). They provide estimates for the net external position
in current US dollars. These estimates are calculated using the cumulated current
account data and are adjusted for valuation effects. In order to be consistent with the
PPP-adjusted data used here, a PPP deflator is extracted from the PennWorld Table
and is used to calculate a PPP-adjusted measure of net external position. Actual
capital outflows during the period, as a share of initial output, are denoted ∆B
Y0
.
These estimates are confronted with the predicted values given by the riskless and
portfolio approaches, respectively ∆B
Y0
and ∆̂B
Y0
, and to the components highlighted
in the previous section.
3.2.1 The riskless approach
Table II.2 reproduces the outcome of the riskless approach. Column (1) reports
the actual net capital outflows as a share of initial output ∆B/Y0 : their size is
−54% on average, which means that emerging countries have received net capital
inflows during the period. Column (2) reports the predicted capital outflows based
on equation (II.18). These estimates are constructed under the hypothesis that the
productivity catch-up follows a linear trend : pit = pimin{t/T, 1}, as in Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2007). Our results, despite the continuous time framework and the use
of a different method to calibrate the capital wedge τ , are in line with Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2007). According to the model, non-OECD countries should have
received capital inflows on average, which is the case. However, here, contrary to
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007), average predicted flows (column (2)) in non-OECD
countries are of the same order of magnitude as the actual ones (column (1)). This
comes from the fact that consumption smoothing has a lower magnitude than in
their calibration. Still, when excluding African countries, capital inflows seem to be
strongly overestimated. They also seem to have the right sign, but if we exclude
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China and India, which account for a large part of negative outflows, the sign of
predicted outflows becomes positive, while actual ones are negative on average.
While unclear in terms of global trends, the model fails completely when considering
the direction of flows inside the sample. According to the predictions, low-income
countries should have exported capital while high-income countries should have
received capital inflows. Actually, the opposite happened. Latin America and Africa
should have invested abroad while Asia should have hosted capital inflows. But
in fact Asia received less capital than the other regions. The origins of these
discrepancies are examined by looking into the components of predicted capital flows.
Tab. II.2 – Predicted and actual capital flows between 1980 and 2000 - Riskless
approach
Capital flows (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(share of initial output) ∆BY0
∆B
Y0
∆Bc
Y0
∆Bi
Y0
∆Bs
Y0
∆Bt
Y0
Obs.
Non-OECD† -0,54 -0,36 0,51 -0,14 -0,29 -0,43 66
Low income‡ -1,13 1,56 0,38 0,08 1,58 -0,49 23
Lower middle income‡ -0,68 -0,42 0,45 -0,10 -0,29 -0,47 22
Upper middle income‡ -0,03 0,12 0,81 0,005 -0,20 -0,50 14
High income‡ (non-OECD†) 0,82 -7,40 0,54 -1,29 -6,64 -0,02 7
Africa -0,77 1,24 0,92 0,09 0,81 -0,58 27
Latin America -0,46 4,81 0,55 0,41 4,31 -0,47 22
Asia -0,29 -9,57 -0,20 -1,23 -8,00 -0,15 17
Excluding China and India -0,55 0,70 0,51 -0,03 0,67 -0,45 64
China and India -0,35 -34,30 0,57 -3,67 -31,19 -0,01 2
Excluding Africa -0,38 -1,46 0,23 -0,30 -1,05 -0,33 39
∆B
Y0
is the observed ratio of net capital outflows to initial output, predicted capital flows
∆B
Y0
and its components ∆BcY0 ,
∆Bi
Y0
, ∆BsY0 and
∆Bt
Y0
are given by (II.18).
The figures are unweighted country averages.
† : Includes also Korea, Mexico and Turkey.
‡ : World Bank classification based on 2007 GNI per capita.
After looking into components, it appears that the convergence term in column
(3) of Table II.2 contributes positively to the total predicted outflows. This can
be explained by the fact that, as shown above, countries have started on average
above their long-term level of capital, and thus have disinvested on average. As a
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consequence, they should have lent to the rest of the world. This is the case in
Latin America and Africa which had too much capital and should have used their
extra capital stock to invest abroad, whereas Asia should have received capital from
abroad to finance its growth in capital stock.
The catch-up component, in column (4), has a negative contribution. This
average result is mainly driven by Asia, which had a strong positive long-term
productivity catch-up : it should have borrowed from the rest of the world in order to
finance the extra investment. Other non-OECD countries have fallen behind world
productivity on average, namely Africa and Latin America. This relative fall in
productivity should have led households to disinvest and enabled them to lend to
the rest of the world.
The consumption smoothing component, in column (5), is negative on average
despite the negative average productivity catch-up. This is because Asian countries,
which have benefited from a positive productivity catch-up, contribute highly to the
sample mean. When considering regions, it still appears that Latin America and
Africa, which expected a fall in their revenue because of a negative catch-up, should
have saved in order to smooth consumption. The contribution of the consumption
smoothing term is therefore positive for those regions. On the opposite, Asiatic
countries, which expected a relative rise in their productivity and therefore a relative
rise in their revenue, should have dissaved in order to smooth consumption. Their
consumption smoothing term is thus negative.
These three components (convergence, catch-up and consumption smoothing) are
at odds with the data. They all imply capital inflows to Asia and capital outflows
from Latin America and Africa, while actually Asia received less capital than the
two other regions.
Only the last one, the trend component in column (6), is consistent with
the data. Indeed, as observed capital inflows, it is decreasing with income. Also,
according to this component, Asia should receive less capital than Latin America
and Africa. However, its quantitative importance is not sufficient to counteract the
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other components.
On the whole, the puzzle of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) seems to be robust to
the continuous-time approach and to the use of an alternative method to compute
the capital wedge : capital seems to flow in the wrong direction, that is less to the
more productive countries than to the less productive. Figure II.3 sums up the puzzle
by showing the scatter plot of actual versus predicted flows. The correlation seems,
at best, non-significant and, at worst, negative.
Fig. II.3 – Actual capital outflows (as a share of initial GDP) against their predicted
value, according to the riskless approach, 1980-2000
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Figure II.4 presents the scatter plots of actual capital flows against each compo-
nents, stressing the contribution of each of them to the overall correlation between
predicted and capital flows. The component which is the most negatively correlated
with actual flows is the catch-up component. This is consistent with Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2007)’s findings. After comes the consumption smoothing component,
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while the convergence component does not seem to be correlated anymore. Also,
as expected, the trend component is the only one which is positively correlated.
The puzzle is therefore mainly due to the catch-up and consumption smoothing
components. Long-run productivity catch-up, which is the main determinant of these
two components, is thus at the core of the puzzle. Figure II.2 showed that, indeed,
long-run productivity catch-up is positively correlated with capital outflows, while
the riskless approach predicted the opposite. This calibration analysis confirms that
the wrong correlation with long-run productivity catch-up is responsible for the
puzzle.
Fig. II.4 – Actual capital outflows (as a share of initial GDP), against the different
components of predicted capital flows, 1980-2000 - Riskless approach
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Source : PennWorld Tables 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006),
author’s calculations.
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3.2.2 The portfolio approach
We have shown that the model without risk reproduces exactly the puzzle
highlighted by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007). We now turn to the extension with
risk.
Table II.3 sums up the results for the portfolio approach. Column (2) reports
the estimated predicted net outflows according to equation (II.19). The estimates
are computed under the Assumption that the productivity catch-up follows a linear
path, as in the riskless approach. The path of capital per efficient unit of labor k˜t
implied by the model is approximated by the following formula : k˜t = k˜0e
gkmin{t/T,1},
where gk = ln(k˜
∗)− ln(k˜0)8.
Note first that the magnitude of predicted flows (column (2)) is well above the
actual ones (column (1)), by three to four orders of magnitude. This is a shortcoming
of the portfolio approach that has been already highlighted in Kraay et al. (2005).
But this shortcoming is accentuated here by the presence of potentially huge human
wealth effects, due to labor and productivity growth. This human wealth can
represent more than one hundred times current income and can enable the country
to borrow enormous amounts, as long as it can pledge its future labor income and
transfers.
When looking into details, it appears that the main origin of the discrepancy
is the portfolio term, in column (5). The magnitude of this term can be explained
by the fact that the initial share of capital in the portfolio is low as compared to
the steady-state one, as pointed to when analyzing Table II.1. This initial share is
small because the beginning-of-period human wealth is large and the external debt
is small. This results in a predicted reallocation of the portfolio in favor of capital in
the long term. Provided some adjustments in human wealth, this implies that bond
holdings should diminish in the long term, which is equivalent to capital inflows.
8 The sequence of of {k˜t}t=1,..,T could be inferred from the parameters, the initial values and the
exogenous trend of productivity by solving the (II.9), (II.10), (II.11) and (II.12) system. However,
the assumed trend is a good proxy for the capital dynamics since the theory predicts that it moves
smoothly from k˜0 to k˜∗.
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The human wealth adjustment term, in column (6) of Table II.3, is positive in
all country groups. This can be explained by the fact that human wealth falls on
average between the beginning and the end of period. This fall in human capital
contributes positively to capital outflows, since, holding portfolio shares constant,
bond holdings are substituted to human wealth inside the safe portfolio. But this
adjustment is not sufficient to compensate for the portfolio term. The magnitude
of the other terms is not as striking, so the discrepancy between the data and the
model comes mainly from the discrepancy between the beginning-of-period observed
external position and human wealth, which results in a very negative portfolio term.
Tab. II.3 – Predicted and actual capital flows between 1980 and 2000 - Portfolio
approach
Capital flows (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(share of initial output) ∆BY0
∆̂B
Y0
∆̂Bc
Y0
∆̂Bi
Y0
∆̂Bp
Y0
∆̂Bh
Y0
Obs.
Non-OECD† -0,54 -101,54 -2,55 23,56 -138,42 15,80 66
Low income‡ -1,13 -130,56 -1,54 9,82 -152,33 13,37 23
Lower middle income‡ -0,68 -101,59 -2,17 26,28 -142,35 16,59 22
Upper middle income‡ -0,03 -89,53 -4,31 23,69 -125,79 16,85 14
High income‡ (non-OECD†) 0,82 -30,04 -3,51 59,85 -105,65 19,23 7
Africa -0,77 -131,92 -4,17 13,65 -155,55 14,03 27
Latin America -0,46 -90,32 -3,02 12,53 -114,53 14,65 22
Asia -0,29 -67,80 0,63 53,55 -142,13 20,11 17
Excluding China and India -0,55 -101,99 -2,52 21,32 -136,32 15,46 64
China and India -0,35 -87,09 -3,38 94,95 -205,59 26,96 2
Excluding Africa -0,38 -80,50 -1,43 30,41 -126,56 17,03 39
∆B
Y0
is the observed ratio of net capital outflows to initial output, predicted capital flows
∆̂B
Y0
and its components ∆̂BcY0 ,
∆̂Bi
Y0
, ∆̂BpY0 and
∆̂Bh
Y0
are given by (II.19).
The figures are unweighted country averages.
† : Includes also Korea, Mexico and Turkey.
‡ : World Bank classification based on 2007 GNI per capita.
When abstracting from the magnitude issue, it appears that the predicted
outflows in column (2) of Table II.3 exhibit the right sign, which is negative,
and, contrary to the riskless approach, the right ranking between country groups.
Predicted capital inflows are now decreasing with income, as the actual ones. Also,
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Africa is the region that receives the highest amount of capital inflows while Asia is
the one that receives the smallest amount, as in the data.
Since, on average, developing countries started from a high level of capital relative
to the long-term one, the average contribution of the convergence term in column
(3) of Table II.3 to capital outflows is negative. This is because, holding the portfolio
structure unchanged, a less capitalized country can hold less safe assets since it has
to self-insure against less risk. The sign of the contribution of the convergence term in
this specification is opposite to its sign in the riskless one. Asia is supposed to export
and not import capital, while Latin America and Africa are supposed to import and
not export capital. Regions are now correctly ranked in terms of capital outflows
when considering the convergence component. Regions are also correctly ranked
when considering the catch-up term in column (4). While, in the riskless approach,
Asia was supposed to receive more inflows than the other non-OECD countries,
the estimates here suggest that it should export more capital, which matches the
data better, not in terms of the direction of flows but in terms of hierarchy between
regions. To understand this predictions’ reversal for the convergence and catch-up
terms, note that both high productivity catch-up and positive convergence imply
investment in domestic technology. In the riskless approach, more investment is
financed through more borrowing from abroad while in the portfolio approach, more
investment implies more safe assets to compensate for more risk-taking.
Coming back to the portfolio term in column (5) of Table II.3, we can notice that
it is negative in all income groups and all regions. Interestingly, it is increasing with
income and as a consequence it reproduces the right income-group ranking in terms
of flows. This effect is not originated in productivity catch-up, since we would expect
it to vary negatively with the portfolio component. Indeed, high productivity growth
implies a high beginning-of-period human wealth and therefore a low beginning-of-
period capital share φ0. The adjustment in the portfolio structure would then entail a
diminution in the bond level and therefore lead to large capital inflows. In that case,
high-income countries, which benefited from higher catch-up terms, should present
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a more negative portfolio component. But it is not the case. Rather, we should seek
the explanation of this phenomenon in the size of the initial capital per efficient
unit of labor k˜0. This term has two counteracting effects. First, countries which are
already highly capitalized in the beginning tend to have initially a large share of
capital in their portfolio. The adjustment to a larger capital share in the long-term
implies then a smaller diminution in bond holdings, and therefore less capital inflows.
Second, the level of capital affects the scale of bond holdings adjustment consecutive
to these adjustments in portfolio shares. This is simply because the magnitude of
the bond adjustment consecutive to a change in portfolio structure depends on the
size of the portfolio itself. The initial capital level k˜0 has therefore a negative effect
on capital inflows through its impact on the portfolio structure and a positive effect
through the scale of the portfolio. Finally, it appears that the first effect dominates
since high-income countries, which started on average with a higher level of capital,
are supposed to get less capital inflows according to the portfolio term. This analysis
is also consistent with the fact that Africa, which has the smallest level of initial
capital among regions, has the more negative portfolio term. However, Asia and
Latin America have a very close level of initial capital, while Asia is supposed to
receive more capital. Here, higher productivity catch-up in Asia can explain the
difference.
The last term, in column (6) of Table II.3, which sums up the adjustment in
human wealth, is positive on average and in all country groups. This comes from
the fact that human wealth is higher in the beginning than in the end of period :
for a given portfolio structure, bond holdings must rise in order to compensate for
the decrease in human wealth. This term is increasing with income and is higher
in Asia than in the other regions. This is because high income countries and Asian
economies have experienced larger TFP gains than the others on average during the
period. Therefore, their initial human wealth is higher, so the implied rise in bond
holdings is also more important.
Therefore, all the components reproduce the right pattern of flows (in terms
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of groups ranking) : the convergence, catch-up, portfolio and human wealth
components.
Fig. II.5 – Actual capital outflows (as a share of initial GDP) against their predicted
value, according to the portfolio approach, 1980-2000
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Source : PennWorld Tables 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006),
author’s calculations.
To conclude, the portfolio approach seems to be a better predictor, if not of
the magnitude of flows, at least of their direction. Figure II.5 sums up this idea by
plotting predicted flows against the actual ones. The upper and lower panels are
constructed respectively by using the riskless and the portfolio approaches. While
the upper graph shows a negative correlation between predicted and actual flows,
a positive correlation is recovered in the lower graph. According to the previous
analysis, this reversal may be due to the convergence, catch-up or portfolio terms.
To understand which components contribute to solving the puzzle, consider
Figure II.6, which plots actual capital flows against the different components of
predicted capital flows. It appears here that, on the sample of non-OECD countries,
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the convergence component does not seem correlated with actual capital flows, so
it does not contribute to the positive correlation between actual and predicted
flows. However, the graph confirms that the catch-up, portfolio and human wealth
components are positively correlated with actual flows and thus contribute to solving
the puzzle.
Fig. II.6 – Actual capital outflows (as a share of initial GDP), against the different
components of predicted capital flows, 1980-2000 - Portfolio approach
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Source : PennWorld Tables 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006),
author’s calculations.
Two characteristics of the portfolio approach contribute therefore to the re-
solution of the puzzle. (i) Long-term productivity catch-up has a positive effect
on capital outflows in the portfolio approach, through the catch-up and human
wealth component. As a consequence, the positive correlation between productivity
growth and capital outflows (see Figure II.2), which was at the core of the puzzle
in the riskless approach, contributes to solving the puzzle in the portfolio choice
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specification, as suggested by Proposition 3. (ii) A novel effect, specific to the
portfolio approach, appears : the change in portfolio structure. Countries with a
higher initial capital share in the portfolio are expected to receive less capital from
abroad. This is the case in the data, as shown in Figure II.2.
4 Extensions
The main shortcoming of the portfolio approach is that it overestimates the
magnitude of flows by several orders of magnitude. This section aims at diminishing
this discrepancy by providing extensions to the portfolio approach : (i) sovereign
risk, (ii) differing amounts of production risk σ in emerging countries and the rest
of the world and (iii) the presence of hand-to-mouth workers. These extensions all
aim at diminishing the portfolio change component, which is the main source of
the discrepancy, in particular by affecting human wealth. This section does not
seek quantitative relevance but tries to propose some potential directions for further
research aiming at reconciling the magnitude of flows in the data and in the portfolio
approach.
4.1 Sovereign risk
Sovereign risk is introduced through a risk premium on the country’s bond
liabilities. If the country is indebted, then it faces an interest rate equal to R∗(1+ ²),
where ² > 0. The parameter ² is supposed to be common across developing countries
and reflects the level of sovereign risk, that is the probability that the economy
defaults on its debt. If the country has positive bond holdings, then it faces the
world’s interest rate R∗ without risk premium. This assumption is made to illustrate
the fact that there is no default risk on the rest of the world’s bond liabilities,
since it is composed mainly of industrial countries with sound institutions. The risk
premium is introduced in an ad hoc way and it is supposed moreover that it does
not depend on the amount of debt. This is justified since this extension does not
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target quantitative relevance but aims rather at showing whether the magnitude of
flows is indeed reduced when introducing sovereign risk through a fixed premium
on bond liabilities. The idea behind this is that a higher interest rate might reduce
human wealth and therefore limit the ability of households to hold huge amounts of
debt.
This extension does not require to change the baseline parameters. ² only has to
be defined. It is set at 1% in order to satisfy the constraint R∗(1 + ²)− ρ− g∗ > 0.
Tab. II.4 – Predicted and actual capital flows between 1980 and 2000 - Extensions
of the portfolio approach
Capital flows (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(share of initial output) ∆BY0
∆̂B
Y0
∆̂Bc
Y0
∆̂Bi
Y0
∆̂Bp
Y0
∆̂Bh
Y0
Obs.
Baseline portfolio approach -0,54 -101,54 -2,55 23,56 -138,42 15,80 66
Sovereign risk - -41,88 -8,65 79,97 -86,27 15,73 -
Asymmetric production risk - -57,00 -5,39 49,82 -117,24 15,80 -
HTM workers - -40,22 -0,82 7,54 -51,77 4,83 -
HTM workers (asymmetric) - -13,56 -0,82 7,54 -22,70 2,42 -
∆B
Y0
is the observed ratio of net capital outflows to initial output, predicted capital flows
∆̂B
Y0
and its components ∆̂BcY0 ,
∆̂Bi
Y0
, ∆̂BpY0 and
∆̂Bh
Y0
are given by (II.19).
The figures are unweighted country averages.Sample : Non-OECD countries, including
also Korea, Mexico and Turkey.
Consider Table II.4. It represents the actual and predicted net capital outflows
and their components, for the baseline portfolio approach and for the various
extensions presented in this section. Despite the low sovereign risk premium, the
mean predicted inflows in column (2) diminish by more than a half as compared to
the baseline specification. This comes mainly from the increase in capital outflows
implied by productivity catch-up (that is the catch-up component in column (3))
and the diminution of the capital inflows implied by portfolio change (that is the
portfolio component in column (5)). The increase in the perceived interest rate on
bonds has two effects that could explain this. First, the steady-state share of capital
φ∗ diminishes, which means that households want to hold more safe assets in the
end of period. This magnifies the impact of productivity catch-up on bond holdings,
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which explains the effects on the catch-up component : an increase in capital is
matched by a further increase in bond assets. Second, the initial level of human
wealth h˜0 diminishes because the discount factor increases, so the estimated initial
share of capital φ0 is higher. As a result, the share of safe assets in the beginning-of-
period is lower. This implies a smaller decrease in bond holdings during the period,
holding human wealth constant, which explains the smaller capital inflows reported
in the portfolio component.
Fig. II.7 – Actual capital outflows (as a share of initial GDP), against the different
components of predicted capital flows, 1980-2000 - Extensions of the portfolio
approach
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However, if the magnitude of flows is lower on average, this is not true when
looking into details. Figure II.7 shows clearly that the dispersion of predicted flows
is similar to the baseline case. This can be explained as follows. Sovereign risk might
reduce the volatility of the portfolio term, but it increases the dispersion between
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countries with negative and positive catch-up because it magnifies the impact of
capital accumulation on bond holdings.
4.2 Asymmetric production risk
In the baseline portfolio approach, the amount of idiosyncratic production risk
has been assumed to be identical across countries. The parameter σ has been set
to 0.3 in all countries, following microeconomic empirical studies in the US and
Eurozone. The world interest rate R∗ has been set in order to match the steady-
state share of capital in the US φ∗US. Assuming identical risk implies that the
share of capital in developing countries should catch-up with the US. However,
financial markets are often less developed in developing than in industrial countries,
and therefore less able to insure investors against their individual risk. We assume
then, for illustrative purposes, that the amount of individual risk in developing
countries is twice as high as in the US (that is, σ = 0.6). As a consequence, the
corresponding steady-state share of capital in the portfolio φ∗ is smaller, and the
portfolio adjustment term, which was the main source of the excessive magnitude
of predicted flows, should be less negative, because the adjustment in safe assets
should be milder.
The increase in the level of idiosyncratic risk has similar effects as in the sovereign
risk case. The diminution in φ∗ has a positive impact on capital outflows due to
productivity catch-up (column (4) of Table II.4) and a negative effect on capital
inflows due to portfolio change (column (5) of Table II.4). As a result, the total
predicted inflows are smaller than in the baseline case by a significant margin (a
little more than one third). However, as in the sovereign risk extension, predicted
outflows are still dispersed, as shown by Figure II.7.
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4.3 Hand-to-mouth workers
We have assumed so far that all households had access to financial assets,
capital and bonds. However, a significant share of the population holds no assets
and has a limited ability to borrow. As in Angeletos and Panousi (2007), hand-to-
mouth workers are introduced to capture in a crude way this heterogeneity among
households. The population is composed of two groups : ”investors”, who supply
labor, invest in productive capital and have access to the bond market ; and ”hand-
to-mouth workers”, who supply labor but do not hold any asset, and consume their
entire labor income at each period. A notable consequence of this extension is that
investors hold only a fraction of the country’s human wealth, which should reduce
their amount of debt.
I follow Angeletos and Panousi (2007) in setting the proportion of hand-to-mouth
workers in the US so that their share of aggregate consumption is equal to 50%. This
gives a proportion of 70% : only 30% of the population have access to financial assets.
This new calibration yields a higher initial and steady-state portfolio share of capital
(respectively φ0 and φ
∗). Then, it is assumed in a first step that the proportion of
investors in developing countries is identical to the US (symmetric case). In a second
step, the proportion of investors is set at 15%, to represent the fact that financial
markets are less accessible in developing countries (asymmetric case). This has no
additional impact on the end-of-period share of capital in the portfolio φ∗. However,
it will have an impact on the initial one, through the initial investors’ human wealth.
As a consequence, the portfolio change component should be less important in the
asymmetric than in the symmetric case.
According to column (2) of Table II.4, the decrease in the predicted level of
capital inflows in the symmetric case is of the same magnitude as in the extension
with sovereign risk. This time, the diminution comes mainly from the portfolio term
in column (5). The key element is the increase in the initial share of capital in
portfolio φ0 due to the diminution in the amount of human wealth held by investors.
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The decrease in safe assets during the period is therefore mitigated. The diminution
in the capital outflows due to human wealth adjustment (column (6)) comes simply
from the fact that investors hold only a fraction of the country’s human wealth.
Contrary to the case with sovereign risk and asymmetric production risk, capital
outflows due to productivity catch-up (column (4)) diminish, because φ∗ increases.
Households hold less bonds in their portfolio, so the impact of productivity catch-up
on bond accumulation is alleviated. As a consequence, the dispersion of predicted
flows is also diminished, while the correlation between actual and predicted flows is
still significantly positive, as illustrated in Figure II.7.
In the asymmetric case, the predicted inflows decrease further, and are now
one order of magnitude lower than in the baseline specification. The origin of this
decrease lies again in the portfolio term, thanks to the further increase in the initial
share of capital in the portfolio φ0. As a consequence of the decline in the share
of human wealth held by investors, the human wealth component decreases. The
catch-up and convergence components do not change as compared to the symmetric
case, since the steady-state share of capital φ∗ is unaffected. As shown by Figure
II.7, the cross-country dispersion of predicted flows is also diminished.
5 Conclusion
This chapter develops an extension of the traditional neoclassical growth model
to risky investment that reverses the predictions in terms of capital flows, and
therefore contributes to match the actual ones and to solve the puzzle highlighted
by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007). The advantage of this approach is that it does
not constitute a great departure from the textbook model and therefore allows the
adoption of a similar development accounting approach to Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2007). The portfolio approach appears then more promising than the riskless one
in explaining the allocation of capital flows among developing countries. This shows
that international financial markets have to be considered not only as a financing
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source, but also as a way to provide insurance in the presence of domestic investment
risk.
However, while the portfolio approach explains better the direction of flows than
the riskless one, it fails to account for their magnitude, which is overestimated
by several orders of magnitude. From that point of view, the portfolio approach
fares worse than the riskless one. Still, this problem of magnitude in the portfolio
choice model is commonly come across in the literature. It can be related to the
findings of Kraay et al. (2005) on the magnitude of North-South bond position. In
this chapter, some potential explanations have been proposed to enrich the model
and account for the discrepancy between actual and predicted flows : sovereign
risk, asymmetric production risk and the presence of hand-to-mouth workers. The
extension with hand-to-mouth workers appears to be the more promising one because
it reduces both the average amount of predicted capital inflows and their cross-
country dispersion. A challenge for future research is to reconcile both the direction
and the magnitude of flows. Another potential candidate is to model productivity
growth as a random walk. This would have two effects : human wealth would be
diminished since positive productivity shocks would be unanticipated, which would
diminish the countries’ ability to borrow ; bonds would constitute a larger share of
the portfolio since it would be the only safe asset. This is left for future research.
Another direction for research consists in checking whether the portfolio approach
can also account for the composition of flows. Extending the model to the possibility
to trade equity could lead to predictions in terms of equity holdings. According
to portfolio choice models, the more productive assets should constitute a higher
share both in the domestic and foreign portfolio, which would explain why direct
foreign investment is still positively correlated with productivity growth, as shown
in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007).
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Maximizing U it is equivalent to maximizing V
i
t = U
i
t/Nt = Et
∫∞
t
e−(ρ−n)(s−t) ln(cis)ds.
Indexes are now dropped for simplicity. Define φ such that φ = k/ω. The
constraint of the maximization problem is therefore : dω = [(r − R∗)φ + R∗)ω −
c− nω]dt+ σφωdz.
The Bellman equation for this problem is :
(ρ− n)Vt = max
c,φ
{
ln(ct) +
∂Vt
∂t
}
Then, applying Ito’s Lemma, we obtain :
(ρ−n)V (ω, t) = max
c,φ
{
ln(c) +
∂V (ω, t)
∂t
+
∂V (ω, t)
∂ω
[((r −R∗)φ+R∗)ω − c− nω] + ∂
2V (ω, t)
∂ω2
1
2
φ2ω2σ2
}
The first-order conditions of this problem are :
1
c
− ∂V (ω, t)
∂ω
= 0
∂V (ω, t)
∂ω
(r −R∗) + ∂
2V (ω, t)
∂ω2
φωσ2 = 0
An educated guess for the general form of the value function is :
V (ω, t) =
ln(ω)
χ
+ ψ
where χ and ψ have to be determined.
Substituting the derivatives of the value function into the first order conditions
yields the solutions :
c = χω and φ =
r −R∗
σ2
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Plugging these expressions into the Bellman equation yields χ = ρ − n and
ψ = ln(ρ− n) + (r −R∗)2/2σ2 +R∗ − ρ. This gives Equations (II.7) and (II.8).
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of (i) :
(II.9) is derived as follows. Lemma 1 states that cit = (ρ−n)ωit. Since every family
has the same number of members, then the country’s average wealth per capita is
equal to the average of families’ wealth per capita : ωt =
∫ 1
0
ωit. As a consequence, the
country’s consumption per capita is equal to a fraction of the country’s wealth per
capita : ct = (ρ−n)ωt. This implies that they grow at the same rate : c˙t/ct = ω˙t/ωt.
When aggregating across households, risk disappears and Equation (II.6) gives :
ω˙t/ωt = R¯t − ρ, where R¯t = φrt + (1 − φ)R∗ the average return on wealth. As a
consequence, we can derive the aggregate Euler condition in per capita terms :
c˙t
ct
= R¯t − ρ (II.20)
Now, using the definition of pit (III.6), the growth rate of productivity A˙t/At is equal
to p˙it + g
∗. Then , applying the definition of c˜t, we obtain :
˙˜ct
c˜t
=
c˙t
ct
− A˙t
At
= R¯t − ρ− (p˙it + g∗)
Equation (II.10) is obtained as follows. From aggregating Equation (II.6) and
rearranging terms, using the fact that rtkt = (1 − τ)αF (kt, At) − δkt, wt + zt =
(1− α+ τα)F (kt, At), one obtains the following resource constraint of the economy
in per capita terms :
k˙t + b˙t = F (kt, At)− δkt +R∗bt − ct − n(kt + bt)
The Wiener process disappears from the aggregate resource constraint since by
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assumption
∫ 1
0
dvit = 0. Then, using k˙t/kt =
˙˜kt/k˜t + A˙t/At, we obtain :
˙˜kt +
˙˜bt = f(k˜t)− δk˜t +R∗b˜t − c˜t − (n+ p˙it + g∗)(k˜t + b˜t)
Equation (II.11) is derived by aggregating the investment policy rule when σ > 0
(II.8) across households and using the definition of ωt : ωt = kt + ht + bt. Then, we
obtain
kt =
φt
1− φt (ht + bt)
Dividing each side by At yields Equation (II.11).
Equation (II.12) is derived in the same way as Equation (II.10), starting from
the law of evolution of human wealth (II.4).
Proof of (ii) :
Consider Equation (II.8). When σ goes to zero, φ goes to infinity as long as
rt > R
∗. The only possible equilibrium outcome when σ = 0 is therefore rt = R∗.
When σ = 0, the same consumption policy rule (II.7) and the same budget
constraint (II.6) hold. Therefore, the evolution of consumption obeys to the Euler
conditions in efficient unit of labor and in per capita terms (II.9) and (II.20), only
with R¯t = R
∗. However, the investment rule obeys to the arbitrage condition rt = R∗.
By using rt = R
∗ and the definition of rt, we obtain the optimal value of capital
(II.13).
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of (i) :
To obtain Equation (II.14), write Equation (II.9) for ˙˜c/c˜ = 0 and p˙i = 0 :
R¯− ρ− g∗ = 0
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This implies, after replacing R¯ :
R∗ − ρ− g∗ + φ(r −R∗) = 0
And after replacing φ and rearranging, we obtain :
(r −R)2
σ2
= ρ+ g∗ −R∗
This implies that R∗ ≤ ρ + g∗ necessarily at steady state. Again, after replacing r
and rearranging, we obtain Equation (II.14). Finally, in order to rule out R∗ = ρ+g∗,
notice that it would imply φ = 0 at steady state, which means that k˜∗ = 0. This is
impossible since limk˜→0 f
′(k˜) = +∞, which contradicts Equation (II.14).
Equation (II.15) derives from the portfolio rule (II.11). We only have to
determine h˜ at steady state. h˜t =
∫∞
0
e−R
∗s Nt+sAtt+s
NtAtt
(1 − α + τα)f(k˜t+s)ds =∫∞
0
e−(R
∗−(n+g∗))s+pis−pit(1− α+ τα)f(k˜t+s)ds. Equation (II.14) gives k˜∗, the steady-
state value of k˜. We have also pit = pi in the long run. Therefore,
h˜∗ =
(1− α + τα)f(k˜∗)
R∗ − (n+ g∗)
Replacing h˜∗ in Equation (II.11) yields Equation (II.15).
Proof of (ii) :
When σ = 0, Equation (II.9) becomes :
˙˜ct
c˜t
= R∗ − ρ− (p˙it + g∗)
Applying the definition of steady state, this yields :
R∗ = ρ+ g∗
Equation (II.16) is only another way to write the arbitrage condition rt = R
∗ or
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(II.13).
Equation (II.17) is inferred from the budget constraint (II.10) and the Euler
condition (II.20) with R¯t = R
∗. Equation (II.10) can be rewritten as follows :
˙˜kt +
˙˜bt = (1− α + τα))f(k˜t) +R∗(k˜t + b˜t)− c˜t − (n+ p˙it + g∗)(k˜t + b˜t)
Write the Euler condition (II.20) when R∗ = ρ+ g∗ :
c˙t
ct
= g∗
Therefore, ct = c0e
g∗t, and c˜t = c˜0e
g∗tA0/At = c˜0e
−pit . As a consequence, we obtain
at steady state : c˜∗ = c˜0e−pi. We know also that k˜t = k˜∗ always. We thus have at
steady state :
˙˜bt = (1− α + τα)f(k˜∗) +R∗(k˜∗ + b˜t)− c˜0e−pi − (n+ g∗)(k˜∗ + b˜t)
Since ρ > n, then R∗ > n+ g∗, so the only non-explosive solution for b˜t is :
b˜t = b˜
∗ = −k˜∗ − (1− α + τα)f(k˜
∗)− c˜0e−pi
R∗ − (n+ g∗)
Hence the result. To derive c˜0, we use the intertemporal budget constraint at t = 0 :
∫ ∞
0
e−R
∗tNtctdt =
∫ ∞
0
e−R
∗tNt(wt + zt)dt+N0(k0 + b0)
Replacing wt + zt by (1 − α + τα)Atf(k˜∗), using the fact that Nt grows at rate n,
that At = A0e
pit+g∗t and that ct = c0e
g∗t, we obtain :
∫ ∞
0
e−(R
∗−(n+g∗))tc0dt =
∫ ∞
0
e−(R
∗−(n+g∗))t+pitA0(1− α + τα)f(k˜∗)dt+ k0 + b0
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which implies :
c0
R∗ − (n+ g∗) = A0
(
(1− α + τα)f(k˜∗)
∫ ∞
0
e−(R
∗−(n+g∗))t+pitdt+ k0 + b0
)
The final result is obtained by rearranging terms and replacing R∗ by ρ+ g∗.
Proof of Proposition 2
Notice that, with or without risk, when T is sufficiently large, the predicted
capital flows must satisfy :
∆B
Y0
= epi+(n+g
∗)T b˜
∗
y0
− b˜0
y0
(II.21)
Proof of (i) :
Replacing the expression for b˜∗ (II.17) in Equation (II.21) and substituting for
c˜0, we obtain :
∆B
Y0
=
k˜0 − k˜∗
k˜α0
e(n+g
∗)T +
(
e(n+g
∗)T − 1) b˜0
k˜α0
− (epi − 1) k˜
∗
k˜α0
e(n+g
∗)T
−epi+(n+g∗)T (1− α + ατ)f(k˜∗)
(
1
ρ− n −
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ−n)t+pit−pidt
)
Since 1/(ρ− n) = ∫∞
0
e−(ρ−n)tdt, this expression leads to Equation (II.18).
Proof of (ii) :
In order to derive Equation (II.19), we use Equation (II.21) where b˜∗ is replaced
using Equation (II.15) and b˜0 is given by the portfolio rule in t = 0 :
b˜0 =
1− φ0
φ0
k˜0 − h˜0
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This yields :
∆B
Y0
=
1− φ
φ
k˜∗ − k˜0
k˜α0
+
1− φ
φ
k˜∗
k˜α0
(
epi+(n+g
∗)T − 1)+ k˜0
k˜α0
(
1
φ
− 1
φ0
)
−
epi+(n+g
∗)T (1−α+τα)f(k˜∗)
R∗−(n+g∗) − h˜0
k˜α0
Besides :
h˜0 =
∫ ∞
0
e−R
∗t(1− α+ τα)NtAt
N0A0
f(k˜t)dt
=
∫ T
0
e−R
∗t(1− α + τα)NtAt
N0A0
f(k˜t)dt+
∫ ∞
T
e−R
∗t(1− α+ τα) NtAt
NTAT
NTAT
N0A0
f(k˜t)dt
=
∫ T
0
e−(R
∗−(n+g∗))t+pit(1−α+τα)f(k˜t)dt+
∫ ∞
T
e−(R
∗−(n+g∗))t(1−α+τα)e(n+g∗)T+pif(k˜∗)dt
=
∫ T
0
e−(R
∗−(n+g∗))t+pit(1− α + τα)f(k˜t)dt+ e(n+g∗)T+pi (1− α + τα)f(k˜
∗)
R∗ − (n+ g∗)
Hence the final result.
Chapitre III
Exchange Rate Volatility and
Productivity Growth : the Role of
Liability Dollarization
1 Introduction
The choice of exchange rate regime and its impact on economic performance is
among the most controversial issues in macroeconomic policy. The empirical works
on the growth effect of exchange rate volatility conclude either on exchange rate
neutrality, or on a different effect in industrial and developing countries. Baxter
and Stockman (1989) were the first to bring this ”instability puzzle” forward. The
literature has since been inconclusive on the subject : Husain et al. (2005) find that
exchange rate flexibility is growth-enhancing in industrial countries and neutral in
developing economies, while Dubas et al. (2005), relying on an alternative exchange-
rate classification, find that a fixed exchange rate has good growth performances in
the latter while it is neutral in the former ; similarly, De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005)
show that exchange rate stability is associated with higher growth in South-Eastern
and Central European countries.
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Some recent studies suggest that the failure of the empirical literature at bringing
a stable, clear-cut effect of exchange volatility to the fore may be due to nonlinear
effects : Razin and Rubinstein (2006) allow the exchange rate regime to have both
a direct effect on short-term growth, and an indirect one that is channelled through
the crisis probability, while Aghion et al. (2006a) introduce the interaction of the
exchange rate regime with financial development. Using a sample of 83 countries
spanning the years 1960-2000, they show that real exchange rate volatility can have
a significant impact on the long-term rate of productivity growth, but the effect
depends critically on the countries’ level of financial development. For economies
with relatively low levels of financial development, exchange rate volatility generally
reduces growth, whereas for financially advanced countries, there is no significant
effect. Their empirical result is consistent with the previous literature, in particular
with the finding that exchange rate stability is more growth enhancing in developing
than in industrial countries. Their theoretical model suggests that exchange rate
flexibility exacerbates the volatility of firms’ cash flows. As a consequence, exchange
rate volatility makes the financing of innovations more difficult on average when
financial development is low, that is when credit requirements are stricter, and results
in lower growth. The main idea is that during slumps, the innovating capacity of firms
is hampered while booms do not significantly foster the ability of firms to overcome
the liquidity shock. The consequence of this asymmetry is that less volatility fosters
growth.
In this chapter, the effect of exchange rate volatility on growth is related to the
level of liability dollarization, also referred to as ”original sin”, that is the inability of
developing countries to borrow in their own currency. As a preliminary evidence on
the link between exchange rate volatility and growth for different levels of liability
dollarization, consider Figure III.1. It presents productivity growth against measures
of exchange rate volatility, both adjusted for some control variables1, for low and
1 The control variables include initial productivity, financial depth, secondary schooling, govern-
ment expenditure, inflation, trade openness. These variables are defined in section 4.
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Fig. III.1 – Real exchange rate volatility, exchange rate flexibility and productivity
growth 
 High levels of dollarization (above median)* Low levels of dollarization (below median)* 
-.0
4
-.0
2
0
.02
.04
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 gr
ow
th 
res
idu
als
-.05 0 .05 .1
Real exchange rate volatility residuals
coef = -.11644546, (robust) se = .06818136, t = -1.71
-.0
1
-.0
05
0
.00
5
.01
.01
5
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 gr
ow
th 
res
idu
als
-.04 -.02 0 .02 .04
Real exchange rate volatility     residuals
coef = -.02082144, (robust) se = .08264721, t = -.25   
 High levels of dollarization (above median)* Low levels of dollarization (below median)* 
-.0
5
0
.05
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 gr
ow
th 
res
idu
als
-2 -1 0 1 2LS flexibility index residuals
coef = -.00613294, (robust) se = .00267511, t = -2.29
-.0
4
-.0
2
0
.02
.04
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 gr
ow
th 
res
idu
als
-2 -1 0 1 2 3LS flexibility index residuals
coef = -.0020612, (robust) se = .00155774, t = -1.32  
* : Pooled regressions of productivity growth, real exchange rate volatility (standard deviation
of real exchange rate changes) and exchange rate flexibility (LS classification of exchange rate
management) are performed using five-year average data for 51 (upper graphs) to 75 (lower
graphs) countries over 1995-2005. The control variables include initial productivity, financial
depth, secondary schooling, government expenditure, inflation, trade openness. For each group,
the regressions are performed and then the residuals of productivity growth are regressed on the
residuals of real exchange rate volatility or exchange rate flexibility.
Source : CHELEM, World Bank, Barro and Lee (2000), Beck et al. (1999), Hausmann et al. (2001)
and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002).
high levels of dollarization. In order to adjust for the set of controls, we take the
residuals of pooled regressions of productivity growth and exchange rate volatility
using five-year average data for 51 (upper graphs) or 75 (lower graphs) countries
over 1995-2005. Low and high levels of dollarization are respectively those below
and above the sample median. Two proxies are used to account for exchange rate
flexibility : the standard deviations of the real effective exchange rate in the upper
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graphs and the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) classification of exchange rate
regimes in the lower graphs. The dollarization measure is the external ”original
sin” taken from Hausmann et al. (2001) and Hausmann and Panizza (2003). High
dollarization countries exhibit a significant negative relationship between exchange
rate flexibility and growth, while the slope is not significantly different from zero in
low dollarization countries. The contribution of the chapter is to provide a theoretical
model that would predict this fact and to confirm the robustness of this preliminary
evidence, using a panel of 77 countries over the period 1995-2004.
As in Aghion et al. (2006a), an open monetary economy model with wage
stickiness, where exchange rate fluctuations affect the growth performance of credit-
constrained firms is developed : on the one hand, to be able to innovate, firms
have to finance a transitory liquidity shock ; on the other hand, exchange rate
volatility affects cash flows volatility under wage stickiness and thus impairs the
firms’ financing capacities on average. But this framework is not sufficient to account
for liability dollarization and is supplemented with two important features : 1) the
production is split into tradable and nontradable goods while the liquidity cost is in
tradable goods to allow a mismatch ; 2) the firms’ cash flows are the profits net of
debt repayments, whereas in Aghion et al. (2006a), the cash flows are made of the
firms’ gross profits. Holding everything equal, the value of nontradable production
in terms of tradables would fall after a nominal depreciation while the value of
the tradable output would remain constant under the law of one price. Since the
liquidity cost is denominated in tradable goods, this would reduce the firms’ financing
capacities. But if the firms’ debt is partially denominated in domestic currency, this
depreciation would also alleviate debt repayments and thus limit the fall in the firms’
cash flows. An a priori intuition is therefore that under complete debt dollarization,
a fixed exchange rate regime is growth-enhancing as compared to a flexible exchange
rate regime, and when the level of dollarization falls, the growth advantage of pegged
regimes diminishes.
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However, whether exchange rate flexibility destabilizes firms’ production in terms
of tradable goods under general equilibrium is not a trivial issue. According to Milton
Friedman, a flexible exchange rate has a stabilizing effect on output when the source
of shocks is external since a foreign shock that requires a real depreciation would
imply a costless nominal depreciation while there would be a contractionary deflation
under a fixed exchange rate. As a result, a flexible exchange rate has a stabilizing
effect on output. However, the output measured in foreign currency depends on
both the output in real terms and the real exchange rate. Therefore, firms’ revenues
in foreign currency can be better stabilized by a fixed exchange rate regime if its
stabilizing effect on the real exchange rate compensates for its destabilizing effect
on output. In the model presented here, with productivity shocks in the tradable
sector, it is the case : because the nontradable sector is more labor-intensive than the
tradable sector, the traditional contractionary deflation effect under a peg is present,
but because the elasticity of substitution between the nontradable and tradable
goods is lower than one (as is widely admitted in the literature), the net effect is
mitigated under a peg.
To test the basic hypothesis that exchange rate flexibility has a more negative
impact in dollarized countries, standard growth regressions are used (the baseline
specification is taken from Levine et al. (2000)). Those standard growth regressions
are augmented by a measure of exchange rate flexibility (as in Aghion et al. (2006a)),
a measure of external dollarization and the interaction term of exchange rate
flexibility and dollarization. The results are based on a dynamic panel of 77 countries
between 1995 and 2004 described above. Both OLS and GMM methodologies are
adopted and robust two-step standard errors are also computed using the method
of Windmeijer (2004). The GMM methodology helps tackle the issue of endogeneity
but suffers from the problem of weak instruments. The set of instruments is
therefore carefully selected using both overidentification and underidentification
tests. Afterwards, robustness checks are run.
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The introduction of original sin to understand the impact of exchange rate on
growth is motivated by the recurrent use of liability dollarization in the literature
to understand emerging markets. In particular, while some dollarization may be
required by exporters as a hedge against exchange rate fluctuations, widespread
dollarization introduces a currency mismatch. This mismatch has been pointed to
as a source of vulnerability by several authors.2 Original sin is therefore a major
candidate to explain the relative growth performances of exchange rate regimes in
developing and industrial countries. Among the few empirical works on liability
dollarization (Arteta, 2005; Calvo et al., 2004; De Nicolo et al., 2003; Reinhart
et al., 2003; Levy-Yeyati, 2006), only Levy-Yeyati (2006) have examined the overall
growth impact of original sin, but none yet have considered its effect on aggregate
productivity when interacted with exchange rate volatility.
Another reason for enriching the approach of Aghion et al. (2006a) is that an
exchange rate depreciation has expansionary effects in their model : since firms
produce only tradable goods and because of the law of one price, a depreciation is
equivalent to inflation which leads to a decrease in the real wage. The negative effect
of exchange rate volatility thus comes mainly from the appreciation episodes, which
goes against the evidence, especially for developing countries. The introduction of a
nontradable good sector which is more labor-intensive than the tradable good sector
helps reverse this prediction, so that an exchange rate depreciation is contractionary.
Section 2 presents a stylized model of growth and monetary policy. Section 3
derives the empirical implications of the model concerning the link between growth
and exchange rate volatility. Section 4 tests these empirical predictions.
2 See, among others, Krugman (1999), Aghion et al. (2000), Aghion et al. (2004), and Cespedes
et al. (2002).
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2 A stylized monetary model
2.1 A small open economy with sticky wages and two sectors
Consider a small open economy with a continuum of firms, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1],
that are owned in equal shares by a continuum of households indexed by j ∈ [0, 1].
Households supply labor and start period t with a stock of monetary balances. Firms
produce both tradable goods T , which are identical to the outside world good, and
nontradable goods N . There are two currencies : the domestic currency (peso) and
the foreign currency (dollar).
Firms are price-taker and competitive so that the law of one price applies in the
sector of tradables :
P Tt = StP
T∗
t
where P Tt and P
T∗
t are respectively the domestic (peso) and foreign (dollar) price of
tradable goods and St is the nominal exchange rate. P
T∗
t is assumed to be constant
and normalized to one. Thus P Tt = St : dollars and tradables are one and unique
good.
The timing within period t is the following :
1. Wages are preset.
2. The entrepreneurs borrow Dt to be able to innovate in period t + 1 : that is
upgrade At, the level of productivity.
3. An aggregate productivity shock occurs in the tradable sector, firms hire labor
Lt and produce AtY
T
t and AtY
N
t , respectively the production of tradable and
nontradable goods.
4. Firms repay their debt Dt, and pay the wages AtWtLt, with AtWt the wage
rate and Lt aggregate labor.
5. Firm i, i ∈ [0, 1] faces a liquidity shock AtΦit in dollars. If the liquidity shock
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is financed, then the firm is able to innovate and recovers AtΦ
i
t. If it is not
financed, then the firm cannot innovate and disappears at the end of the period.
6. Firms distribute profits to the household and consumption takes place.
We assume that there are no credit markets at step 5. This important assumption
implies that the ability to innovate can be hampered because of a bad shock on
cash flows. We also make the simplifying assumption that there is no intertemporal
trading, so the analysis can be split into the within-period equilibrium and the
evolution of productivity At, which depends on the equilibrium cash flow of period
t. First, the process governing the evolution of productivity is presented to determine
how growth depends on current cash flows and then a within-period analysis is run
to determine how cash flows react to shocks under a flexible and fixed exchange rate
regime.
2.2 The evolution of productivity
2.2.1 Innovation process
The innovation process is specified as follows : if the firm is able to overcome the
liquidity shock of period t, then its t+ 1 productivity evolves according to :
At+1 = δρtAt + (1− ρt)At
with δ > 1 and ρt the proportion of innovating firms. The firm benefits from positive
innovation externalities. Otherwise, the firm disappears and is replaced by a new firm
that benefits from the new level of productivity. These assumptions are made to rule
out heterogeneity among firms and to keep their number constant. The aggregate
growth rate is therefore g = (δ − 1)ρt.
2.2.2 Liquidity shocks and credit market imperfections
To be able to innovate, the firm has to pay a fixed cost Dt = dAt (d > 0) in
dollars at the beginning of period t (before the revelation of the aggregate shock),
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and pay an idiosyncratic liquidity cost AtΦ
i
t in dollars at the end of period t, after
paying the wage bill and repaying its debt, where Φit is independently and identically
distributed across firms, with cumulative distribution function F . At is used to scale
the fixed cost and the liquidity shock to ensure a balanced growth path.
Firms start the period without funds, so they must borrow Dt. For tractability,
firms’ indebtedness is introduced under the form of a fixed cost. It is also assumed
for simplicity that the credit constraints are not binding at this stage and that the
cost of borrowing is lower than the expected value of innovation, which implies that
firms always choose to pay the fixed cost. This cost can be viewed as spending on
R&D, learning expenses or investment in a new technology.
At the end of the period t, firm i faces the liquidity cost shock AtΦ
i
t. If they
do not finance this cost, the firms cannot innovate and disappear at the end of the
period. If firms meet this cost, they will recover AtΦ
i
t at the end of the current period
and pay back their creditors before the beginning of the next one. For simplicity, it
is also assumed that the liquidity cost can be financed with a zero interest rate. As
a consequence, the innovation cost is neutral regarding the net profit of the current
period. Therefore, it is always profitable for the firms to finance the liquidity shock.
AtΦ
i
t can be viewed as the cost induced by a delay, typically in an equipment delivery,
or any transitory shock that would ruin the business unless there is enough liquidity
to overcome it.
It is assumed that there are no credit markets at this stage, so firms are able to
overcome the transitory liquidity shock if and only if their cash flow is sufficient to
meet the cost :
Πt ≥ Φit
where Πt is the cash flow of the firm expressed in dollars and scaled by At.
Firms have the same cash flows Πt and differ only regarding the liquidity shock
Φit. Therefore, ρt, the proportion of firms which are not constrained (and thus of
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innovating firms), is the proportion of firms whose liquidity shock is lower than Πt :
ρt = P (Φ
i
t < Πt) = F (Πt) (III.1)
The aggregate growth rate depends directly on the level of cash flows Πt. The
purpose of the next subsection is to determine the behavior of Πt depending on the
exchange rate regime.
2.3 Within-period analysis
The purpose of this subsection is to examine the impact of exchange rate policy,
which is implemented through a monetary instrument, in terms of transmission of
shocks to prices and quantities, and therefore to firms’ cash flows. For this purpose,
the structure of the within-period model is specified. The presence of nominal rigidi-
ties (preset wages) implies that monetary policy has real consequences, in particular
in terms of cash flows volatility. Some other key assumptions contribute to shape the
model’s predictions. First, the nontradable sector is more labor-intensive than the
tradable one. This is empirically relevant, but it has also an important implication,
which is that an output contraction is consistent with a real depreciation. As a result,
the peso-denominated debt has hedging properties regarding cash-flows volatility
in terms of dollars. Second, the elasticity of substitution between tradables and
nontradables is lower than one, which is widely admitted in the literature, but is
also key in ranking the flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes in terms of cash-flow
volatility.
Finally, the level of dollarization is exogenous. Indeed, the fact that liability
dollarization is imposed on developing countries is widely admitted in the literature.
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), among others, support this view :
The problem is not that firms simply lack the foresight to match the maturity
structure of their assets and liabilities ; it is that they find it impossible to do so.
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The incompleteness of financial markets is thus at the root of financial fragility.
This financial markets incompleteness is often related to the lack of sound
institutions and can therefore be regarded as exogenous.3
2.3.1 Firms
Production and growth
Final goods are produced using labour. Labour is differentiated across house-
holds, so that households have market power in wage setting. We can define the
aggregate labor composite as :
L =
[∫ 1
0
(Lj)1−1/δdj
] 1
1−1/δ
where Lj is employment of household j, and δ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
between labor varieties.
Firms have identical technologies. A firm produces both tradable and nontradable
goods. The tradable and nontradable productions of firm i ∈ [0, 1] during period t
are respectively denoted by AtY
Ti
t and AtY
Ni
t and :
Y Tit = Y
T
t = e
ut (III.2)
Y Nit = Y
N
t =
√
Lt (III.3)
Y Tit and Y
Ni
t are the firm’s productions scaled by the level of productivity and
ut is the aggregate productivity shock in the tradable sector, with Eut = 0 and
V (ut) = σ
2
u. The labor demand is identical across firms because firms have the same
technology. For simplicity, it is assumed that the production of nontradables requires
3 Existing explanations point at time inconsistency problems related to the temptation to ”default”
on local currency debt through inflation (Calvo and Guidotti, 1989), the incidence of implicit
debtor guarantees (Burnside et al., 2001) and signaling problems (De la Torre et al., 2003), among
others. De Nicolo et al. (2003) provides evidence that the credibility of macroeconomic policy and
the quality of institutions are both key determinants of cross-country variations in dollarization.
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labor while the production of tradables involves no input. This specification has been
chosen to capture the fact that the nontradable sector is more labor-intensive than
the tradable sector.
Firms choose employment to maximize the nontradable profit PNt
√
Lt−
∫ 1
0
W jt L
j
tdj
with respect to Ljt , j ∈ [0, 1], subject to the labor composite definition, where W jt
is the wage set by household j in pesos, scaled by At, and P
N
t is the peso price of
nontradable goods. We get the implicit labor demand function :
W jt =
PNt
2
√
Lt
(
Ljt
Lt
)−1
ρ
(III.4)
In a symmetric equilibrium,W jt = Wt and L
j
t = Lt. We therefore get the optimal
aggregate employment condition :
WtLt =
PNt Y
N
t
2
(III.5)
Indebtment and dollarization
Firms borrow the fixed cost Dt = dAt to be able to innovate in period t + 1. It
is assumed that debt is contracted in nominal terms and is denominated either in
foreign currency (dollars) or in local currency (pesos). An exogenous fraction α is
denominated in dollars while the rest is denominated in pesos. α is the degree of
dollarization.
r∗, the interest rate on dollar bonds, is fixed internationally. It is assumed that
foreigners are risk neutral and value dollars so that r, the interest rate on peso bonds,
satisfies the following no-arbitrage condition :
(1 + r)E
1
P Tt
= 1 + r∗
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At the end of period t, the firm has therefore to repay in dollars :
(
α +
1
P Tt E
1
PTt
(1− α)
)
(1 + r∗)Dt
Cash flows
The liquidity shock occurs after the firm has paid the wage bill and repaid the
debt, so the cash flow in terms of dollars and scaled by At is Πt = Y
T
t +
PNt
PTt
Y Nt −
WtLt
PTt
−
(
α + 1
PTt E

1
PTt
(1− α)
)
(1 + r∗)d. After replacing the wage bill using labor
demand (III.5), one gets :
Πt = Y
T
t +
1
2
PNt
P Tt
Y Nt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gross profits
−
α+ 1
P Tt E
(
1
PTt
)(1− α)
 (1 + r∗)d
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Debt repayments
(III.6)
The cash flows include gross profits, but to get the actual cash on hand, debt
repayments must be substracted from them. Comparing the gross profit component
and the debt component of cash flows will give the actual financing capacity of firms.
Because firms’ revenues are partly in nontradable goods while the liquidity shock
is denominated in tradables, firms face a currency mismatch. According to (III.6),
firms’ gross profits are sensitive to nominal exchange rate variations (changes in
P Tt ). However, the peso-denominated fraction of firms’ debt helps them hedge the
variations in the nontradable value of their profits. For example, everything else
equal, a nominal depreciation implies a fall in the value of gross profits in terms of
tradables. If α = 1, debt repayments, in terms of tradables, are immune to exchange
rate variations, whereas if α < 1, a nominal depreciation leads to a decrease in
debt repayments in terms of tradables, which alleviates the overall impact of the
depreciation on the cash flows. However, in order to generalize this intuition, the
model needs to be closed.
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2.3.2 Households
The households maximize their utility : log(AtCt) + log
(
AtMt
Pt
)
− v(Ljt), v′ > 0,
v′′ > 0, with respect to Ct, their consumption basket and Mt, their nominal money
balances, both scaled by the level of productivity At :
Ct =
[
γ
1
θC
T θ−1
θ
t + (1− γ)
1
θC
N θ−1
θ
t
] θ
θ−1
(III.7)
subject to their -scaled- budget constraint :
P Tt C
T
t + P
N
t C
N
t +Mt = Πt +W
j
t L
j
t + Tt +Mt−1At−1/At (III.8)
where CTt and C
N
t are respectively the consumptions of tradables and nontradables,
and Tt are monetary transfers from the government, all scaled by At. Mt−1At−1 is
the initial stock of monetary balances. The households use the dividends (firms’
net profits), their wage, government transfers and their begining-of-period money
balances to finance their consumption in tradables and nontradables and their
current money balances. θ is the elasticity of substitution between tradable and
nontradable goods. It is assumed that θ < 1, which means that goods are weakly
substitutable. This is a standard assumption concerning tradables and nontradables.
0 < γ < 1 is the weight of tradables in the consumption basket.
The program yields the relative demand for tradables and nontradables :
PNt
P Tt
=
(
1− γ
γ
CTt
CNt
) 1
θ
(III.9)
and the demand for money :
1
PtCt
=
1
Mt
(III.10)
The general price index associated to the household maximization program is
the following :
Pt =
(
γP T1−θt + (1− γ)PN1−θt
) 1
1−θ (III.11)
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2.3.3 Wage setting
To model wage stickiness, we assume that nominal wages are preset ex ante.
Household j sets the wage W jt in order to maximize his expected utility subject to
his budget constraint (III.8) and to the implicit labor demand (III.4). Since each
household possesses a small fraction of the firms, he does not internalize the effect
of his wage on the dividends. In a symmetric equilibrium, this yields :
Wt =
ρ
ρ− 1
E(Ltv
′(Lt))
E
(
Lt
PtCt
) (III.12)
2.3.4 Monetary policy
The monetary policy targets either the stability of the general price index -
flexible exchange rate :
Pt = P¯ (III.13)
or the stability of the nominal exchange rate - fixed exchange rate :
P Tt = P¯
T (III.14)
where P¯ and P¯ T are exogenous. The government’s instrument is a nominal transfer
Tt, which is the amount of banknotes that are created by the government and
distributed to the households. The outside world has a zero net demand for money
balances. The government’s budget constraint therefore yields :
Mt −Mt−1At−1/At = Tt (III.15)
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2.3.5 Equilibrium
The aggregate equilibrium budget constraint (balanced current account4), scaled
by At, is given by :
P Tt Y
T
t + P
N
t Y
N
t −
αP Tt + (1− α) 1
E
(
1
PTt
)
 (1 + r∗)d = P Tt CTt + PNt CNt
Since nontradables cannot be traded internationally :
Y Nt = C
N
t (III.16)
which also yields :
Y Tt −
α+ (1− α) 1
P Tt E
(
1
PTt
)
 (1 + r∗)d = CTt (III.17)
This means that both current accounts, in tradables and nontradables, are ba-
lanced : the nontradable output is entirely consumed and the tradable consumption
is what remains from the tradable production after repaying the debt. Nominal
exchange rate movements have therefore an impact on tradable consumption : if
α < 1, a depreciation enables the household to consume more tradable goods by
alleviating the burden of the peso debt.
Definition : For each period t, given At−1 and At, a symmetric equilibrium is defi-
ned by a set of prices
{
PNt , P
T
t , Pt,Wt
}
and allocations
{
Y Nt , Y
T
t , C
N
t , C
T
t , Ct, Lt,Mt, Tt
}
that solves the supply of nontradable and tradable goods (III.2) and (III.3), the
4 The current account is balanced because we have assumed that there is no intertemporal trading,
that is no asset trade. This assumption simplifies the analysis but is not crucial. Qualitatively,
the results would be unchanged if we introduced intertemporal trade in bonds. This is because,
as long as there is imperfect risk sharing, a productivity shock leads households to alter their
consumption, which is at the origine of the mechanisms of the model. Trade in bonds only limits
the impact of productivity shocks on consumption by sharing their effect between current and
future consumption ; it does not suppress it. The difference with the model without trade in
bonds is only quantitative and does not alter the comparison between regimes.
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aggregate labor demand (III.5), the consumption basket (III.7) the relative demand
for tradable and nontradable goods (III.9), the demand for money (III.10), the price
index (III.11), the symmetric wage setting (III.12), one of the two monetary policies
(III.13) or (III.14), the government budget constraint (III.15) and the equilibrium
conditions on the tradable and nontradable markets (III.16) and (III.17).
If the equilibrium productions and prices are determined, the values of firms’
cash flows Πt can be inferred from (III.6).
5
Appendix A shows that the non-stochastic solution (without aggregate shock
in the tradable sector) for
{
Y Nt , Y
T
t , C
N
t , C
T
t , Ct, Lt, P
N
t , P
T
t , Pt,Wt
}
is unique and
constant across regimes. This defines the steady-state equilibrium of the model. Let
X denote the steady-state value for Xt.
The empirical predictions of the model are derived in the next section by log-
linearizing the model around the non-stochastic steady state and by studying the
transmission mechanisms under both regimes.
3 Model’s empirical implications
In this section, we study the differential impact of aggregate shocks on the
quantities and prices under both regimes by using a reduced-form log-linearized
model and then derive some conclusions on exchange rate regimes on growth.
3.1 The log-linearized, reduced-form model
Let xt denote the deviation from the non-stochastic steady state of Xt : xt =
Xt−X
X
w ln(Xt)− ln(X).
We are interested in the behavior of pi (time subscripts are dropped for
5 To obtain the value of the aggregate variables in absolute terms, multiply{
Y Nt , Y
T
t , C
N
t , C
T
t , Ct,Wt,M, Tt
}
by At (
{
Lt, P
N
t , P
T
t , Pt
}
are already in absolute terms).
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simplicity). We thus log-linearize (III.6) and use the labor demand (III.5) to infer :
pi = (1− κ)(η + 1)yT + κ(pN − pT + yN)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gross profit effect
+(1− κ)η(1− α)pT︸ ︷︷ ︸
Debt valuation effect
where κ =
PN2
2PTW
1−(1+r∗)d+ PN2
2PTW
denotes the steady-state share of nontradables in the cash
flows and η = (1+r
∗)d
1−(1+r∗)d denotes the steady-state ratio of debt repayments over the
tradable consumption (tradable profit minus debt repayments). We have 0 < κ < 1
and η > 0. The first and second terms of pi represent respectively the tradable and
nontradable gross profits valued in terms of tradables (or dollars). The last term
represents the effect of the debt currency composition on the financing capacities
of firms. For example, everything equal, a nominal exchange rate depreciation
(appreciation), that is a rise in pT (a fall) leads to a depreciation (appreciation)
in the value of the nontradable gross profits, but it also alleviates (increases) the
peso-denominated part of the debt when α < 1. If α = 1, debt repayments in terms
of tradables are immune to nominal exchange rate variations and cannot hedge the
variations in the tradable value of profits. However, one needs to consider how yT ,
yN , pT and pN vary jointly. To know how pi reacts to the productivity shock u, it is
then sufficient to know the behavior of production and prices, which we can derive
from the following reduced-form model.
The log-linearization of the relative demand for tradables and nontradables
(III.9) (pN − pT = 1
θ
(cT − cN)) and the equilibrium conditions (III.16) (cN = yN)
and (III.17) (cT = (η + 1)yT + η(1− α)pT ) gives :
pN − pT = 1
θ
[(η + 1)yT + η(1− α)pT − yN ] (III.18)
The relative price of nontradables in terms of tradables has to fall either if the
production of nontradables rises or if the production of tradables falls. This also
happens if α < 1 and the nominal exchange rate appreciates (pT falls), because
this makes the peso-denominated debt increase which leaves less tradable goods to
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consume for the household.
Besides, the log-linearization of supply of nontradables (III.3) (yN = l
2
) and the
labor demand (III.5) (pN + yN = l) yields :
yN = pN (III.19)
Here we see that a deflation in pN has a contractionary effect on yN . This is
because nominal wages are preset. As a consequence, a deflation in pN depresses the
production of nontradables through the rise of the real wage.
Moreover, by log-linearizing the supply for tradables (III.2), we obtain :
yT = u (III.20)
Finally, the two possible policy choices are the following :
– Flexible exchange rate :
p = 0
Besides, according to (III.11) (p = γpT + (1 − γ)pN) the flexible rule reduces
to :
pT =
−(1− γ)
γ
pN (III.21)
– Fixed exchange rate :
pT = 0 (III.22)
With only (III.18), (III.19), (III.20) and one of the two monetary rules (III.21)
or (III.22), pi can be inferred.
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3.2 Reactions of quantities and prices to shocks
The reduced form model composed of (III.18), (III.19), (III.20) and one of the
two monetary rules (III.21) or (III.22) is solved to obtain the following Lemma :
Lemma 1
– Under a flexible exchange rate,
pNflex =
γ(η + 1)u
θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α) , p
Tflex =
(1− γ)(η + 1)u
θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α)
pNflex − pTflex = (η + 1)u
θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α)
yNflex =
γ(η + 1)u
θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α) , y
Tflex = u
– Under a fixed exchange rate,
pNfix =
(η + 1)u
θ + 1
, pTfix = 0, pNfix − pTfix = (η + 1)u
θ + 1
yNfix =
(η + 1)u
θ + 1
, yTfix = u
Lemma 1 is used to establish the following proposition :
Proposition 1 (proof in Appendix A) :
After an identical negative productivity shock in the tradable sector :
– If α = 1, the production of nontradables (yN) falls more under a peg than under
a float. However, the relative price of nontradables (pN − pT ) (henceforth the
real exchange rate) experiences a higher depreciation under a float.
– When α diminishes, the fall in the production of nontradables and in the real
exchange rate is mitigated under a float.
The intuition is the following : a negative shock on the productivity of the
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tradable sector requires a real depreciation (a fall in pN − pT ) which results in a
contractionary deflation in the nontradable sector under both regimes, as illustrated
in Figure III.2. This negative effect is accentuated under the fixed exchange rate
regime because the real depreciation occurs only through a deflation in pN while
under a flexible regime it is shared between a rise in pT and a fall in pN . However,
precisely because of the further contraction in yN , the real exchange rate depreciation
is milder under a peg because it compensates for the fall in yT . But when α falls,
the consumption of tradables is stabilized under a float thanks to the hedging effect
of the peso-denominated debt, which mitigates the required real depreciation and
the consecutive adjustment in yN , as Figure III.2 shows.
As a result, the comparative impact of a negative shock on the nontradable
production valued in terms of tradables seems ambiguous. But the following
proposition can be established :
Proposition 2 (proof in Appendix A) :
After an identical negative productivity shock in the tradable sector :
– If α = 1, the fall in the nontradable production valued in terms of tradables
(yN + pN − pT ) is higher under a float than under a peg.
– When α diminishes, this fall is mitigated under a float.
Since tradable and nontradable goods are weakly substitutable (θ < 1), prices
move more than quantities. As a result, when α = 1, the additional fall in the relative
price of nontradables under a float offsets the additional fall in nontradable output
under a peg. The production of nontradables expressed in tradables therefore falls
more under a float than under a peg. When α diminishes, the stabilizing effect of
the peso debt on the consumption of tradables makes the response of nontradable
production in terms of tradables smoother under a float, because it stabilizes both
the production and the real exchange rate, according to Proposition 1. This is
illustrated by the behavior of yN + pN − pT in Figure III.2.
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Fig. III.2 – The effect of a negative shock in the tradable sector (u = −1)
pN
-1,2
-1
-0,8
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
α
Flexible
Fixed
yN
-1,2
-1
-0,8
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
α
Flexible
Fixed
 
pN-pT
-1,9
-1,7
-1,5
-1,3
-1,1
-0,9
-0,7
-0,5
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
α
Flexible
Fixed
yN+pN-pT
-2,6
-2,4
-2,2
-2
-1,8
-1,6
-1,4
-1,2
-1
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
α
Flexible
Fixed
 
Assumptions : θ = 0.6, γ = 0.4, κ = 0.6, η = 0.7.
3.3 Comparing regimes
The non-stochastic steady-state cash flows Π are the same under both regime.
However, uncertainty affects the distribution of Πt through two main channels : the
level of the stochastic steady state EΠt, which differs from the non-stochastic steady
state because of the presence of risk premia, and the volatility around EΠt. These
two channels are affected by the nature of the regime. Finally, the proportion of
innovating firms Eρt = EF (Πt) depends on the distribution of Πt, so Eρt depends
on the exchange rate regime. To make the comparison between exchange rate regimes
tractable, we focus on small productivity shocks ut.
Lemma 2 (proof in Appendix A) :
If F sufficiently concave around u = 0 and σ2 = 0, then when u and σ2 close to
0, EF (Πflext )− EF (Πfixt ) is of the same sign as V (pifix)− V (piflex).
Assuming that F is sufficiently concave insures that the effect of σ on the
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volatility around the steady state has a higher impact on growth than its effect
on the stochastic steady state itself. In this case, more volatility around Π implies
that in a boom, where Πt is high, only a few more firms are able to overcome the
liquidity shocks, whereas in slumps, where Πt is low, many more firms are prevented
from innovating. It then follows that the regime that results in more volatile cash
flows Πt yields a lower innovating probability. If this is not the case, then there is the
possibility that more volatility could stimulate innovation and productivity growth
in expansions. The empirical section suggests that this latter effect is dominated. In
what follows, it is then admitted that lower volatility yields higher growth.
3.4 The impact of exchange rate regimes on growth
Once we admit that lower cash-flow volatility yields higher growth through a
higher innovating probability, it is possible to infer what regime is preferred in terms
of growth.
Proposition 3 (proof in Appendix A) :
– If α = 1, a peg yields higher growth than a float.
– When α decreases, the growth differential between a peg and a float decreases.
– If κ(1−θ)
η[1+κ+(1−κ)θ] < 1, there exist values of α > 0 such that a float yields higher
growth than a peg.
The first point of Proposition 3 is derived directly from Proposition 2. The
second and third points come from the fact that the peso-denominated debt has
two stabilizing effects on firms’ cash flows under a float : 1) a direct stabilizing effect
through the hedging role of debt repayments in pesos, 2) an indirect stabilizing
effect through the stabilization of the nontradable gross profits expressed in terms
of tradables (Proposition 2). Thus, under a flexible exchange rate regime, the level
of dollarization has a negative impact on growth because it annihilate the hedging
properties of the peso-denominated debt.
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If the level of dollarization is high, then a fixed exchange rate regime is always
better for growth. Indeed, in that case, the potential gross profit effects dominate the
potential debt valuation effects and therefore a peg stabilizes the cash flow better.
But if the indebtment level η and the elasticity of substitution θ are high and if the
share of nontradable production κ is low, then when the level of dollarization is low,
debt valuation effects can be high enough compared to profit effects to make a float
more growth-enhancing than a peg for low values of dollarization.
Fig. III.3 – The variance of firms’ cash flows
V(pi)
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
5
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
α
Flexible (η=0.7)
Fixed (η=0.7)
Flexible (η=0.1)
Fixed (η=0.1)
 
Assumptions : θ = 0.6, γ = 0.4, κ = 0.6.
Figure III.3 shows the behavior of the variance of firms’ cash flows under fixed
and flexible exchange rate regimes for some parameter values. The dashed lines are
constructed under the assumption that η = 0.1 (low level of debt) and the solid
lines are drawn under the assumption that η = 0.7 (high level of debt). Besides,
the elasticity of substitution θ has been set at 0.6, which is a standard estimate
of the elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods (Lorenzo
et al., 2005), and the weight of tradable goods in the consumption basket γ as well
as in cash flows 1 − κ are set to 0.4 (Mendoza, 2001). It appears clearly that the
volatility of cash flows under a float increases with the level of dollarization under
both parameters’ configuration. Under the first hypothesis (low debt), the volatility
of cash flows with the flexible exchange rate regime is always higher than with
the fixed regime, whereas under the second hypothesis (high debt), the volatility
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becomes lower with the flexible exchange rate regime for small values of α.
As a conclusion, the testable empirical implication of this model is that
fixed exchange rates are growth-enhancing as compared to flexible exchange rates
in countries with high liability dollarization and that the growth differential is
decreasing as the level of dollarization falls. Whether there are values of dollarization
for which flexible exchange rate regimes become more growth-enhancing than fixed
exchange rate regimes depend on parameters values.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, the prediction that the level of dollarization conditions the
impact of exchange rate regimes on growth is tested. The basic hypothesis is that
exchange rate flexibility has a more negative impact in dollarized countries. Some
authors have already studied the impact of dollarization on growth : Reinhart et al.
(2003) compare average growth rates for low and high dollarization economies, with
mixed results, and Levy-Yeyati (2006) evaluates the effect of dollarization, showing
that growth is sensibly smaller in financially dollarized economies. The effect of
dollarization has never been assessed for different levels of exchange rate flexibility.
To do so, standard growth regressions are used (the baseline specification is
taken from Levine et al. (2000)). Those standard growth regressions are augmented
by a measure of exchange rate flexibility (as in Aghion et al. (2006a)), a measure
of external dollarization and the interaction term of exchange rate flexibility and
dollarization. First, the data and methodology are presented and then the results
based on a dynamic panel of 77 countries between 1995 and 2004 are discussed.
4.1 Data and methodology
As is common in the growth empirical literature, we work on non-overlapping
five-year averages. This transformation aims at filtering business cycles fluctuations
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and so allows us to focus on long-run effects only.
4.1.1 The dependent variable
The explained variable is the average growth rate of productivity on a five-year
period. Productivity is defined as the ratio of real output per worker. Real GDP is in
1995 PPP-adjusted US dollars. The work force and GDP data come respectively from
the World Bank (World Development Indicators database) and CEPII (CHELEM
database).
4.1.2 The dollarization variable
The most important and most problematic variable is the liability dollarization
measure. It is difficult to find a measure which is both accurate and encompassing,
because the currency breakdown of domestic and external liabilities is often not
available.
The data provided by Hausmann et al. (2001) and Hausmann and Panizza (2003)
are used to construct a proxy for liability dollarization. They provide measures of
”original sin”, that is the inability of an economy to borrow internationally in its
own currency. Their dataset covers 90 industrial and developing countries. They
rely on -non public- BIS data of the currency breakdown of foreign banks’ assets and
liabilities vis-a`-vis industrial and developing countries and construct three indicators
of original sin.
Those measures are restricted de facto to external dollarization and have a small
time coverage, but they encompass industrial countries and thus allow a substantial
variability in the dollarization index. Their advantage is that they give a good picture
of the currency composition of the world’s banking sector’s assets in the economy,
especially for debt securities. The problem is that they ignore domestic dollarization
and do not distinguish the public from the private sector. However, first, domestic
dollarization is likely to be correlated with external dollarization and second, the
dollarization of the public sector has probably a similar impact as that of the private
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sector, since it prevents the government from subsidizing firms and helping them
invest in the bad states. The original sin measures are provided as averages for
1993-1998 and 1999-2001, which allows to use only two 5-year sequences, 1995-1999
and 2000-2004. The dollarization index used in this chapter is computed as the
average of the three indicators. It ranges from 0 to 1.
Figure III.4 presents the distribution of original sin in industrial and developing
countries. It appears that it is concentrated on its maximum value in developing
countries, while in industrial countries it is lower on average and shows more
variability. Besides, it is noteworthy that the original sin index varies only in 20%
of the countries between 1993-1998 and 1999-2001. Those characteristics of the
dollarization variable, that is high persistence and concentration on high values in
developing countries, have to be born in mind when choosing the methodology and
running the robustness checks.
Fig. III.4 – Distribution of original sin in industrial and developing countries
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Source : Hausmann et al. (2001).
4.1.3 Exchange rate flexibility variables
Two alternative measures of exchange rate flexibility are considered. The first
measure is the volatility of the index of real effective exchange rate provided by the
World Bank. Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of annual changes in
the logarithm of the index, calculated over five years.
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The second measure is an index of exchange rate flexibility based on the Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) (henceforth LS) classification of exchange rate
regimes. They define exchange rate regimes according to the behavior of three
classification variables : changes in the nominal exchange rate, the volatility of these
changes, and the volatility of international reserves. Since originally this index is
a measure of rigidity, exchange rate regimes are reordered from the more rigid to
the more flexible : {1, 2, 3, 4} = {fix, crawling peg, dirty float, float}. This index is
averaged over five years.
While the first is a measure of de facto exchange rate volatility, the second is
more a measure of exchange rate management. According to the prediction of the
model, they are positively correlated (see Appendix C) : a more flexible exchange
rate regime results in a higher real exchange rate volatility.
4.1.4 Other variables
The set of control variables follows Levine et al. (2000) and Aghion et al. (2006a) :
financial development measured as in Beck et al. (1999) by the amount of credit
provided by banks and other financial institutions to the private sector (as a share
of GDP), education measured as the average years of secondary schooling (Barro
and Lee, 2000), inflation and the size of government measured by governement
consumption as a percentage of GDP and trade openness measured by the share
of exports and imports in GDP (World Bank). Finally, the usable dataset covers
77 countries and two periods : 1995-1999 and 2000-2004. When real exchange rate
volatility is used, this sample reduces to 51 countries, among which 12 have only one
observations, and when the LS flexibility index is used, it reduces to 75 countries,
among which 17 have only one observation. Appendix B gives the exhaustive list
of countries present in both samples and Appendix C provides some descriptive
statistics.
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4.1.5 Methodology
The benchmark specification follows Levine et al. (2000) and Aghion et al.
(2006a). But, instead of interacting exchange rate flexibility and financial de-
velopment as Aghion et al. (2006a) do, I interact exchange rate flexibility and
dollarization. The estimated equation is the following :
∆yit = y
i
t−yit−1 = (α−1)yit−1+γ1Flexit+γ2OSIN it+γ3Flexit∗OSIN it+β′Zit+dt+²it
(III.23)
where yit is the logarithm of real output per worker in country i at the end of period t,
t = 1995− 1999, 2000− 2004, Flexit is the exchange rate flexibility measure, OSIN it
is the measure of original sin, Zit is the set of control variables, dt is a time effect
and ²it is the error term.
γ1 + γ3OSIN
i
t describes the overall effect of exchange rate flexibility on growth.
γ1 (the linear term) and γ1 + γ3 (which is provided as complementary information)
can be interpreted respectively as the effect of exchange rate flexibility in low
dollarization countries (original sin=0) and in high dollarization countries (original
sin=1). The threshold original sin for which the sign of the overall impact of exchange
rate flexibility changes is −γ1
γ3
. The estimate for −γ1
γ3
is provided along with its
significance test as complementary information in the regressions. Besides, a Wald
test for the significance of exchange rate total effect is run.
The main hypothesis to test is whether exchange rate volatility has a more
negative effect on growth when the level of dollarization increases. This would be
validated by the data if γ3 is found significantly negative. Otherwise, the model would
be rejected. The second hypothesis is that the threshold original sin −γ1
γ3
is between
0 and 1. This would mean that the impact of exchange rate risk on growth switches
from positive to negative within the actual range of the original sin measure. The
validation of this hypothesis would shed some light on the exchange rate instability
puzzle, which could then be explained by the presence of this kind of non-linearities.
First OLS are run with time effects to estimate this model. However, since it is
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a dynamic model, country effects are necessarily correlated with yit−1. The GMM
dynamic panel data estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano
and Bover (1995) is implemented. The persistence of the dollarization data justifies
the use of the extended system-GMM estimator elaborated by Blundell and Bond
(1998) and Blundell and Bond (2000). Robust two-step standard errors are also
computed by following the method of Windmeijer (2004). Using this approach,
the issue of the endogeneity of the lagged explained variable is addressed, with
different assumptions about the status of the other explanatory variables : strict
exogeneity, predetermination and endogeneity. Original sin can only be considered
as predetermined because higher lags are not available. Robustness checks are then
considered by adding other controls.
4.2 The role of financial dollarization
4.2.1 OLS
Table III.1 shows the results of the OLS regression of productivity growth on the
set of explanatory variables described earlier, using equation (III.23).
Consider the impact of exchange rate flexibility and original sin on growth. The
literature has underscored several times the absence of linear long-run effects of
exchange rate flexibility on productivity growth. Regressions (1) and (4) confirm
this fact again : the impact of exchange rate flexibility on growth is not significant,
whether it is measured by the standard deviation of the real exchange rate (column
(1)) or by the LS measure of exchange rate flexibility (column (4)). When the sample
is restrained to data points for which the original sin measure is available (columns
(2) and (5)), this effect becomes significantly negative. This is because the size of the
sample has diminished and it does not challenge the results of previous literature.
It confirms that the impact of exchange rate flexibility is sample-sensitive.
Importantly, as column (3) shows, liability dollarization makes the impact of real
exchange rate volatility on growth more negative, as conjectured. This is illustrated
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Tab. III.1 – Growth effects of the flexibility of Exchange Rate Regime - OLS with
robust standard errors and time effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Initial prod. per worker -0.013** -0.010 -0.006 -0.004 -0.011** -0.008 -0.005
(2.17) (1.37) (0.81) (1.11) (2.04) (1.40) (0.74)
Fin. dev. 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001
(0.35) (0.34) (0.31) (0.28) (0.44) (0.23) (0.28)
O. sin 0.034** 0.043** 0.018*
(2.15) (2.41) (1.83)
REER vol. -0.077 -0.211*** 0.203
(1.53) (3.17) (1.15)
REER vol.*O. sin -0.461**
(2.02)
LS index of ER flex. -0.002 -0.005*** 0.007**
(1.37) (2.73) (2.22)
LS Flex.*O. sin -0.014***
(2.84)
REER Depreciation -0.006
(0.03)
REER Dep.*O. sin -0.444*
(1.72)
Control variables
Education 0.021** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.009 0.031*** 0.027*** 0.018*
(2.40) (3.26) (3.10) (1.54) (3.66) (3.36) (1.72)
Trade openness 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.005* 0.004 0.005 0.002
(1.40) (0.72) (0.62) (1.66) (1.12) (1.16) (0.56)
Inflation -0.033 -0.049* -0.039 -0.016** -0.071*** -0.067*** -0.126***
(1.63) (1.91) (1.59) (1.98) (3.02) (2.89) (4.63)
Government burden -0.001 -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.003 -0.009 -0.008 -0.017***
(0.23) (3.67) (3.75) (0.59) (1.40) (1.31) (2.78)
Intercept 0.052 0.049 -0.011 0.020 0.017 -0.040 0.022
(1.17) (0.89) (0.17) (0.60) (0.37) (0.90) (0.46)
Wald test (F-statistic) :
H0 : ER flex./dep.
total effect = 0 5.67*** 4.56** 4.48***
Threshold O. sin 0.44 0.50 -0.01
H0 : Thres. = 0 (F-stat.) 5.70** 28.38*** 0.00
H0 : Thres. = 1 (F-stat.) 61.00*** 250.68*** 4.42**
Observations 177 90 90 261 129 129 89
R-squared 0.249 0.420 0.437 0.131 0.282 0.308 0.500
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%.
by the fact that the coefficient of the interaction term of original sin and real
exchange rate volatility is significantly negative (at the 5% level). Similarly, the
results of column (6) suggest that a higher level of dollarization makes exchange
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rate flexibility significantly more costly in terms of growth (at the 1% level) when it
is measured by the LS index.
As conjectured, the threshold level is between 0 and 1 : respectively 0.44 when
using real exchange rate volatility and 0.50 when using the LS flexibility index.
As a consequence, on the one hand, the impact of exchange rate flexibility is
significantly negative in both specifications when original sin is equal to 1. On
the other hand, exchange rate flexibility has a positive impact on growth in low
dollarization countries (the coefficient of the linear term is positive), but this impact
is not significant when using real exchange rate volatility. In both specifications, the
total effect of exchange rate flexibility is significant.
Column (7) gives a clue about how the impact of exchange rate volatility on
growth is channeled. It includes the mean real exchange rate depreciation rate and
its interaction with original sin. It shows that a real exchange rate depreciation has
a negative impact on growth, and that this negative impact is magnified by the level
of dollarization (the interaction term is negative and significant at the 10% level).
This confirms the prediction of the model that a real depreciation hampers growth
by disrupting firms’ balance sheets when their level of dollarization is high. This also
suggests that the negative effect of exchange rate volatility on growth comes mainly
from the depreciation episodes. Note also that a real exchange rate depreciation is
never growth enhancing (the threshold level is not significantly different from zero).
4.2.2 GMM
In order to avoid the shortcomings of OLS, the GMM methodology is implemen-
ted.
Table III.2 reports the results of the GMM regressions. These results are drawn
under the following assumption : all the explanatory variables except initial income
are predetermined and they are uncorrelated with fixed effects. This assumption
about the explanatory variables has been chosen after excluding more restrictive
ones which suffered from weak instruments issues according to the Anderson and
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Tab. III.2 – Growth effects of the flexibility of Exchange Rate Regime - 2-step
system-GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust correction
and time effects
(1) (2) (3)
Initial prod. per worker 0.002 0.003 -0.013
(0.24) (0.35) (1.32)
Fin. dev. -0.004 -0.004 0.002
(0.81) (0.57) (0.63)
O. sin 0.037** 0.041* 0.008
(2.08) (1.93) (0.53)
REER vol. 0.223 0.008
(1.18) (0.53)
REER vol.*O. sin -0.429*
(1.90)
LS index of ER flex. 0.006*
(1.87)
LS Flex.*O. sin -0.011**
(2.19)
REER Depreciation 0.103
(0.64)
REER Dep.*O. sin -0.546**
(2.64)
Control variables
Education 0.023** 0.018 0.026**
(2.17) (1.22) (2.16)
Trade openness 0.003 0.008 0.005
(0.66) (1.38) (1.11)
Inflation -0.049 -0.066** -0.128***
(1.55) (2.18) (5.41)
Government burden -0.021*** -0.012* -0.018***
(2.96) (1.68) (2.87)
Intercept -0.081 -0.119* 0.060
(1.10) (1.84) (0.83)
Wald test (F-statistic) :
H0 : ER flex./dep. total effect = 0 6.21*** 2.45* 8.60***
Threshold O. sin 0.52 0.55 0.19
H0 : Thres. = 0 (F-stat.) 7.92*** 21.47*** 0.63
H0 : Thres. = 1 (F-stat.) 67.80*** 164.50*** 11.59***
Hansen overidentification test
H0 Valid instruments (Prob > chi2) 0.520 0.327 0.315
Anderson underidentification test
H0 Underidentification (Prob > chi2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Cragg-Donald underidentification test
H0 Underidentification (Prob > chi2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 90 129 89
Number of countries 51 75 50
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%
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Cragg-Donald tests of underidentification.6 These tests assess whether the equation
is identified and whether the instruments give sufficient information to identify
the effect of the variables of interest. As shown in Table III.2, these tests reject
underidentification in all columns. Therefore, this set of instruments does not show
weak instruments problems. According to the Hansen test, it can also be considered
as globally valid, despite the use of a large number of instruments. Moreover,
difference-in-Sargan tests can help evaluate the exogeneity of subsets of instruments.
After running some of those tests, it appears that neither the predetermination of
regressors nor the absence of correlation between the latter and fixed effects can be
rejected at the 10% level.
The results of columns (1) and (2) of Table III.2 are again in line with the main
model’s prediction, which is that the impact of exchange rate flexibility on growth is
more negative when the level of dollarization is higher, according to the coefficients
of the interaction terms. Both regressions provide the same - significant - threshold
original sin (respectively 0.52 and 0.55). The second conjecture is again satisfied since
it is in the right range. As a result, consider the two extreme cases : when original sin
is maximal, exchange rate rigidity is significantly better for growth while exchange
rate flexibility is preferred when original sin is minimal, but not necessarily in a
significant fashion (the coefficient of the linear term of exchange rate flexibility is
not significant when using real exchange rate volatility (column (1)). Column (3)
confirms the negative impact of a real depreciation, especially in highly dollarized
countries. The effect is even stronger in absolute value and in term of significance
than with the OLS methodology.
To illustrate the magnitude of these effects, consider South Africa : between the
end of the nineties and the beginning of the 2000s, its index of original sin moved
from 0.78 to 0.58. Considering its real exchange rate volatility (0.16) and its LS
index (4) during 200-2004, its growth gain is respectively 1.3 or 0.9 percentage point
6 This assumption has also been chosen for practical reasons. Because of data scarcity, it is
impossible to use second order lags of original sin. It can be therefore considered at best as
predetermined. But, as highlighted by Aghion et al. (2006a), the interaction term is less vulnerable
to potential endogeneity issues than the corresponding linear terms.
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per year, depending on the specification. Similarly, an entirely dollarized emerging
country (original sin index equal to 1) with a rather high exchange rate flexibility like
Colombia during 2000-2004 (real exchange rate volatility equal to 0.10 and flexibility
index equal to 4) would gain 1.8 percentage point of annual growth according to both
models.
Up to this stage, the hypothesis of the existence of a nonlinear effect of exchange
rate volatility on growth is not rejected by the data when using the OLS methodology
and some reasonable GMM specifications. More specifically, exchange rate rigidity is
found to be growth-enhancing in high dollarization countries. The fact that exchange
rate flexibility promotes growth in low dollarization countries is also suggested by
the data but is less robust. The remainder of the section explores further robustness
issues. The next regressions will also be run using the GMM methodology and under
the assumption of predetermined regressors and absence of correlation with fixed
effects.
4.3 Robustness checks
Table III.3 reports the results of the same regressions as before, using the two-
stage system-GMM and Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust standard errors, but
with additional variables to control for potential simultaneity. Columns (1) and (5)
incorporate the average of Kaufmann et al. (1999) Governance indicators, which is
taken as a proxy for institutional quality. Columns (2) and (6) include the logarithm
of net external debt over GDP and column (3) and (7) present the results with both
additional controls.
One surprising outcome is that the coefficient of financial development is
significantly negative in columns (2) and (3), that is when real exchange rate
volatility is used as a measure of flexibility and net debt is introduced, which is
not in line with Levine et al. (2000) and Aghion et al. (2006a). This might be
explained by the fact that the dataset used here is smaller and more subject to
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Tab. III.3 – Growth effects of the volatility of Exchange Rate Regime with additional
controls - 2-step system-GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample
robust correction and time effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Initial prod. per worker -0.007 0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.020 0.002 -0.016
(0.54) (0.59) (0.75) (0.73) (1.18) (0.21) (1.53)
Fin. dev. -0.004 -0.008** -0.009*** -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
(0.79) (2.46) (3.18) (0.66) (1.07) (1.29)
O. sin 0.031 0.032** 0.024* 0.020 0.037* 0.031 0.026
(1.50) (2.14) (1.78) (1.58) (1.68) (1.60) (1.48)
REER vol. 0.195 0.344** 0.329** 0.187
(0.93) (2.31) (2.21) (1.63)
REER vol.*O. sin -0.433* -0.592*** -0.566** -0.361**
(1.71) (3.06) (2.62) (2.46)
LS index of ER flex. 0.005 0.007** 0.005*
(1.45) (2.53) (1.78)
LS flex.*O. sin -0.010** -0.011** -0.008
(2.28) (2.38) (1.61)
Control variables
Education 0.023** 0.021* 0.019*** 0.018** 0.028** 0.021 0.029***
(2.28) (1.83) (2.74) (2.51) (2.53) (1.63) (3.65)
Trade openness 0.004 0.009* 0.008* 0.008** 0.004 0.012** 0.010*
(0.81) (1.96) (1.88) (2.02) (0.84) (2.15) (1.92)
Inflation -0.040 -0.042* -0.043 -0.027 -0.064*** -0.068*** -0.058***
(1.33) (1.70) (1.43) (1.39) (2.81) (3.13) (2.78)
Government burden -0.019** -0.023*** -0.019** -0.019*** -0.011 -0.012* -0.011
(2.26) (2.71) (2.53) (3.17) (1.49) (1.74) (1.59)
Additional control
variables
Governance index 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002
(0.92) (1.31) (0.60) (1.21) (1.47)
Net external debt -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005*
(0.56) (1.13) (1.35) (0.72) (1.68)
Intercept -0.002 -0.115* -0.029 0.007 0.071 -0.136** 0.008
(0.02) (1.70) (0.59) (0.10) (0.42) (2.54) (0.08)
Hansen test
(Prob > chi2) 0.373 0.810 0.908 0.541 0.173 0.571 0.344
Observations 90 77 77 84 129 113 113
Number of countries 51 44 44 46 75 66 66
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%
colinearity problems. Indeed, the correlation matrix provided in Appendix C shows
a high negative correlation between financial development and original sin on the one
hand and financial development and external debt on the other. To show whether
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this colinearity problem drives the main results, the financial development variable
is removed in column (4).
As for the effect of original sin and the real exchange rate volatility, consider
the first four columns : the inclusion of additional controls does not change the
results. The additional controls themselves do not appear significant. The impact
of the interaction term is negative, even when financial development is removed
(column (4)). When the LS index of exchange rate flexibility is used (last three
columns), the results are less robust, especially when both the institutional variable
and net external debt are included : in column (7), the coefficient of the interaction
term is not significant at the conventional levels, though it still has a negative sign.
Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that its level of significance is 11%, which is close
to the conventional ones. The Kaufmann governance index has a positive but often
non significant impact, and net external debt has a negative, non-significant impact
on growth, which may be explained by the growth costs of debt defaults.
In the theoretical model, the firms’ vulnerability is caused mainly by the volatility
of the price of nontradables in terms of tradables. However, the view that the
volatility of the real exchange rate is mainly driven by the volatility of the price
of nontradables is controversial. On the one hand, Engel (1999) shows that the
variability of the relative price of tradable goods accounts for most of the real
exchange rate volatility in the United States. On the other hand, Mendoza (2000)
provides evidence that the variance decomposition of real exchange rate variations
between variations in the relative price of tradable goods and variations in the price
of nontradables in terms of tradables is unstable across countries and across periods,
and depends on the exchange rate regime. Table III.4 introduces terms of trade
volatility and its interaction with original sin to control for the volatility of the
relative price of tradable goods. The interaction of the exchange rate flexibility
measure and original sin remains significantly negative at the 10% level when using
the real exchange rate volatility (columns (1) to (3)). In column (1) and (2), the
financial development variable appears with a negative sign, so it is excluded in
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Tab. III.4 – Growth effects of the volatility of Exchange Rate Regime, controlling for
terms of trade volatility - 2-step system-GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004)
small sample robust correction and time effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Initial prod. per worker 0.003 0.004 -0.000 -0.017 -0.018
(0.55) (0.73) (0.03) (1.35) (1.41)
Fin. dev. -0.009** -0.010*** -0.007* -0.006
(2.65) (2.96) (1.75) (1.33)
O. sin 0.035** 0.028 0.034*** 0.004 0.006
(2.12) (1.50) (2.89) (0.15) (0.28)
REER vol. 0.284 0.258 0.249
(1.43) (1.24) (1.59)
REER vol.*O. sin -0.573* -0.514* -0.543**
(1.99) (1.79) (2.56)
LS index of exchange rate flexibility 0.004 0.004
(0.99) (1.18)
LS flex.*O. sin -0.008 -0.008*
(1.30) (1.74)
Terms of trade vol. 0.004 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003
(1.22) (0.03) (0.08) (0.52) (0.18)
Terms of trade vol.*O. sin 0.004 0.005 0.000
(0.30) (0.46) (0.01)
Control variables
Education 0.024** 0.023* 0.024** 0.018 0.018
(2.43) (1.86) (2.04) (1.43) (1.38)
Trade openness 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.007
(0.84) (0.74) (1.53) (0.99) (0.99)
Inflation -0.048 -0.044 -0.028 -0.064** -0.066**
(1.54) (1.42) (0.74) (2.37) (2.17)
Government burden -0.023*** -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.011 -0.012
(3.40) (3.30) (4.37) (1.37) (1.64)
Constant -0.067 -0.049 -0.053 -0.140* -0.150*
(0.79) (0.50) (1.02) (1.83) (1.85)
Hansen test (Prob > chi2) 0.600 0.670 0.553 0.546 0.558
Observations 68 68 74 87 87
Number of countries 43 43 44 60 60
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%
column (3). Despite this, The interaction term is still significantly negative. When
using the LS flexibility measure, and when only the linear terms-of-trade volatility
term is introduced, the interaction term has a negative impact on growth, but not
in a significant fashion (column (4)). However, when introducing the interaction of
terms-of-trade volatility term with original sin, it becomes significant (column (5)).
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Tab. III.5 – Growth effects of the flexibility of Exchange Rate Regime, excluding
currency crisis episodes - 2-step system-GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004)
small sample robust correction and time effects
(1) (2)
Initial prod. per worker -0.001 -0.006
(0.06) (0.70)
Fin. dev. -0.006 -0.008
(0.71) (1.49)
O. sin 0.020 0.024
(1.27) (1.47)
REER vol. 0.162
(0.97)
REER vol.*O. sin -0.339*
(1.74)
LS index of ER flex. 0.006**
(2.21)
LS flex.*O. sin -0.010**
(2.17)
Control variables
Education 0.022* 0.032***
(1.86) (2.90)
Trade openness 0.006 0.010**
(1.39) (2.15)
Inflation -0.061** -0.072**
(2.30) (2.54)
Government burden -0.018** -0.011*
(2.25) (1.78)
Constant -0.055 -0.092
(0.49) (1.52)
Hansen test (Prob > chi2) 0.467 0.437
Observations 84 124
Number of countries 49 73
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%
Table III.5 presents further robustness checks. The question tackled here is the
role of currency crises. Currency crisis episodes are eliminated from the sample to
check whether the negative growth effect of the interaction between original sin and
exchange rate volatility is limited to episodes of financial turmoil. A currency crisis
episode is defined by the two following conditions :
– There is a substantial depreciation : the nominal exchange rate change within
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one year is greater than 25% and exceeds by at least 10% the exchange
rate change of the previous year, which is the definition of a currency crisis
suggested by Frankel and Rose (1996).
– The depreciation follows a peg. The periods of pegged exchange rate are
determined by referring to the classification of LS. Besides, the year of the
depreciation must not be classified by LS as a peg.
The currency crisis episodes are defined so as to detect temporary and substantial
disruptions of pegs that result in exchange rate volatility and thus could be
misleadingly taken as the outcome of a flexible exchange rate regime. It is essential
to remove them to confirm the relative benefit of fixed exchange rate regimes. Again,
the control variables have the expected signs or, at worst, are not significant. As for
the variables of interest, the results remain robust : when considering real exchange
rate standard deviations, the interaction term is significant at the 10% level, and
when considering the LS index of exchange rate flexibility, it is significant at the
5% level. This shows that the particularly negative impact of flexible exchange rate
regimes in dollarized countries highlighted before is not due to financial turmoil
episodes.
Table III.6 tries to answer a legitimate question : are the results due to the fact
that original sin is very high in developing countries and low in industrial economies
in general ? Then the results could reflect only the fact that exchange rate flexibility
is bad for growth in emerging economies as other authors have already shown,
without proving necessarily the role of dollarization. This objection is justified by the
observation that original sin is very correlated with the fact of being a developing or
industrial country (see Figure III.4 and the correlation between initial productivity
and original sin in Appendix C). A dummy for industrial countries and its interaction
with exchange rate flexibility measures are thus added. The results are robust : when
using the standard deviation of the real exchange rate (columns (1) and (2)), the
coefficient of the interaction term remains negative at the 10% level even when the
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Tab. III.6 – Growth effects of the flexibility of Exchange Rate Regime, industrial
versus developing countries - 2-step system-GMM estimation with Windmeijer
(2004) small sample robust correction and time effects
(1) (2) (4) (5)
Initial prod. per worker 0.000 -0.003 0.006 0.007
(0.04) (0.23) (0.52) (0.58)
Fin. dev. -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004
(0.91) (0.97) (0.64) (0.56)
O. sin 0.036** 0.056 0.036* 0.042
(2.17) (1.53) (1.74) (1.36)
REER vol. 0.225 0.597
(1.21) (1.39)
REER vol.*O. sin -0.435* -0.801*
(1.89) (1.71)
LS index of exchange rate flexibility 0.006 0.009
(1.66) (1.09)
LS flex.*O. sin -0.011** -0.014*
(2.02) (1.76)
Industrial country 0.002 0.028 -0.008 -0.003
(0.20) (1.36) (0.59) (0.13)
ER vol.*Industrial country -0.314
(1.12)
ER flex.*Industrial country -0.002
(0.47)
Control variables
Education 0.024** 0.023* 0.018 0.018
(2.43) (1.86) (1.43) (1.38)
Trade openness 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007
(0.84) (0.74) (0.99) (0.99)
Inflation -0.048 -0.044 -0.064** -0.066**
(1.54) (1.42) (2.37) (2.17)
Government burden -0.023*** -0.028*** -0.011 -0.012
(3.40) (3.30) (1.37) (1.64)
Constant -0.067 -0.049 -0.140* -0.150*
(0.79) (0.50) (1.83) (1.85)
Hansen test (Prob > chi2) 0.550 0.608 0.284 0.212
Observations 90 90 129 129
Number of countries 51 51 75 75
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%
interaction of the industrial country dummy and volatility is added. When using the
LS index of exchange rate flexibility (columns (3) and (4)), the significance of the
interaction term remains significant at the 5% or 10% level. The significance of the
interaction term certainly declines with both measures, but remains at reasonable
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levels considering the sample size and the high correlation between the industrial
country dummy and original sin.
As a conclusion, the nonlinear effect of exchange rate flexibility and original
sin on growth is globally robust to the inclusion of institutional quality, indebtment
measures, and terms-of-trade volatility : exchange rate volatility has a more negative
impact on productivity growth in dollarized than in non-dollarized countries.
Besides, this additional negative effect is not due to exchange rate crisis episodes.
Finally, the correlation between the industrial country dummy and original sin is
not enough to explain the significance of the interaction term : there is still enough
volatility in the original sin index to identify a significant nonlinear effect. The
threshold original sin is still significantly between 0 and 1.
5 Conclusion
As Aghion et al. (2006a), this chapter challenges the conventional view that
there is no significant difference in the growth performances of fixed and flexible
exchange rate regimes. This view has been misleadingly vehicled by the empirical
literature because usually the specificity of emerging markets financial systems is not
taken into account. But, whereas Aghion et al. (2006a) highlight the role of financial
development, this chapter focuses on original sin, which is another prominent feature
of the developing world. A theoretical model is developed, in which the higher
the share of foreign currency in external debt, the more exchange rate volatility
is detrimental to growth, which is in line with the empirical results of section 4 :
the interaction of exchange rate flexibility with original sin has a negative impact.
It also appears that exchange rate flexibility is growth-reducing in highly dollarized
countries and growth-enhancing in low dollarization countries (but this last effect is
not always significant). Consistently, the threshold original sin above which exchange
rate risk becomes detrimental to growth is estimated to be significantly between 0
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and 1. This sheds some light on the instability of the effect of exchange rate volatility
on growth in previous literature.
It is also shown that these predictions are robust to the inclusion of institutional
quality, net external debt and terms-of-trade volatility, and are not the mere reflect
of the heterogeneity between developing and industrial countries. Besides, they
are robust to the elimination of exchange rate crisis episodes. However, further
robustness checks were prevented by the lack of data : the GMM methodology could
not be used to tackle the possible contemporaneous endogeneity of original sin since
only two five-year averages were available. It was not possible either to study the
three-way interaction of exchange rate flexibility, liability dollarization and financial
development, because of the lack of data. An extension of this work would therefore
have to rely on broader datasets, either by extending the time coverage or by using
firm or industry-level information.
The study of the impact of exchange rate flexibility on growth can help address
the issue of the choice of monetary framework in a setting of financial openness
and growing cross-country capital flows. The available choices are delimited by the
”trilemma” (Obstfeld et al., 2005) : under capital mobility, policymakers cannot
attain simultaneously exchange rate stability and domestically-oriented monetary
policy. Typically, adopting an exchange rate peg entails the sacrifice of the shock
absorption capacity of exchange rate flexibility when nominal prices and wages
are sticky. This is indeed the case in this chapter’s framework. However, liability
dollarization makes it more difficult for the emerging countries that embrace financial
globalization to adopt floating exchange rates (Obstfeld, 2008; Obstfeld et al., 2008)
and explains why they exhibit ”fear of floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). This
study sheds some additional light on the reasons why developing economies find it
hard to find a comfortable resolution of the trilemma.
154 Exchange Rate Volatility and Productivity Growth
6 Appendix
Appendix A : Proofs
Derivation of the non-stochastic steady-state equilibrium
The non-stochastic steady-state equilibrium (for u = 0) is derived as follows.
Take the labor demand (III.5) and the supply of nontradable goods (III.3) and
derive the expression for Y N :
Y N =
PN
2W
(III.24)
We have also :
Y T = 1 (III.25)
Use then the relative demand for tradable and nontradable goods (III.9), where
the consumptions for tradables and nontradables are replaced using the equilibrium
equations in the tradable and nontradable markets (III.16) and (III.17) and where
Y N and Y T are replaced using (III.24) and (III.25), to derive :
(
PN
W
)1+ 1
θ
=
P T
W
(
1− γ
γ
2 (1− (1 + r∗)d)
) 1
θ
(III.26)
For (III.26) to be well-defined, we must assume that 1− (1 + r∗)d > 0.
PN/W is implicitely defined by (III.26) as an increasing function of P T/W .
The non-stochastic wage setting equation, derived from (III.12), gives :
W =
ρ
ρ− 1v
′(L)PC (III.27)
Using the labor demand (III.5), the supply of nontradables and tradables (III.24)
and (III.2), the consumption basket (III.7), and the price index (III.11), (III.27)
yields :
1
[γ(P T/W )1−θ/+ (1− γ)(PN/W )1−θ] 11−θ
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=
ρ
ρ− 1v
′
([
PN
2W
]2)[
γ
1
θ (1− (1 + r∗)d) θ−1θ + (1− γ) 1θ
(
PN
2W
) θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
(III.28)
(III.28) defines an implicit decreasing relation between PN/W and P T/W . We
show below that (III.26) and (III.28) admit a unique solution for PN/W and P T/W
which do not depend on the exchange rate regime.
Using one of the two monetary rules (III.13) or (III.14), along with the price
index (III.11), one can derive W , P T , PN and P .
Once P T , PN and W are determined, we can infer Y N using (III.24). Then, CN
can be determined using (III.16) and CT using (III.17). Finally, C can be derived
from (III.7). So there is a unique solution for
{
Y N , Y T , CN , CT , C, L, PN , P T , P,W
}
.
Notice that since PN/W does not depend on the exchange rate regime, neither does
Y N . As a consequence, with no uncertainty, the allocations and relative prices are
the same under both regimes.
Π can then be derived from (III.6). Finally, the amount of nominal monetary
balances required to satisfy the policy objective is derived from C, P and the demand
for money (III.10). T must then satisfy the steady-state version of the government
budget constraint (III.15) gM/(1 + g) = PT , with At+1 = (1 + g)At and g the
steady-state growth rate.
Existence and unicity of the steady-state equilibrium
PN/W is implicitely defined by (III.26) as a function of P T/W . Denote by PN1 (.)
this function.
The LHS of (III.28) is decreasing in P
N
W
and P
T
W
while the RHS is increasing in
PN
W
. (III.28) defines another implicit relation between PN/W and P T/W . Denote
this implicit function of P T/W as PN2 (.). P
N
2 is strictly decreasing in P
T/W with
PN2 (0) > 0 and (P
N
2 )
−1(0) > 0. Since PN1 (.) is continuous and strictly increasing,
with limPN1 (P
T )PT→0 = 0 and limPN1 (P
T )PT→∞ =∞, there exists only one positive
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intersection of PN1 and P
N
2 . This intersection defines P
N/W and P T/W . PN/W and
P T/W do not depend on the exchange rate regime.
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, P T is fixed. We can then inferW = P T 1
PT /W
and then PN = W P
N
W
. P is then derived from the price index (III.11).
Under a flexible exchange rate regime, P/W can be derived using the price index
(III.11). Since P is fixed, we can derive W = P 1
P/W
, and from it P T = W P
T
W
and
PN = W P
N
W
.
Proof of Proposition 1
– From Lemma 1, if u < 0 :
yNflex > yNfix ⇔ γ(θ+1) < θ+γ+(1−γ)η(1−α)⇔ (1−γ)[θ+η(1−α)] > 0 :
always true.
pNflex− pTflex < pNfix− pTfix ⇔ θ+1 > θ+γ+(1− γ)η(1−α)⇔ α > 1− 1
η
,
true for α = 1.
– From Lemma 1, yNflex and pNflex − pTflex are both decreasing in (1− α).
Proof of Proposition 2
– From Lemma 1, we derive :
yNflex+pNflex−pTflex = κ(1 + γ)(η + 1)u
θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α) < y
Nfix+pNfix−pTfix = 2κ(η + 1)u
θ + 1
if u < 0 :
⇔ (κ(1 + γ)(η + 1)
θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α) >
2κ(η + 1)
θ + 1
⇔ κ(1 + γ)(θ + 1) > 2κ[θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α)]
after rearranging :
⇔ α > 1− κ(1− θ)
η
true for α = 1 since θ < 1
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– yNflex + pNflex − pTflex decreasing in (1− α).
Proof of Lemma 2
Consider F (Π(u, σ2)) and take a second-order expansion around u = 0 and
σ2 = 0 :
F (Π(u, σ2)) = F (Π(0, 0)) +
∂F (Π)
∂u
(0, 0)u+
∂F (Π)
∂σ2
(0, 0)σ2
+
1
2
∂2F (Π)
∂u∂σ2
(0, 0)uσ2 +
1
2
∂2F (Π)
∂u2
(0, 0)u2 +
1
2
∂2F (Π)
(∂σ2)2
(0, 0)σ4
Its expected value can be approximated by (terms of higher order than σ2 are
neglected) :
EFΠ(σ2) = F (Π(0, 0)) +
[
∂F (Π)
∂σ2
(0, 0) +
1
2
∂2F (Π)
∂u2
(0, 0)
]
σ2
We have :
∂F (Π)
∂σ2
(0, 0) = f(Π(0, 0))
∂Π
∂σ2
(0, 0)
∂2F (Π)
∂u2
(0, 0) = f(Π(0, 0))
∂Π
∂u2
(0, 0) + f ′(Π(0, 0))
(
∂Π
∂u
(0, 0)
)2
So, if |f ′| sufficiently high, then :
EFΠ(σ2) =
1
2
f ′(Π(0, 0))
(
∂Π
∂u
(0, 0)
)2
When u small, Π(u, 0) = Π(pi + 1) with pi = p¯iu, so ∂Π
∂u
(0, 0) = Πp¯i
As a consequence, since f ′(Πflex(0, 0)) = f ′(Πfix(0, 0)) = f ′(Π(0, 0)) :
EF (Πfix)− EF (Πflex) = 1
2
f ′(Π(0, 0))Π[(p¯ifix)2 − (p¯iflex)2]σ2
We have V (pi) = p¯i2σ2, so :
EF (Πfix)− EF (Πflex) = 1
2
f ′(Π(0, 0))Π[V (pifix)− V (piflex)]
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So, if f ′ < 0 (F concave), then EF (Πfix) − EF (Πflex) is of the same sign as
V (piflex)− V (pifix).
Proof of Proposition 3
From Lemma 1, we derive :
piflex(u) =
[θ + γ + κ(1− θ)](η + 1)
θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α) u
pifix(u) =
[θ + 1 + κ(1− θ)](η + 1)
θ + 1
u
Thus :
V (piflex) =
[θ + γ + κ(1− θ)]2(η + 1)2
[θ + γ + (1− γ)η(1− α)]2 σ
2 =
(
∂piflex
∂u
)2
σ2
V (pifix) =
[θ + 1 + κ(1− θ)]2(η + 1)2
(θ + 1)2
σ2 =
(
∂pifix
∂u
)2
σ2
– V (piflex) > V (pifix) ⇔ [θ + γ + κ(1 − θ)](θ + 1) > [θ + 1 + κ(1 − θ)][θ + γ +
(1− γ)η(1− α)]
⇔ α > 1− κ(1−θ)
η[1+κ+(1−κ)θ] : true for α = 1 since θ < 1.
– ∂(V (pi
fix)−V (piflex))
∂α
= −∂V (pi
flex)
∂α
∂V (piflex)
∂α
is of the same sign as ∂pi
flex
∂u∂α
, which is positive, so ∂(V (pi
fix)−V (piflex))
∂α
< 0.
– V (pifix) > V (piflex) ⇔ α > 1 − κ(1−θ)
η[1+κ+(1−κ)θ] and 1 − κ(1−θ)η[1+κ+(1−κ)θ] > 0 ⇔
κ(1−θ)
η[1+κ+(1−κ)θ] < 1
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Appendix B : Countries in sample
Asia Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa
China Argentina* Kenya (only 95-99)*
Hong Kong, China* Bolivia (only 95-99) Mauritius*
India* Brazil* South Africa
Indonesia* Chile Zimbabwe (only 95-99)*
Korea, Rep.* Colombia Industrial countries
Malaysia Costa Rica Australia
Pakistan Dominican Republic Austria (only 00-04)
Philippines Ecuador Belgium (only 00-04)
Sri Lanka* El Salvador* Canada
Thailand* Guatemala* Denmark
Transition countries Jamaica* Finland
Bulgaria Mexico* France (only 00-04)
Czech Republic Nicaragua Germany
Cyprus (only 95-99) Panama (only 95-99)* Greece
Estonia* Papua New Guinea (only 95-99) Ireland
Hungary (only 00-04) Peru* Italy
Kazakhstan (only 00-04)* Trinidad and Tobago 95-99** Japan
Latvia* Trinidad and Tobago 00-04 Netherlands (only 00-04)
Lithuania* Uruguay New Zealand
Moldova (only 95-99) Venezuela, RB (only 95-99) Norway
Poland Middle East and North Africa Portugal
Romania (only 00-04) Algeria (only 95-99) Spain
Slovak Republic Bahrain (only 95-99) Sweden
Slovenia* Egypt, Arab Rep. (only 00-04)* Switzerland
Turkey* Israel United Kingdom
Ukraine 95-99 Oman (only 95-99)* United States
Ukraine 00-04** Morocco**
Tunisia
* : Not in the REER volatility sample.
** : Not in the LS flexibility index sample.
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Appendix C : Descriptive statistics
Summary statistics 1995-2004 (data in five-year averages)
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Productivity growth 134 0,02 0,02 -0,05 0,10
Initial productivity 134 26413,24 18668,75 2172,53 70091,68
Financial development 134 0,53 0,39 0,03 1,63
Education 134 83,79 28,43 14,00 158,76
Trade openness 134 81,38 46,03 18,11 322,35
Inflation 134 0,08 0,11 -0,02 0,78
Government burden 134 15,87 5,17 5,52 29,21
Kaufman governance index 134 3,19 4,83 -7,06 11,69
Net external debt 134 0,24 0,42 -2,15 1,88
REER vol. 90 0,06 0,04 0,01 0,19
LS Index of ER flex. 129 2,40 1,18 1,00 4,00
Original sin 134 0,86 0,22 0,20 1,00
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Chapitre IV
Conclusion Ge´ne´rale et
Orientations de Recherche
Dans cette the`se, nous avons e´tudie´ l’impact du risque de liquidite´ et de
production sur le lien entre flux de capitaux et croissance d’une part, entre politique
de change et croissance d’autre part. Ainsi, nous avons pu proposer des explications
a` certains paradoxes de la finance internationale : le paradoxe de l’allocation et le
paradoxe du re´gime de change. Plus pre´cise´ment, ces paradoxes font re´fe´rence, pour
le premier, a` la relation ”perverse” entre croissance et flux de capitaux ; pour le
deuxie`me, a` l’absence de relation stable entre re´gimes de change et performances
e´conomiques.
Les deux premiers chapitres sont consacre´s au paradoxe des flux de capitaux. Le
premier tente d’expliquer comment croissance de la productivite´ globale des facteurs
(PGF) et sorties de capitaux peuvent eˆtre associe´s de manie`re endoge`ne. Il peut ainsi
mettre en relation les re´cents de´se´quilibres mondiaux avec la croissance des pays
e´mergents. Le deuxie`me, quant a` lui, applique une de´marche comptable, ou` ce ne
sont pas tant les liens de causalite´ entre flux et croissance qui sont e´tudie´s que leur
cohe´rence dans la dimension inter-pays. En effet, dans chaque pays, la croissance
de la productivite´, quelle que soit sa source, endoge`ne ou exoge`ne, implique un
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certain montant de sorties ou entre´es de capitaux. Le deuxie`me chapitre tente ainsi
de re´concilier les flux pre´dits par le mode`le de croissance ne´oclassique avec les flux
observe´s.
Dans le mode`le du premier chapitre, l’inte´gration financie`re entre deux pays
ayant des niveaux de de´veloppement financier diffe´rents permet de reproduire les
faits stylise´s observe´s depuis les anne´es 1990, a` savoir : les de´se´quilibres mondiaux
et la croissance relative des pays e´mergents, cette dernie`re ayant pour origine a` la
fois une augmentation relative de la PGF et du capital. La source de la croissance
de la PGF re´side dans une meilleure allocation du capital entre deux technologies,
l’une plus productive que l’autre mais soumise a` des chocs de liquidite´ (capital de
long terme), tandis que l’autre peut eˆtre utilise´e comme ”re´serve” pour faire face a`
ces chocs (capital de court terme). Le me´canisme du mode`le est le suivant. Dans le
pays e´mergent, dont le de´veloppement financier est faible, le de´faut d’assurance des
chocs de liquidite´ se traduit par des contraintes financie`res : les entreprises doivent
sur-investir dans les actifs liquides (titres de dette et capital de court terme). Ceux-ci
constituent une e´pargne de pre´caution. En conse´quence, les ressources disponibles
pour investir dans le capital de long terme sont moindres. En autarcie, la demande
nette de titres de dette est nulle, donc c’est le capital de court terme qui constitue
l’e´pargne de pre´caution du pays e´mergent. Lorsque le marche´ des titres s’ouvre, le
pays industriel, dont le secteur financier est plus de´veloppe´, peut offrir des titres
au pays e´mergent avec un rendement plus e´leve´, car les ressources y sont mieux
alloue´es. Cette augmentation du taux d’inte´reˆt a deux effets sur le pays e´mergent :
(i) au sein de son e´pargne de pre´caution, le titre de dette est substitue´ au capital de
court terme ; (ii) des ressources supple´mentaires sont de´gage´es, permettant d’investir
plus dans le capital de long terme. Le mode`le statique implique donc a` la fois une
augmentation de la dette du pays industriel et de la PGF dans le pays e´mergent,
graˆce a` une meilleure allocation du capital. La calibration d’un mode`le a` horizon
infini montre que ces deux phe´nome`nes sont e´tale´s dans le temps, ce qui concorde
avec les donne´es. Il peut aussi rendre compte de l’augmentation du stock de capital
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agre´ge´ dans le pays e´mergent.
Le deuxie`me chapitre s’appuie sur le mode`le de croissance ne´oclassique afin
d’expliquer la relation positive entre flux de capitaux et croissance. Le point
de de´part est la de´marche de Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007), qui consiste a` (i)
reconstituter le niveau de flux compatible avec la croissance observe´e, notamment
telle qu’elle se de´compose entre croissance du capital par teˆte et croissance de la PGF,
puis a` (ii) comparer ces flux pre´dits aux flux observe´s. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007)
trouvent une corre´lation ne´gative entre ces derniers, ce qui constitue le ”paradoxe de
l’allocation”. En particulier, le mode`le de croissance ne´oclassique pre´dit que les pays
ou` la croissance de la PGF a e´te´ la plus forte auraient duˆ recevoir plus de capitaux.
Or, ils en ont rec¸u moins.
Nous tentons d’expliquer ce paradoxe de l’allocation par la pre´sence d’un risque
d’investissement individuel non assurable. Ainsi, le mode`le de croissance ne´oclassique
est enrichi d’un choc sur le rendement du capital. On distingue alors ”l’approche
du portefeuille”, ou` la part d’actifs sans risque dans le portefeuille importe, de
”l’approche sans risque”, correspondant au mode`le de Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007).
Dans l’approche du portefeuille, les investisseurs s’auto-assurent contre leur risque
individuel en de´tenant des titres sans risque. Ainsi, un pays ayant une croissance de
la productivite´ e´leve´e investit plus dans sa production domestique, mais il augmente
ainsi son niveau de risque. Les agents domestiques cherchent donc a` s’auto-assurer
en de´tenant des titres sans risque a` l’e´tranger. Les flux entrants pre´dits sont donc
ne´gativement corre´le´s a` la croissance de la PGF, contrairement a` l’approche sans
risque, et conforme´ment a` ce qu’on observe. On retrouve alors une corre´lation
positive entre flux pre´dits et flux observe´s, sur le meˆme e´chantillon que Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2007), a` savoir 66 pays entre 1980 et 2000. C’est donc la croissance de
la PGF, qui e´tait a` la source du paradoxe dans l’approche sans risque, qui contribue
a` le re´soudre dans l’approche du portefeuille. Il faut ajouter a` cela une autre raison
du succe`s de l’approche du portefeuille : les pays ayant une faible part de capital
dans leur portefeuille en de´but de pe´riode doivent substituer des titres sans risque a`
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du capital, et doivent donc recevoir des entre´es de capitaux, selon le mode`le. Or, on
observe bien une corre´lation ne´gative entre la part de capital dans le portefeuille en
de´but de pe´riode et les entre´es de capitaux, ce qui contribue e´galement a` re´soudre
le paradoxe.
Enfin, le troisie`me chapitre s’inte´resse au choix de re´gime de change et a` son
impact sur la croissance. La litte´rature empirique sur la question n’a pas mis en
e´vidence de lien robuste entre la flexibilite´ du taux de change et la croissance. En
particulier, la stabilite´ du taux de change ne semble avoir d’impact positif que dans
les pays en de´veloppement. Aghion et al. (2006a) expliquent ce phe´nome`ne par des
niveaux de de´veloppement financier diffe´rents dans les pays e´mergents et industriels.
Lorsque les agents font face a` des contraintes de cre´dit, leur capacite´ d’innovation
re´agit de manie`re asyme´trique aux chocs sur leur collate´ral. Dans ces conditions, la
volatilite´ du collate´ral a un impact ne´gatif sur l’innovation et la croissance. Ainsi, le
re´gime de change fixe, en stabilisant le collate´ral des entreprises, favorise la croissance
dans les pays ou` les contraintes de cre´dit sont fortes. Ce chapitre tient compte de
la dollarisation de la dette et de son impact de´stabilisateur sur le collate´ral des
pays en de´veloppement subissant des fluctuations de taux de change. Nous montrons
the´oriquement et empiriquement que le pe´che´ originel est une source d’he´te´roge´ne´ite´
qui permettrait d’expliquer l’impact positif de la fixite´ du taux de change sur la
croissance dans les pays e´mergents. La pre´diction du mode`le, a` savoir que la stabilite´
du taux de change est d’autant plus be´ne´fique pour la croissance que la pays est
dollarise´, est confirme´e sur un panel de 77 pays entre 1995 et 2004.
Ces re´sultats sugge`rent de nouvelles orientations de recherche.
Tout d’abord, le premier chapitre e´voque un canal ine´dit par lequel l’inte´gration
financie`re affecte la PGF : l’acce`s a` des actifs liquides qui permettent de re´allouer
le capital vers des activite´s plus productives mais moins liquides. Dans cette e´tude,
ce canal n’est qu’une explication sugge´re´e, une interpre´tation des faits stylise´s. Il
serait inte´ressant de l’identifier de manie`re plus pre´cise, en e´tudiant l’impact de
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la libe´ralisation financie`re sur la structure de l’investissement dans les pays en
de´veloppement au niveau macroe´conomique. La difficulte´ principale de cet exercice
est de mesurer la structure de l’investissement. Une solution serait d’utiliser la
strate´gie d’Aghion et al. (2006b), qui utilisent la de´composition des importations
en biens d’e´quipement inte´grant diffe´rents niveaux de R&D. L’ide´e est que les
biens d’e´quipement sont en ge´ne´ral produits par les pays industriels, et que les
importations sont donc une mesure fiable de l’investissement en biens d’e´quipement
dans les pays e´mergents. De meˆme, au niveau microe´conomique, il existe encore
peu d’e´tudes e´tudiant l’impact de la libe´ralisation financie`re sur la productivite´
des firmes.1 Il serait instructif d’examiner si ce nouveau canal joue un roˆle dans la
re´partition des activite´s dans l’entreprise et entre secteurs.
Ensuite, un approfondissement de la de´marche du deuxie`me chapitre est
ne´cessaire pour ame´liorer les performances de l’approche du portefeuille. En effet,
si l’approche du portefeuille permet de mieux expliquer la direction des flux que
l’approche sans risque, elle pe´che lorsqu’il s’agit d’expliquer leur magnitude, qui est
surestime´e de plusieurs ordres de grandeur dans le mode`le. Des extensions visant a`
diminuer ces ordres de grandeur sont propose´es dans le chapitre (risque souverain,
risque d’investissement asyme´trique, travailleurs n’ayant pas acce`s aux marche´s
financiers), mais elles ne re´solvent pas le proble`me de manie`re satisfaisante et doivent
eˆtre approfondies. Au final, expliquer a` la fois la magnitude et la direction des flux
reste un de´fi a` relever. Les explications qui se fondent sur l’approche du portefeuille
devront expliquer pourquoi, dans les faits, les agents ne peuvent pas emprunter a`
hauteur de la richesse intertemporelle implique´e par le mode`le. Par exemple, en
prenant en compte d’autres frictions sur le marche´ des titres, notamment l’acce`s
limite´ de certains agents aux marche´s financiers, ou en diminuant cette richesse
intertemporelle en mode´lisant la dynamique de la PGF comme une marche ale´atoire.
Une autre direction de recherche consisterait a` ve´rifier si l’approche du por-
tefeuille peut aussi rendre compte de la composition des flux de capitaux entre
1 Celles-ci incluent Galindo et al. (2002), Gupta and Yuan (2006) et Levchenko et al. (forthcoming).
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titres de dette d’une part et actions de l’autre. La possibilite´ d’investir dans la
production e´trange`re a en effet des implications en termes de de´tention d’actions.
Selon les mode`les de portefeuille, les actifs les plus productifs constituent une part
plus importante a` la fois des portefeuilles domestique et e´tranger. Cela pourrait
expliquer pourquoi les investissements directs, contrairement aux flux de capitaux
agre´ge´s, sont positivement corre´le´s avec la croissance de la PGF (Gourinchas and
Jeanne, 2007).
Le deuxie`me chapitre a e´galement pour limite qu’il suppose la croissance de la
PGF exoge`ne. Cette hypothe`se est certes adapte´e a` la de´marche comptable qui est
adopte´e, mais elle laisse sous silence l’impact que peuvent avoir les flux de capitaux
sur la croissance. Cependant, comme le sugge`re le premier chapitre, mais aussi
d’autres e´tudes, notamment Aghion et al. (2006b), Dooley et al. (2004), Dooley
et al. (2005b) et Dooley et al. (2005a), les sorties de capitaux peuvent avoir des
effets be´ne´fiques sur la productivite´. Le mode`le du premier chapitre pourrait ainsi
eˆtre e´tendu a` un mode`le de croissance endoge`ne, ou` par exemple l’investissement
de long terme aurait des externalite´s positives sur la productivite´ globale. Ce
type d’extension pourrait donner lieu a` des e´quilibres multiples et pourrait ainsi
expliquer pourquoi les pays qui be´ne´ficient d’une forte croissance (l’Asie) sont ceux
qui connaissent des sorties de capitaux tandis que les pays dont la croissance est
plus faible sont ceux qui connaissent des entre´es de capitaux (l’Ame´rique Latine et
l’Afrique).
Quant au troisie`me chapitre, ses re´sultats empiriques sont limite´s par les donne´es.
A cause de l’e´troitesse du panel de pays et des proble`mes de coline´arite´ qui y sont
associe´s, il n’est pas possible de faire interagir le de´veloppement financier avec le
niveau de dollarisation et la flexibilite´ du taux de change dans les re´gressions. Il
n’est donc pas possible d’e´tudier de manie`re plus approfondie le roˆle respectif de
la dollarisation et du de´veloppement financier. Il n’est pas non plus possible de
traiter plus avant de la possible endoge´ne´ite´ de la dollarisation, car cette variable
n’est disponible que pour deux pe´riodes conse´cutives et peut eˆtre conside´re´e au
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mieux comme pre´de´termine´e. L’acce`s a` des donne´es plus de´taille´es et plus e´tendues
pourrait permettre de re´soudre ces proble`mes. En particulier, l’acce`s a` des donne´es
sectorielles ou de firmes pourrait limiter les proble`mes de coline´arite´, mais aussi
fournir une plus grande variabilite´ de la mesure d’acce`s au financement externe,
qui ne de´pend pas seulement du de´veloppement financier, mais aussi du secteur.
Notamment, on pourrait recourir aux mesures de de´pendance financie`re de Rajan
and Zingales (1998).
L’acce`s a` des donne´es de´sagre´ge´es ne permettrait pas seulement d’approfondir les
re´sultats obtenus sur un panel de pays, mais aussi de ve´rifier les hypothe`ses qui sont a`
la base des pre´dictions du mode`le, a` savoir l’impact asyme´trique des chocs de revenu
sur la capacite´ des firmes a` innover. En effet, c’est a` cause de cette asyme´trie que
l’impact de volatilite´ sur la croissance n’est pas nul en moyenne. Or, s’il est vrai qu’en
l’absence de contraintes de cre´dit, les chocs n’ont pas d’effet sur l’innovation et que
par conse´quent la volatilite´ a un impact neutre, il n’est pas certain qu’en pre´sence de
contraintes de cre´dit les chocs aient des effets asyme´triques. Par exemple, si les firmes
sont tre`s contraintes, un choc positif sur leur revenus leur de´gage autant de marge de
manoeuvre qu’un choc ne´gatif ne leur en enle`ve : les chocs ont des effets syme´triques.
Ainsi, dans le cas extreˆme ou` les firmes sont tre`s contraintes, la volatilite´ ne devrait
pas avoir d’impact sur la croissance. C’est lorsque les contraintes de cre´dit auxquelles
elles font face sont mode´re´es que les firmes souffrent de la volatilite´. Dans ce cas, elles
ne saturent leur contrainte de cre´dit que lorsqu’elles font face a` des chocs ne´gatifs.
L’impact de la volatilite´ macroe´conomique n’est dans ce cas pas neutre. Celle-ci n’a
donc d’effet que pour des niveaux interme´diaires de restriction d’acce`s au cre´dit.
L’impact agre´ge´ de´pend aussi de la distribution des firmes en fonction de l’acce`s au
cre´dit. Seules des donne´es microe´conomiques permettraient d’examiner ces questions
importantes pour l’e´tude de l’impact de la volatilite´ sur la croissance.
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Re´sume´
Dans cette the`se, nous e´tudions l’impact du risque de liquidite´ et de production
sur le lien entre flux de capitaux et croissance d’une part, entre politique de change
et croissance d’autre part. Ainsi, nous avons pu proposer des explications a` certains
paradoxes de la finance internationale : le paradoxe de l’allocation et le paradoxe du
re´gime de change. Plus pre´cise´ment, ces paradoxes font re´fe´rence, pour le premier,
a` la relation ”perverse” entre croissance et flux de capitaux ; pour le deuxie`me, a`
l’absence de relation stable entre re´gimes de change et performances e´conomiques.
Les deux premiers chapitres sont consacre´s au paradoxe des flux de capitaux. Le
premier tente d’expliquer comment croissance de la productivite´ globale des facteurs
et sorties de capitaux peuvent eˆtre associe´s de manie`re endoge`ne. Il peut ainsi mettre
en relation les re´cents de´se´quilibres mondiaux avec la croissance paralle`le des pays
e´mergents. Le deuxie`me, quant a` lui, applique une de´marche comptable, ou` ce ne
sont pas tant les liens de causalite´ entre flux et croissance qui sont e´tudie´s que leur
cohe´rence dans la dimension inter-pays. Dans les deux cas, la pre´sence de risque non
assurable au niveau des firmes, qu’il s’agisse de risque de production ou de risque
de liquidite´, explique la relation positive entre croissance et sorties de capitaux.
Enfin, le troisie`me chapitre s’inte´resse au choix de re´gime de change et a`
son impact sur la croissance. C’est le risque de liquidite´ et l’acce`s imparfait au
cre´dit qui justifie l’ide´e que la volatilite´ peut avoir un impact sur la croissance.
Plus particulie`rement, ce chapitre e´tablit au niveau the´orique et empirique que la
dollarisation de la dette conditionne cet impact. Il permet d’expliquer ainsi la faible
robustesse des pre´ce´dentes e´tudes empiriques sur la question.
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